IP Library Granted Patent US 12,512,973
Granted Patent B2
US 12,512,973 · App. 17/791,547 · Granted Dec 30, 2025

Secret maximum value calculation apparatus, method and program

Inventors: Koki Hamada (Musashino, JP); Ryo Kikuchi (Musashino, JP)
Assignee: NTT, Inc.
H04L9/0861G06F7/544
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,512,973
App. No.
17/791,547
Granted
Dec 30, 2025
Kind
B2
Abstract

A secure maximum value computation apparatus, assuming that a set X={[[x 1 ]], [[x 2 ]], . . . , [[x n ]]}, includes an output unit 1 that outputs [[x 1 ]] and [[1]] as a maximum secret value [[y]] and a flag [[z(x 1 )]], respectively, when n=1 holds, a comparison unit 2 that computes a comparison result of which is larger with respect to a predetermined order for each pair {[[x i ]], [[x j ]]}⊂X of elements of the X, a flag computation unit 3 that computes whether all comparison results related to each of the [[x i ]]s are “large” for each of the [[x i ]]s to set a computed value as a flag [[z(x i )]], and a maximum value computation unit 4 that uses the [[z(x i )]] to computes a maximum value [[y]].

Claims (30)

1 . A secure maximum value computation apparatus for a set of secret values X={((x 1 )), ((x 2 )), . . . , ((x n ))} where n is a positive integer, the secure maximum value computation apparatus comprising:

output circuitry configured to output ((x 1 )) and ((1)) as a maximum secret value ((y)) and a flag ((z(x 1 ))), respectively, when n=1;

comparison circuitry configured to compute comparison results of which is larger with respect to a predetermined order for every pairs {((x i )), ((x j ))}⊂X of elements of the set of secret values X, where 1≤i≤j≤n;

flag computation circuitry configured to compute whether all comparison results related to each of the ((x i ))s are “large” for each of the ((x i ))s to set a computed value as a flag ((z(x i ))); and

maximum value computation circuitry configured to use the ((z(x i ))) to compute a maximum value ((y)), wherein

in a case that a function LE(x i , x j ) outputs ((1)) when x i x j and outputs ((0)) when x j >x j , the comparison circuitry performs computations of LE(x i , x j ) for every (i, j)s (i,jϵ[l, n], i<j) to set computation results ((c i, j ))s as the comparison results,

a and b are inputs, and

in a case that a function EQ(((a)), ((b))) outputs ((1)) when a=b and outputs ((0)) when a≠b, the flag computation circuitry:

performs computations of 1−((c j, i ) for every (i, j)s (i, j∈[1, n], i>j) to set computation results as ((c i, j ))s, and

performs a computation of ((z(x j )))←EQ(Σ i≠j ((c i, j )), n−1) for each i to set a computation result as a flag ((z(x i ))).

2 . The secure maximum value computation apparatus according to claim 1 , wherein the maximum value computation circuitry computes Σ i∈[1, n] ((x i ))×((z(x i )))) to set a computation result as the maximum value ((y)).

3 . The secure maximum value computation apparatus according to claim 1 , wherein the flag computation performs computations of 1−((c j, i )) for every (i, j)s (i, j∈[1, n], i>j) to set computation results as (c i, j ))s and performs a computation of Π i≠j ((c i, j )) for each i to set a computation result as a flag ((z(x i ))).

4 . A secure maximum value computation apparatus for a set of secret values X={((x 1 )), ((x 2 )), . . . , ((x n ))}, wherein n is positive integer, the secure maximum value computation apparatus comprising:

output circuitry configured to output ((x 1 )) and ((1)) as a maximum value ((y)) and a flag ((z(x 1 ))), respectively, when n=1;

flag computation circuitry configured to compute whether all comparison results related to each of the ((x i ))s are “large” for each of the ((x i )) s to set a computed value as a flag ((Z(X i )));

comparison circuitry configured to compute comparison results of which is larger with respect to a predetermined order for every pairs {((x i )), ((x j ))}⊂X of elements of the set of secret values X, where 1≤i≤j≤n;

maximum value computation circuitry configured to use the ((z(x i ))) to compute a maximum value ((y)); and

dividing circuitry configured to divide X into two or more subsets, wherein;

the secure maximum value computation apparatus is configured to perform processing on each of the two or more subsets to compute a secret value of a maximum value and a flag corresponding to each of the two or more subsets and perform processing on a set of maximum values corresponding to the two or more subsets to compute a maximum value ((y)) and the flag for each of the two or more subsets; and

flag computation circuitry configured to compute a flag obtained by multiplying the flag computed for each of the two or more subsets with each other.

5 . A secure maximum value computation apparatus for a set of secret values X={((x 1 ), ((x 2 )), . . . , ((x n ))}, wherein n is a positive integer, the secure maximum value computation apparatus comprising:

output circuitry configured to output ((x 1 )) and ((1)) as a maximum secret value ((y)) and a flag ((z(x 1 ))), respectively, when n=1 holds;

comparison circuitry configured to compute comparison results of which is larger with respect to a predetermined order for every pairs {((x i )), ((x j ))}⊂X of elements of the set of secret values X, where 1≤i≤j≤n;

flag computation circuitry configured to compute whether all comparison results related to each of the ((x i ))s are “large” for each of the ((x i ))s to set a computed value as a flag ((z(x i )));

maximum value computation circuitry configured to use the ((z(x i ))) to compute a maximum value ((y)); and

dividing circuitry configured to divide X into two or more subsets, wherein

the secure maximum value computation apparatus performs processing on each of the two or more subsets to compute a secret value of a maximum value and a flag corresponding to each of the two or more subsets, and

the secure maximum value computation apparatus further includes processing circuitry configured to

perform processing on a set of maximum values corresponding to the two or more) subsets to compute the maximum value ((y)) and the flag for each of the two or more subsets; and

compute a flag by multiplying the flag computed for each of the two or more subsets with each other.

Assignments (2)
CHANGE OF NAME Recorded Aug 20, 2025
From: NIPPON TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE CORPORATION
To: NTT, INC.
Reel/Frame 072801/0812 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jul 8, 2022
From: HAMADA, KOKI; KIKUCHI, RYO
To: NIPPON TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE CORPORATION
Reel/Frame 060459/0869 →
Continuity (1)
Related Publication 20230033922A1 · Feb 2, 2023
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