IP Library Granted Patent US 12,254,474
Granted Patent B1
US 12,254,474 · App. 17/457,865 · Granted Mar 18, 2025

Systems and methods for enforcing strict network connectivity and storage access during online payments

Inventors: Bahaa Naamneh (Oslo, NO); David Luz Silva (Dublin, IE); Iskander Sanchez Rola (Antibes, FR)
Assignee: GEN DIGITAL INC.
G06Q20/4016G06Q20/4014G06Q20/407H04L63/1416H04L63/1466
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,254,474
App. No.
17/457,865
Granted
Mar 18, 2025
Kind
B1
Abstract

The disclosed computer-implemented method for enforcing strict network connectivity and storage access during online payments may include (i) determining that a webpage in a tab of a browser application executing on the computing device includes a payment page for an e-commerce website, (ii) based on determining that the webpage includes a payment page, providing formjacking attack protection by monitoring network connectivity and storage access by the browser tab, (iii) based on the formjacking attack protection, identifying a potentially malicious attempt to hijack information entered into at least one web form included in the payment page, and (iv) in response to identifying the potentially malicious attempt, preventing the potentially malicious attempt from hijacking the information entered into the at least one web form included in the payment page. Various other methods, systems, and computer-readable media are also disclosed.

Claims (50)

1. A computer-implemented method for enforcing strict network connectivity and storage access during online payments, at least a portion of the method being performed by a computing device comprising at least one processor, the method comprising:

determining, by a computing device, that a webpage in a tab of a browser application executing on the computing device comprises a payment page for an e-commerce website;

providing, by the computing device and based on determining that the webpage comprises a payment page, formjacking attack protection by monitoring network connectivity and storage access by the browser tab;

identifying, by the computing device and based on the formjacking attack protection, a potentially malicious attempt to hijack information entered into at least one web form included in the payment page by:

detecting a browser storage request for storing a payload including the information entered into the at least one web form; and

detecting an attempted postponed delivery of the payload; and

preventing, by the computing device and in response to identifying the potentially malicious attempt, the potentially malicious attempt from hijacking the information entered into the at least one web form included in the payment page.

2. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , wherein the information entered into the at least one web form included in the payment page comprises payment information of a customer.

3. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , wherein the information entered into the at least one web form included in the payment page comprises personal identification information of a customer.

4. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , wherein monitoring network connectivity comprises monitoring outbound network connections associated with the browser tab.

5. The computer-implemented method of claim 4 , wherein:

identifying a potentially malicious attempt comprises identifying an outbound network connection associated with the browser tab as risky; and

preventing the potentially malicious attempt from hijacking the information comprises blocking the outbound network connection associated with the browser tab.

6. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , wherein monitoring network connectivity and storage access by the browser tab comprises binding a respective event listener to each of one or more input fields included in the at least one web form included in the payment page.

7. The computer-implemented method of claim 6 , wherein:

the one or more input fields comprise document object model (DOM) elements on the payment page; and

the computer-implemented method further comprises invoking an event listener module when an event is triggered for a document object model (DOM) element on the payment page.

8. The computer-implemented method of claim 6 , wherein the one or more input fields allow a customer to input payment information that includes at least one payment account number.

9. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , wherein monitoring storage access comprises monitoring browser storage requests that originate from the browser tab.

10. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , wherein preventing the potentially malicious attempt from hijacking the information comprises blocking the postponed delivery of the payload from the browser tab.

11. A system for enforcing strict network connectivity and storage access during online payments, the system comprising:

at least one physical processor; and

physical memory comprising computer-executable instructions that, when executed by the physical processor, cause the physical processor to:

determine that a webpage in a tab of a browser application executing on the system comprises a payment page for an e-commerce website;

provide, based on determining that the webpage comprises a payment page, formjacking attack protection by monitoring network connectivity and storage access by the browser tab;

identify, based on the formjacking attack protection, a potentially malicious attempt to hijack information entered into at least one web form included in the payment page by:

detecting a browser storage request for storing a payload including the information entered into the at least one web form; and

detecting an attempted postponed delivery of the payload; and

prevent, in response to identifying the potentially malicious attempt, the potentially malicious attempt from hijacking the information entered into the at least one web form included in the payment page.

12. The system of claim 11 , wherein the information entered into the at least one web form included in the payment page comprises payment information of a customer.

13. The system of claim 11 , wherein the information entered into the at least one web form included in the payment page comprises personal identification information of a customer.

14. The system of claim 11 , wherein monitoring network connectivity comprises monitoring outbound network connections associated with the browser tab.

15. The system of claim 14 , wherein:

identifying the potentially malicious attempt comprises identifying an outbound network connection associated with the browser tab as risky; and

preventing the potentially malicious attempt from hijacking the information comprises blocking the outbound network connection associated with the browser tab.

16. The system of claim 11 , wherein monitoring network connectivity and storage access by the browser tab comprises binding a respective event listener to each of one or more input fields included in the at least one web form included in the payment page.

17. The system of claim 16 , wherein:

the one or more input fields comprise document object model (DOM) elements on the payment page; and

the computer-executable instructions that, when executed by the physical processor, further cause the physical processor to invoke an event listener module when an event is triggered for a document object model (DOM) element on the payment page.

18. The system of claim 16 , wherein the one or more input fields allow a customer to input payment information that includes at least one payment account number.

19. The system of claim 11 , wherein:

monitoring storage access comprises monitoring browser storage requests that originate from the browser tab; and

identifying the potentially malicious attempt comprises determining that the browser application is attempting to postpone a delivery of a payload from the browser tab.

20. A non-transitory computer-readable medium comprising one or more computer-executable instructions that, when executed by at least one processor of a computing device, cause the computing device to:

determine that a webpage in a tab of a browser application executing on the computing device comprises a payment page for an e-commerce website;

provide, based on determining that the webpage comprises a payment page, formjacking attack protection by monitoring network connectivity and storage access by the browser tab;

identify, based on the formjacking attack protection, a potentially malicious attempt to hijack information entered into at least one web form included in the payment page; and by:

detecting a browser storage request for storing a payload including the information entered into the at least one web form; and

detecting an attempted postponed delivery of the payload; and

prevent, in response to identifying the potentially malicious attempt, the potentially malicious attempt from hijacking the information entered into the at least one web form included in the payment page.

Assignments (2)
CHANGE OF NAME Recorded Feb 6, 2023
From: NORTONLIFELOCK INC.
To: GEN DIGITAL INC.
Reel/Frame 062714/0605 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Dec 8, 2021
From: NAAMNEH, BAHAA; SILVA, DAVID LUZ; SANCHEZ ROLA, ISKANDER
To: NORTONLIFELOCK INC.
Reel/Frame 058333/0343 →
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Cited By (1)
US 12,513,196