Method and apparatus for detecting and handling evil twin access points
Methods and apparatus for detecting and handling evil twin access points (APs). The method and apparatus employ trusted beacons including security tokens that are broadcast by trusted APs. An Evil twin AP masquerades as a trusted AP by broadcasting beacons having the same SSID as the trusted AP, as well as other header field and information elements IE in the beacon frame body containing identical information. A sniffer on the trusted AP or in another AP that is part of a Trusted Wireless Environment (TWE) receives the beacons broadcasts by other APs in the TWE including potential evil twin APs. The content in the header and one or more IEs in received beacons are examined to determine whether a beacon is being broadcast by an evil twin. Detection of the evil twin are made by one of more of differences in MAC addresses of trusted and untrusted beacons, time jitter measurements and replay detection using timestamps in the beacons, detection of missing security tokens in untrusted beacons and detection that a security token that is mimicked by an evil twin is invalid. In one aspect, the security token is stored in a vendor-specific IE in trusted beacons that is generated by employing a secret key using a cryptographic operation operating on data in the beacon prior to the vendor-specific IE.
1. A method for detecting an evil twin access point (AP), comprising:
broadcasting, from a first IEEE 802.11-based AP comprising a trusted AP having a coverage area in which a second AP comprising an IEEE 802.11-based AP is located, a first beacon comprising a trusted beacon including a service set identifier (SSID) for the trusted AP and containing a security token generated with at least one cryptographic operation employing a secret key and containing a first timestamp generated using a clock on the trusted AP;
receiving a second beacon including the SSID and a second timestamp broadcast by the second AP;
receiving a third beacon including the SSID and a third timestamp broadcast by the second AP; and
examining the content of multiple information elements (IEs) in the second beacon including the second timestamp to detect the second beacon was broadcast by an evil twin AP by determining the first, second, and third timestamp values are the same.
2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the first beacon comprises a header followed by a beacon frame body including a plurality of IEs followed by a vendor-specific IE including a data field containing the security token, and wherein the security token is generated, at least in part by:
performing a hash over all data contained in the header and the plurality of IEs before the vendor-specific IE or data contained in at least a portion of the header and selected IEs in the plurality of IEs before the vendor-specific IE to generate a digest; and
encrypting data including at least the digest using the secret key.
3. The method of claim 2 , wherein the data field of the vendor-specific IE further comprises a nonce, and wherein the data that is encrypted with the secret key is composed of the nonce concatenated with the digest.
4. The method of claim 1 , wherein the first beacon comprises a header followed by a beacon frame body including a plurality of IEs followed by a vendor-specific IE including a data field containing the security token, and wherein the security token is generated by employing a MAC (message authentication code) or an HMAC (hash-based message authentication code) algorithm employing the secret key and using a message comprising all data contained in the header and the plurality of IEs before the vendor-specific IE or data contained in at least a portion of the header and selected IEs in the plurality of IEs before the vendor-specific IE.
5. The method of claim 1 , wherein the security token is contained in a data field of a vendor-specific IE in the trusted beacon, further comprising:
receiving a fourth beacon including the SSID and data in the data field of the vendor-specific IE broadcast by the second AP or broadcast by a third AP comprising an IEEE 802.11-based AP located in the coverage area of the first AP;
processing the security token with the secret key to generate a first value;
processing the data in the data field of the vendor-specific IE of the fourth beacon with the secret key to generate a second value; and
detecting the fourth beacon was broadcast by an evil twin AP when the first and second values do not match.
6. An access point (AP), comprising:
at least one IEEE 802.11 radio configured to support at least one PHY (Physical layer) and MAC (Media Access Channel layer) defined by an IEEE 802.11 PHY standard;
a processor, operatively coupled to the at least one IEEE 802.11 radio;
memory, coupled to the processor;
a clock; and
logic configured to,
generate a security token using at least one cryptographic operation employing a secret key;
broadcast a first beacon comprising a first trusted beacon including a service set identifier (SSID) for the AP and containing the security token and including a first timestamp generated by the clock;
receive a second beacon including the SSID and a second timestamp broadcast by a second AP;
receive a third beacon including the SSID and a third timestamp broadcast by the second AP;
extract the third timestamp from the third beacon; and
examine the content of multiple information elements (IEs) in the second beacon including the second timestamp to detect the second beacon was broadcast by an evil twin AP by determining the first, second, and third timestamps are the same.
7. The AP of claim 6 , wherein the first beacon comprises a header followed by a beacon frame body including a plurality of IEs followed by a vendor-specific IE including a data field containing the security token, and wherein the security token is generated by:
employing a hash or cryptographic hash over all data contained in the header and the plurality of IEs before the vendor-specific IE or data contained in at least a portion of the header and selected IEs in the plurality of IEs before the vendor-specific IE to create a digest; and
encrypting data including at least the digest using the secret key.
8. The AP of claim 7 , wherein the data field of the vendor-specific IE further comprises a nonce, and wherein the data that is encrypted with the secret key is composed of the nonce concatenated with the digest.
9. The AP of claim 6 , wherein the first beacon comprises a header followed by a beacon frame body including a plurality of IEs followed by a vendor-specific IE including a data field containing the security token, and wherein the security token is generated by employing a MAC (message authentication code) or an HMAC (hash-based message authentication code) algorithm employing the secret key and using a message comprising all data contained in the header and the plurality of IEs before the vendor-specific IE or data contained in at least a portion of the header and selected IEs in the plurality of IEs before the vendor-specific IE.
10. The AP of claim 6 , wherein the security token is contained in a data field of a vendor-specific IE in the first beacon, and wherein the logic is further configured to:
receive a fourth beacon including the SSID broadcast by the second AP or broadcast by a third AP comprising an IEEE 802.11-based AP, the fourth beacon including data in a data field of a vendor-specific IE;
process the security token with the secret key to generate a first value;
process the data in the data field of the vendor-specific IE of the fourth beacon with the secret key to generate a second value; and
detect the fourth beacon was broadcast by an evil twin AP when the first and second values do not match.
11. The AP of claim 6 , wherein the security token is contained in a data field of a vendor-specific IE in the first beacon, wherein the AP includes logic to receive a fourth beacon broadcast by the second AP or a third AP comprising an IEEE 802.11-based AP including data in the data field of the vendor-specific IE, and wherein execution of the instructions further enables the first IEEE 802.11 AP to:
process the security token with the secret key to generate a first value;
process the data in the data field of the vendor-specific IE of the fourth beacon with the secret key to generate a second value; and
detect the fourth beacon was broadcast by an evil twin AP when the first and second values do not match.
12. A non-transitory machine-readable medium having instructions stored thereon comprising one or more software modules that are configured to be executed on a processor in a first IEEE 802.11 access point (AP) to enable the first IEEE 802.11 AP to:
generate a security token using at least one cryptographic operation employing a secret key;
generate a beacon frame including a service set identifier (SSID) for the first IEEE 802.11 AP and including the security token, the beacon frame to be broadcast as a first beacon comprising a first trusted beacon by the first IEEE 802.11 AP; and
examine content in multiple information elements (IEs) in a second beacon that is broadcast by a second IEEE 802.11 AP and received by the first IEEE 802.11 AP to detect the second beacon was broadcast by an evil twin AP,
wherein the first beacon comprises a header followed by a beacon frame body including a plurality of IEs followed by a vendor-specific IE, and wherein the security token is generated by:
employing a hash or cryptographic hash over all data contained in the header and the plurality of IEs before the vendor-specific IE or data contained in at least a portion of the header and selected IEs in the plurality of IEs before the vendor-specific IE to create a digest; and
encrypting data including at least the digest using the secret key.
13. The non-transitory machine-readable medium of claim 12 , wherein the first beacon comprises a header followed by a beacon frame body including a plurality of IEs followed by a vendor-specific IE, and wherein the security token is generated by employing a MAC (message authentication code) or an HMAC (hash-based message authentication code) algorithm employing the secret key and using a message comprising all data contained in the header and the plurality of IEs before the vendor-specific IE or data contained in at least a portion of the header and selected IEs in the plurality of IEs before the vendor-specific IE.