IP Library Granted Patent US 11,570,201
Granted Patent B2
US 11,570,201 · App. 17/031,083 · Granted Jan 31, 2023

System and method for detecting and blocking malicious attacks on a network

Inventors: Omri Mallis (Tel Aviv, IL); Eilon Lotem (Tel Aviv, IL); Dima Krasner (Tel Aviv, IL)
Assignee: Securing SAM Ltd.
H04L63/1441H04L63/0236H04L63/0245H04L63/0263H04L63/1416
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 11,570,201
App. No.
17/031,083
Granted
Jan 31, 2023
Kind
B2
Abstract

Systems and method of detecting and blocking malicious attacks on a computer network, including: receiving, by a memory constrained gateway in communication with the computer network, a communication request from at least one device, identifying the type of the at least one device based on the received communication request, verifying that the device is of an allowed type from a predetermined list of allowed device types, checking at least one signature of the received communication request of the allowed device to detect malicious signatures, and blocking communication requests from devices with at least one malicious signature.

Claims (51)

1. A method comprising:

receiving, by a memory constrained gateway in communication with a computer network, a communication request from at least one unverified device to communicate in the computer network;

wherein the communication request comprises at least one signature and at least one device type;

receiving, by the memory constrained gateway, at least one communication rule based on the at least one device type;

wherein the at least one communication rule comprises at least one deep packet inspection (DPI) rule with at least one condition for inspecting data traffic, at least one security protocol, or any combination thereof;

utilizing, by the memory constrained gateway, at least one processing-efficient DPI algorithm based on the at least one DPI rule for the at least one device type of the at least one unverified device to perform a determination, based on an inspection of data packets in the at least one signature for malicious content, when to:

allow the at least one unverified device to communicate in the computer network as a trusted device, or

block the at least one unverified device to communicate in the computer network as a potentially malicious device; and

reducing, by the memory constrained gateway, memory usage, processing power, or both in the memory constrained gateway during the determination by performing at least one of:

(i) limiting the inspection of the data packets in the at least one signature to a portion of the data packets based on the at least one condition for inspecting data traffic;

(ii) reducing a number of data packets for the inspection of the at least one signature in the communication request of the at least one unverified device;

(iii) prioritizing the at least one communication rule for the at least one unverified device for the inspection of the at least one signature, based on a severity of possible exploitation, when more than one unverified device from the at least one unverified device is connected to the computer network at once; or

(iv) flushing the at least one communication rule from a memory of the memory constrained gateway.

2. The method of claim 1 , further comprising determining, by the memory constrained gateway, that the at least one device type in the communication request of the at least one unverified device is an allowed device type to communicate on the computer network.

3. The method of claim 1 , wherein the at least one device type is an allowed device type; and

further comprising determining, by the memory constrained gateway, from data packets in the at least one signature that at least one of port number and origin of communication of the at least one unverified device corresponds to the allowed device type to permit the at least one unverified device to communicate on the computer network.

4. The method of claim 1 , further comprising blocking, by the memory constrained gateway, the at least one unverified device to communicate over the computer network when the at least one unverified device is unidentified as having an allowed device type.

5. The method of claim 1 ,

wherein the at least one communication rule comprises at least one condition for the inspection; and

wherein the at least one condition for the inspection comprises at least one of: known vulnerabilities for the at least one device type, protocol of the at least one unverified device, port number of the at least one unverified device, an origin of communication, a number of bytes to inspect for each session, and a priority of the at least one communication rule.

6. The method of claim 1 , wherein the receiving of the at least one communication rule comprises receiving the at least one communication rule from a gateway server in communication with the computer network.

7. The method of claim 1 , further comprising deleting, by the memory constrained gateway, the at least one communication rule once the at least one unverified device stops to communicate over the computer network.

8. The method of claim 1 , further comprising, by the memory constrained gateway, initiating hardware acceleration.

9. The method according to claim 1 , further comprising blocking, by the memory constrained gateway, the at least one unverified device to communicate in the computer network when determining that the at least one signature appears in a malicious signature database.

10. A system, comprising:

a memory constrained gateway in communication with a computer network; and

a malicious signature database coupled to the memory constrained gateway;

wherein the memory constrained gateway is configured to:

receive a communication request from at least one unverified device to communicate in the computer network;

wherein the communication request comprises at least one signature and at least one device type;

receive at least one communication rule based on the at least one device type;

wherein the at least one communication rule comprises at least one deep packet inspection (DPI) rule with at least one condition for inspecting data traffic, at least one security protocol, or any combination thereof;

utilize at least one processing-efficient DPI algorithm based on the at least one DPI rule for the at least one device type of the at least one unverified device to perform a determination, based on an inspection of data packets in the at least one signature for malicious content, when to:

allow the at least one unverified device to communicate in the computer network as a trusted device, or

block the at least one unverified devices to communicate in the computer network as a potentially malicious device; and

reduce memory usage, processing power, or both in the memory constrained gateway during the determination by performing at least one of:

(i) to limit the inspection of the data packets in the at least one signature to a portion of the data packets based on the at least one condition for inspecting data traffic;

(ii) to reduce a number of data packets for the inspection of the at least one signature in the communication request of the at least one unverified device;

(iii) to prioritize the at least one communication rule for the at least one unverified device for the inspection of the at least one signature, based on a severity of possible exploitation, when more than one unverified device from the at least one unverified device is connected to the computer network at once; or

(iv) to flush the at least one communication rule from a memory of the memory constrained gateway.

11. The system of claim 10 , wherein the memory constrained gateway is further configured to determine that the at least one device type in the communication request of the at least one unverified device is an allowed device type to communicate on the computer network.

12. The system of claim 10 , wherein the at least one device type is an allowed device type; and

wherein the memory constrained gateway is further configured to determine from data packets in the at least one signature that at least one of port number and origin of communication of the at least one unverified device corresponds to the allowed device type to permit the at least one unverified device to communicate on the computer network.

13. The system of claim 10 , wherein the memory constrained gateway is further configured to block the at least one unverified device to communicate over the computer network when the at least one unverified device is unidentified as having an allowed device type.

14. The system of claim 10 ,

wherein the at least one communication rule comprises at least one condition for the inspection; and

wherein the at least one condition for the inspection comprises at least one of: known vulnerabilities for the at least one device type, protocol of the at least one unverified device, port number of the at least one unverified device, an origin of communication, a number of bytes to inspect for each session, and a priority of the at least one communication rule.

15. The system of claim 10 , wherein the memory constrained gateway is further configured to receive the at least one communication rule by receiving the at least one communication rule from a gateway server in communication with the computer network.

16. The system of claim 10 , wherein the memory constrained gateway is further configured to delete the at least one communication rule once the at least one unverified device stops to communicate over the computer network.

17. The system of claim 10 , wherein the memory constrained gateway is further configured to initiate hardware acceleration.

18. The system according to claim 10 , wherein the memory constrained gateway is further configured to block the at least one unverified device to communicate in the computer network when determining that the at least one signature appears in the malicious signature database.

Assignments (6)
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Jul 21, 2026
From: KREOS CAPITAL VI (EXPERT FUND) LP
To: SECURING SAM LTD.
Reel/Frame 075346/0922 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jul 21, 2026
From: MALLIS, OMRI; LOTEM, EILON; KRASNER, DIMA
To: SECURING SAM LTD.
Reel/Frame 075347/0424 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Nov 11, 2024
From: SECURING SAM LTD
To: KREOS CAPITAL VI (EXPERT FUND) LP
Reel/Frame 069196/0632 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Aug 17, 2023
From: SECURING SAM LTD
To: KREOS CAPITAL VI (EXPERT FUND) L.P.
Reel/Frame 064616/0478 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jun 17, 2021
From: MALLIS, OMRI; LOTEM, EILON; KRASNER, DIMA
To: SECURING SAM LTD.
Reel/Frame 056569/0796 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Dec 9, 2020
From: SECURING SAM LTD.
To: KREOS CAPITAL VI (EXPERT FUND) L.P.
Reel/Frame 054584/0817 →
Continuity (2)
Provisional Application 62906175 · Sep 26, 2019
Related Publication 20210099481A1 · Apr 1, 2021