Method for updating a secret data in a credential container

1. A method for updating a first secret data in a credential container including a subscriber identity module:

wherein the first secret data is a subscriber authentication key uniquely assigned to the subscriber identity module;

wherein said credential container comprises a set of secret parameters customized for a network operator; said secret parameters being specific to the network operator and distinct from the first secret data;

wherein said credential container is configured to execute a first algorithm designed only to perform symmetric mutual authentication with a remote server using said set to authenticate to a communication network, wherein all secret parameters of said set are initially provided only for execution of the first algorithm by the credential container; and

wherein the credential container receives from the remote server a second secret data enciphered by using a second algorithm which is an enciphering algorithm and a subset of said secret parameters; and

wherein the credential container deciphers the enciphered second secret data by using both the subset and a third algorithm which is a deciphering algorithm and replaces the first secret data with the second secret data.

2. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the first algorithm is the Milenage algorithm as defined by ETSI TS 135.206 or the TUAK algorithm as defined by ETSI TS 135.231.

3. The method according to claim 1 , wherein said second and third algorithms are identical.

4. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the second algorithm takes g new value of the first secret data as input parameter for generating the enciphered second secret data.

5. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the second algorithm is based on a one-time-pad encryption.

6. The method according to claim 5 , wherein the first secret data is used as a mask applied on the set to identify the subset.

7. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the credential container comprises an IMSI which is a unique identifier of a telecom subscription and a key, Ki, which is a secret key uniquely allocated to the telecom subscription;

wherein the credential container sends an Attach request comprising said IMSI to a Mobile Management Entity, MME;

wherein the MME sends a Send Authentication Information, SAI, comprising the IMSI to a server comprising a Home Subscriber Server, MNO-HSS, and a proxy Home Subscriber Server, K-HSS, in charge of Ki key management;

wherein the K-HSS identifies a new Ki key allocated to the IMSI;

wherein the K-HSS identifies said subset and enciphers the new Ki key with said subset and said second algorithm;

wherein the K-HSS sets a Authentication parameter field, RAND as defined by ETSI TS 124.008, with the enciphered new Ki key and sends to the MME a SAI Ack message comprising the RAND;

wherein, on receipt of the SAI Ack message, the MME sends to the credential container an Authentication request comprising the RAND; and

wherein, on receipt of the Authentication request, the credential container identifies said subset, then retrieves the new Ki by deciphering the enciphered new Ki key using said subset and said second algorithm.

8. The method according to claim 7 , wherein the credential container sets a parameter AUTS, as detailed in ETSI TS 133 102, with a concatenation of bits of the enciphered Ki key and the bits of an identifier, ICCID, of the credential container, then sends to the MME an Authentication failure message comprising said IMSI and AUTS;

wherein, upon receipt of the Authentication failure message, the MME sends to the K-HSS a SAI message comprising the IMSI and the AUTS; and

wherein the K-HSS decodes the received AUTS message and after successfully validating the initial sender using said bits of the ICCID, the K-HSS sends to the credential container a new OPC, as defined by ETSI TS 135.206, in a way similar to that of the new Ki key.

9. The method according to claim 8 , wherein the credential container sends to the MME an Authentication answer and the MME sends to the K-HSS a Location Update message;

wherein, upon Location Update message, the MNO-HSS activates these new Ki key and new OPC then sends to the MME a Location Update Error message;

wherein, upon receipt of the Location Update Error message, the MME sends to the credential container an Attach Request reflecting a reject; and

wherein, upon receipt of the Attach Request reflecting a reject, the credential container activates the new Ki key and new OPC.

10. A credential container comprising a processor and a first secret data and able to receive a message from a remote server:

wherein said credential container includes a subscriber identity module and comprises a set of secret parameters customized for a network operator, said secret parameters being specific to the network operator and distinct from the first secret data;

wherein the first secret data is a subscriber authentication key uniquely assigned to the subscriber identity module;

wherein said credential container being configured to execute a first algorithm designed only to perform symmetric mutual authentication with the remote server using said set to authenticate to a communication network; all secret parameters of said set being initially provided only for execution of first algorithm by the credential container; and

wherein said message comprises a second secret data enciphered by using both a subset of said secret parameters and a second algorithm which is an enciphering algorithm, and wherein the credential container comprises an updating agent adapted to be run by the processor for deciphering the enciphered second secret data by using both the subset and a third algorithm which is a deciphering algorithm and replacing the first secret data with the second secret data.

11. The credential container according to claim 10 , wherein first algorithm is the Milenage algorithm as defined by ETSI TS 135.206 or the TUAK algorithm as defined by ETSI TS 135.231.

12. The credential container according to claim 10 , wherein the second algorithm takes a new value of the first secret data as input parameter for generating the enciphered second secret data.

13. The credential container according to claim 10 , wherein the second algorithm is based on a one-time-pad encryption.

14. The credential container according to claim 10 , wherein the credential container is a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM), a Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC), a embedded secure element (eUICC) or an integrated secure element (iUICC).

15. A server comprising a hardware processor and a non-volatile memory and able to send a message to a credential container including both a subscriber identity module and a first secret data:

wherein the first secret data is a subscriber authentication key uniquely assigned to the subscriber identity module;

wherein said server comprises a set of secret parameters customized for a network operator; said secret parameters being specific to the network operator and distinct from the first secret data;

wherein said server is configured to execute a first algorithm designed only to perform symmetric mutual authentication with the credential container using said set to allow said credential container to authenticate to a communication network; all secret parameters of said set being initially provided only for execution of the first algorithm by the server; and,

wherein said server comprises a provisioning agent adapted to be run by the processor for generating a second secret data enciphered by using both a subset of said secret parameters and a second algorithm which is an enciphering algorithm and for including the enciphered second secret data in said message, said second secret data being intended to replace the first secret data in the credential container.

16. The server according to claim 15 , wherein first algorithm is the Milenage algorithm as defined by ETSI TS 135.206 or the TUAK algorithm as defined by ETSI TS 135.231.

17. The server according to claim 15 , wherein the second algorithm is based on a one-time-pad encryption.