Enhanced beacon frames in wireless communications
This disclosure describes systems, methods, and devices related to using protected beacon frames in wireless communications. A device may determine a beacon management element of a beacon frame body and may determine an integrity group key identifier of the beacon management element, wherein the integrity group key identifier is associated with a basic service set (BSS). The device may determine, based on the integrity group key identifier, a management integrity check (MIC) field of the beacon management element. The device may generate a beacon frame including the beacon frame body. The device may send the beacon frame.
1. A device, the device comprising processing circuitry coupled to storage, the processing circuitry configured to:
calculate a first integrity code using an integrity group temporal key, wherein the integrity code is used for a protected beacon frame;
generate the protected beacon frame, wherein the protected beacon frame comprises a beacon frame body;
include the integrity group temporal key in a beacon management element of the beacon frame body of the protected beacon frame;
determine an information element (IE) comprising a beacon integrity number indicating a beacon count based on received beacons from associated devices;
assign a beacon number to the protected beacon frame, the beacon number being derived from a multiple basic service set (MultiBSS) beacon number acting as a counter shared by multiple virtual APs of a multiple basic service set identification (BSSID) set; and
cause to send the protected beacon frame to a first station device.
2. The device of claim 1 , wherein the integrity group temporal key is included in the beacon frame body for the first station device to calculate a second integrity code using the integrity group temporal key.
3. The device of claim 2 , wherein the first integrity code and the second integrity code being the same indicates to the first station device that the protected beacon frame is not compromised.
4. The device of claim 2 , wherein a mismatch between the first integrity code and the second integrity code indicates to the first station device that the protected beacon frame is compromised and to be discarded.
5. The device of claim 2 , wherein a mismatch between the first integrity code and the second integrity code indicates to the first station device to increment a replay counter.
6. The device of claim 1 , wherein the beacon number indicates to the first station device to compare the beacon number to a counter value and if the first station device determines that the beacon number is less than or equal to the counter value, the first station device discards the protected beacon frame.
7. The device of claim 1 , further comprising a transceiver configured to transmit and receive wireless signals.
8. The device of claim 7 , further comprising an antenna coupled to the transceiver to cause to send the protected beacon frame.
9. A non-transitory computer-readable medium storing computer-executable instructions which when executed by one or more processors result in performing operations comprising:
calculating a first integrity code using an integrity group temporal key, wherein the integrity code is used for a protected beacon frame;
generating the protected beacon frame, wherein the protected beacon frame comprises a beacon frame body;
including the integrity group temporal key in a beacon management element of the beacon frame body of the protected beacon frame;
determining an information element (IE) comprising a beacon integrity number indicating a beacon count based on received beacons from associated devices;
assigning a beacon number to the protected beacon frame, the beacon number being derived from a multiple basic service set (MultiBSS) beacon number acting as a counter shared by multiple virtual APs of a multiple basic service set identification (BSSID) set; and
causing to send the protected beacon frame to a first station device.
10. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 9 , wherein the integrity group temporal key is included in the beacon frame body for the first station device to calculate a second integrity code using the integrity group temporal key.
11. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 10 , wherein the first integrity code and the second integrity code being the same indicates to the first station device that the protected beacon frame is not compromised.
12. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 10 , wherein a mismatch between the first integrity code and the second integrity code indicates to the first station device that the protected beacon frame is compromised and to be discarded.
13. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 10 , wherein a mismatch between the first integrity code and the second integrity code indicates to the first station device to increment a replay counter.
14. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 9 , wherein the beacon number indicates to the first station device to compare the beacon number to a counter value and if the first station device determines that the beacon number is less than or equal to the counter value, the first station device discards the protected beacon frame.
15. A method comprising:
calculating, by one or more processors, a first integrity code using an integrity group temporal key, wherein the integrity code is used for a protected beacon frame;
generating the protected beacon frame, wherein the protected beacon frame comprises a beacon frame body;
including the integrity group temporal key in a beacon management element of the beacon frame body of the protected beacon frame;
determining an information element (IE) comprising a beacon integrity number indicating a beacon count based on received beacons from associated devices;
assigning a beacon number to the protected beacon frame, the beacon number being derived from a multiple basic service set (MultiBSS) beacon number acting as a counter shared by multiple virtual APs of a multiple basic service set identification (BSSID) set; and
causing to send the protected beacon frame to a first station device.
16. The method of claim 15 , wherein the integrity group temporal key is included in the beacon frame body for the first station device to calculate a second integrity code using the integrity group temporal key.
17. The method of claim 16 , wherein the first integrity code and the second integrity code being the same indicates to the first station device that the protected beacon frame is not compromised.