Secure, low-cost, privacy-preserving biometric card
One example method includes generating a biometric of a user, requesting, and receiving, biometric data from a card, comparing the biometric data with the biometric, and when the biometric data matches data of the biometric, authorizing a transaction requested by a user using the card. The request for biometric data may identify what particular type of biometric data is compatible with the device making the request, and the biometric data may be a subset of the data that makes up the biometric.
1. A method, comprising:
receiving, by a device, a biometric from a user to generate first biometric data;
after the first biometric data is generated, sending, by the device, a request for second biometric data from a card, wherein the request includes a type of the first biometric data generated by the device;
randomly selecting and sending to the device, by the card, a subset of second biometric data, wherein the second biometric data comprises data that remains in the card after elimination of biometric data which is stored in the card but does not fulfill the type of the first biometric data in the request;
comparing the randomly selected subset of the second biometric data with the first biometric data;
when the randomly selected subset of the second biometric data matches the first biometric data, authorizing a transaction requested by a user using the card; and
when the randomly selected subset of the second biometric data does not match the first biometric data, denying the transaction request by the user using the card and locking the card,
wherein comparing the randomly selected subset of the second biometric data results in determining that an identity of the user cannot be derived from the randomly selected subset of the second biometric data, and
wherein the second biometric data encoded on the card comprises respective biometric datasets for each of a plurality of biometrics of the user.
2. The method as recited in claim 1 , wherein the randomly selected subset of the second biometric data includes all of the biometric data encoded on the card.
3. The method as recited in claim 1 , wherein the randomly selected subset of the second biometric data is encoded on the card.
4. The method as recited in claim 1 , wherein when the randomly selected subset of the second biometric data matches data of the biometric, further comprising transmitting a notification that the transaction has been authorized.
5. The method as recited in claim 1 , wherein the card does not include any visible biometrics of the user.
6. The method as recited in claim 1 , wherein the first biometric data is not persistently stored anywhere.
7. The method as recited in claim 1 , wherein the second biometric data is not persistently stored anywhere except on the card.
8. A non-transitory storage medium having stored therein instructions that are executable by one or more hardware processors to perform operations comprising:
receiving, by a device, a biometric from a user to generate first biometric data;
after the first biometric data is generated, sending, by the device, a request for second biometric data from a card, wherein the request includes a type of the first biometric data generated by the device;
randomly selecting and sending to the device, by the card, a subset of second biometric data, wherein the second biometric data comprises data that remains in the card after elimination of biometric data which is stored in the card but does not fulfill the type of the first biometric data in the request;
comparing the randomly selected subset of the second biometric data with the first biometric data;
when the randomly selected subset of the second biometric data matches the first biometric data, authorizing a transaction requested by a user using the card; and
when the randomly selected subset of the second biometric data does not match the first biometric data, denying the transaction request by the user using the card and locking the card,
wherein comparing the randomly selected subset of the second biometric data results in determining that an identity of the user cannot be derived from the randomly selected subset of the second biometric data, and
wherein the second biometric data encoded on the card comprises respective biometric datasets for each of a plurality of biometrics of the user.
9. The non-transitory storage medium as recited in claim 8 , wherein the randomly selected subset of the second biometric data includes all of the biometric data encoded on the card.
10. The non-transitory storage medium as recited in claim 8 , wherein the randomly selected subset of the second biometric data is encoded on the card.
11. The non-transitory storage medium as recited in claim 8 , wherein when the randomly selected subset of the second biometric data matches data of the biometric, further comprising transmitting a notification that the transaction has been authorized.
12. The non-transitory storage medium as recited in claim 8 , wherein the card does not include any visible biometrics of the user.
13. The non-transitory storage medium as recited in claim 8 , wherein the first biometric data is not persistently stored anywhere.
14. The non-transitory storage medium as recited in claim 8 , wherein the second biometric data is not persistently stored anywhere except on the card.