IP Library Granted Patent US 12,284,216
Granted Patent B2
US 12,284,216 · App. 17/900,774 · Granted Apr 22, 2025

System and method for synthesizing role-based access control assignments per a policy

Inventor: Marc E. Mosko (Kensington, CA)
Assignee: Xerox Corporation
H04L63/20H04L63/104H04L63/105
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,284,216
App. No.
17/900,774
Granted
Apr 22, 2025
Kind
B2
Abstract

A system and method are provided to facilitate securing windows discretionary access control. During operation, the system determines a Windows domain model including: user-specified desired effective permissions as capability assignments of principals on resources, wherein a respective capability assignment comprises a permission of a respective principal to a respective resource and wherein a respective principal comprises a user or a group of users; and user-specified policies and rules for relationships between principals, groups, and resources. The system creates a domain graph and an access control graph based on the Windows domain model. The domain graph maps paths between nodes representing users, groups, and resources based on the policies and rules. The access control graph allows for calculation of actual permissions of principals on resources based on the desired effective permissions. The system determines a set of optimal policy-conformant configurations based on the domain graph and the access control graph.

Claims (135)

1. A computer-implemented method, the method comprising:

determining a Windows domain model including:

user-specified desired effective permissions as capability assignments of principals on resources, wherein the principals comprises users or groups of users, wherein a capability assignment comprises a permission of a principal to a resource, and wherein the user-specified desired effective permissions are included in a scenario file; and

user-specified policies and rules for relationships between the principals and the resources, wherein the user-specified policies and rules are included in a policy file;

creating a domain graph and an access control graph based on the Windows domain model by transmitting, to a python role-based access control (RBAC) module, the scenario file, the policy file, and other input files describing the Windows domain model for processing,

wherein the domain graph maps paths between nodes representing the users, groups, and resources based on the policies and rules, and

wherein the access control graph allows for calculation of actual permissions of the principals on the resources based on the desired effective permissions;

generating a multi-layer graph by determining a set of optimal configurations which conform to a policy based on the mapped paths from the domain graph and the calculated actual permissions from the access control graph;

applying a process on the multi-layer graph to obtain a recommended configuration, wherein the process applies operational and security constraints to the multi-layer graph; and

generating, based on the recommended configuration, a report comprising at least one of:

choices made by the system in selecting the recommended configuration, including prioritization of a first constraint over a second constraint;

a description of capabilities assigned to users and resources; and

a description of group memberships.

2. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 ,

wherein the domain graph comprises: a plurality of nodes which represent at least one of the users, the groups of users, and the resources; and a plurality of directed edges between the nodes,

wherein a first directed edge from a respective user or a first group in a first domain to a second group in the first domain indicates an intra-domain membership relation,

wherein a second directed edge from the respective user or the first group in the first domain to a third group in a second domain indicates an inter-domain membership relation,

wherein a third directed edge from the respective user or the first group in the first domain to a first resource in the first domain indicates an intra-domain permission relation,

wherein a fourth directed edge from the respective user or the first group in the first domain to a second resource in the second domain indicates an inter-domain permission relation, and

wherein a fifth directed edge from the first resource in the first domain to a third resource indicates an inheritance relation which comprises inheriting a characteristic from another node in the domain graph.

3. The computer-implemented method of claim 2 ,

wherein each directed edge is associated with a user-assigned weight indicated in the policies and rules, and

wherein determining the set of optimal configurations which conform to the policy based on the mapped paths from the domain graph further comprises calculating a path associated with a least coast from a respective user node to a respective resource node in the domain graph based on the user-assigned weight for each directed edge.

4. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 ,

wherein the access control graph comprises: a plurality of nodes which represent at least one of the users, the groups of users, assigned permissions, actual permissions, and the resources; and a plurality of directed edges between the nodes,

wherein a first directed edge from a respective user or a first group to a second group indicates a membership relation,

wherein a second directed edge from the respective user or the first group to a first assigned permission indicates an allow or deny permission relation,

wherein a third directed edge from the first assigned permission to an actual permission indicates an implies relation,

wherein a fourth directed edge from the actual permission to a first resource indicates an applies relation, and

wherein a fifth directed edge from the first assigned permission to a second assigned permission indicates an inherits relation which comprises inheriting a permission from another node in the access control graph.

5. The computer-implemented method of claim 4 ,

wherein a cost associated with an edge and comprising a value of zero is associated with each of:

the first directed edge indicating the membership relation; and

the third directed edge indicating the implies relation; and

wherein a cost of 1 is associated with each of:

the second directed edge indicating the allow or deny permission relation;

the fourth directed edge indicating the applies relation; and

the fifth directed edge indicating the inherits relation.

6. The computer-implemented method of claim 5 , wherein determining the set of optimal configurations which conform to the policy based on the calculated actual permissions from the access control graph further comprises:

for a given user node and a given resource node, applying a shortest path calculation between the given user node and the given resource node, by:

determining whether a deny path exists;

determining whether an allow path exists; and

responsive to determining that the deny path does not exist and the allow path does exist, generating a result of an allow permission for the given user node on the given resource node.

7. The computer-implemented method of claim 6 , further comprising:

responsive to determining that the deny path does exist and the allow path does exist:

calculating a first cost associated with the deny path based on a cost associated with each directed edge in the deny path between the given user node and the given resource node;

calculating a second cost associated with the allow path based on a cost associated with each directed edge in the allow path between the given user node and the given resource node;

responsive to the first cost being less than or equal to the second cost, generating a result of a deny permission for the given user node on the given resource node; and

responsive to the first cost being greater than the second cost, generating a result of an allow permission for the given user node on the given resource node.

8. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 ,

wherein the set of optimal configurations which conform to the policy comprise access control entries for the respective principal to the respective resource and group memberships indicating which users belong to which groups.

9. A computer system, comprising:

a processor; and

a storage device storing instructions that when executed by the processor cause the processor to perform a method, the method comprising:

determining a Windows domain model including:

user-specified desired effective permissions as capability assignments of principals on resources, wherein the principals comprises users or groups of users, and wherein a capability assignment comprises a permission of a principal to a resource, and wherein the user-specified desired effective permissions are included in a scenario file; and

user-specified policies and rules for relationships between the principals and the resources, wherein the user-specified policies and rules are included in a policy file;

creating a domain graph and an access control graph based on the Windows domain model by transmitting, to a python role-based access control (RBAC) module, the scenario file, the policy file, and other input files describing the Windows domain model for processing,

wherein the domain graph maps paths between nodes representing the users, groups, and resources based on the policies and rules, and

wherein the access control graph allows for calculation of actual permissions of the principals on the resources based on the desired effective permissions; and

generating a multi-layer graph by determining a set of optimal configurations which conform to a policy based on the mapped paths from the domain graph and the calculated actual permissions from the access control graph;

applying a process on the multi-layer graph to obtain a recommended configuration, wherein the process applies operational and security constraints to the multi-layer graph; and

generating, based on the recommended configuration, a report comprising at least one of:

choices made by the system in selecting the recommended configuration, including prioritization of a first constraint over a second constraint;

a description of capabilities assigned to users and resources; and

a description of group memberships.

10. The computer system of claim 9 ,

wherein the domain graph comprises: a plurality of nodes which represent at least one of the users, the groups of users, and the resources; and a plurality of directed edges between the nodes,

wherein a first directed edge from a respective user or a first group in a first domain to a second group in the first domain indicates an intra-domain membership relation,

wherein a second directed edge from the respective user or the first group in the first domain to a third group in a second domain indicates an inter-domain membership relation,

wherein a third directed edge from the respective user or the first group in the first domain to a first resource in the first domain indicates an intra-domain permission relation,

wherein a fourth directed edge from the respective user or the first group in the first domain to a second resource in the second domain indicates an inter-domain permission relation, and

wherein a fifth directed edge from the first resource in the first domain to a third resource indicates an inheritance relation which comprises inheriting a characteristic from another node in the domain graph.

11. The computer system of claim 10 ,

wherein each directed edge is associated with a user-assigned weight indicated in the policies and rules, and

wherein determining the set of optimal configurations which conform to the policy based on the mapped paths from the domain graph further comprises calculating a path associated with a least cost from a respective user node to a respective resource node in the domain graph based on the user-assigned weight for each directed edge.

12. The computer system of claim 9 ,

wherein the access control graph comprises: a plurality of nodes which represent at least one of the users, the groups of users, assigned permissions, actual permissions, and the resources; and a plurality of directed edges between the nodes,

wherein a first directed edge from a respective user or a first group to a second group indicates a membership relation,

wherein a second directed edge from the respective user or the first group to a first assigned permission indicates an allow or deny permission relation,

wherein a third directed edge from the first assigned permission to an actual permission indicates an implies relation,

wherein a fourth directed edge from the actual permission to a first resource indicates an applies relation, and

wherein a fifth directed edge from the first assigned permission to a second assigned permission indicates an inherits relation which comprises inheriting a permission from another node in the access control graph.

13. The computer system of claim 12 ,

wherein a cost associated with an edge and comprising a value of zero is associated with each of:

the first directed edge indicating the membership relation; and

the third directed edge indicating the implies relation; and

wherein a cost of 1 is associated with each of:

the second directed edge indicating the allow or deny permission relation;

the fourth directed edge indicating the applies relation; and

the fifth directed edge indicating the inherits relation.

14. The computer system of claim 13 , wherein determining the set of optimal configurations which conform to the policy based on the calculated actual permissions from the access control graph further comprises:

for a given user node and a given resource node, applying a shortest path calculation between the given user node and the given resource node, by:

determining whether a deny path exists;

determining whether an allow path exists;

responsive to determining that the deny path does not exist and the allow path does exist, generating a result of an allow permission for the given user node on the given resource node;

responsive to determining that the deny path does exist and the allow path does exist:

calculating a first cost associated with the deny path based on a cost associated with each directed edge in the deny path between the given user node and the given resource node;

calculating a second cost associated with the allow path based on a cost associated with each directed edge in the allow path between the given user node and the given resource node;

responsive to the first cost being less than or equal to the second cost, generating a result of a deny permission for the given user node on the given resource node; and

responsive to the first cost being greater than the second cost, generating a result of an allow permission for the given user node on the given resource node.

15. The computer system of claim 9 ,

wherein the set of optimal configurations which conform to the policy comprise access control entries for the respective principal to the respective resource and group memberships indicating which users belong to which groups.

16. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing instructions that when executed by a computer cause the computer to perform a method, the method comprising:

determining a Windows domain model including:

user-specified desired effective permissions as capability assignments of principals on resources, wherein the principals comprises users or groups of users, wherein a capability assignment comprises a permission of a principal to a resource, and wherein the user-specified desired effective permissions are included in a scenario file; and

user-specified policies and rules for relationships between the principals and the resources, wherein the user-specified policies and rules are included in a policy file;

creating a domain graph and an access control graph based on the Windows domain model by transmitting, to a python role-based access control (RBAC) module, the scenario file, the policy file, and other input files describing the Windows domain model for processing,

wherein the domain graph maps paths between nodes representing the users, groups, and resources based on the policies and rules, and

wherein the access control graph allows for calculation of actual permissions of the principals on the resources based on the desired effective permissions;

generating a multi-layer graph by determining a set of optimal configurations which conform to a policy based on the mapped paths from the domain graph and the calculated actual permissions from the access control graph;

applying a process on the multi-layer graph to obtain a recommended configuration, wherein the process applies operational and security constraints to the multi-layer graph; and

generating, based on the recommended configuration, a report comprising at least one of:

choices made by the system in selecting the recommended configuration, including prioritization of a first constraint over a second constraint;

a description of capabilities assigned to users and resources; and

a description of group memberships.

17. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 16 ,

wherein the domain graph comprises: a plurality of nodes which represent at least one of the users, the groups of users, and the resources; and a plurality of directed edges between the nodes,

wherein the directed edges indicate at least one of an intra-domain membership relation, an inter-domain membership relation, an intra-domain permission relation, an inter-domain permission relation, and an inheritance relation which comprises inheriting a characteristic from another node in the domain graph,

wherein each directed edge is associated with a user-assigned weight indicated in the policies and rules, and

wherein determining the set of optimal configurations which conform to the policy based on the mapped paths from the domain graph further comprises calculating a path associated with a least cost from a respective user node to a respective resource node in the domain graph based on the user-assigned weight for each directed edge.

18. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 16 ,

wherein the access control graph comprises: a plurality of nodes which represent at least one of the users, the groups of users, assigned permissions, actual permissions, and the resources; and a plurality of directed edges between the nodes,

wherein the directed edges indicate at least one of a membership relation, an allow or deny permission relation, an implies relation, an applies relation, and an inherits relation which comprises inheriting a permission from another node in the access control graph,

wherein each directed edge is associated with a cost comprising a value of zero or one, and

wherein determining the set of optimal policy-conformant configurations based on the calculated actual permissions from the access control graph further comprises:

for a given user node and a given resource node, applying a shortest path calculation between the given user node and the given resource node, by:

determining whether a deny path exists;

determining whether an allow path exists; and

responsive to determining that the deny path does not exist and the allow path does exist, generating a result of an allow permission for the given user node on the given resource node;

responsive to determining that the deny path does exist and the allow path does exist:

calculating a first cost of associated with the deny path based on a cost associated with each directed edge in the deny path between the given user node and the given resource node;

calculating a second cost associated with the allow path based on a cost associated with each directed edge in the allow path between the given user node and the given resource node;

responsive to the first cost being less than or equal to the second cost, generating a result of a deny permission for the given user node on the given resource node; and

responsive to the first cost being greater than the second cost, generating a result of an allow permission for the given user node on the given resource node.

Assignments (8)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Mar 6, 2026
From: XEROX CORPORATION
To: GENESEE VALLEY INNOVATIONS, LLC
Reel/Frame 075020/0755 →
SECOND LIEN NOTES PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Jul 2, 2025
From: XEROX CORPORATION
To: U.S. BANK TRUST COMPANY, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 071785/0550 →
FIRST LIEN NOTES PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Apr 11, 2025
From: XEROX CORPORATION
To: U.S. BANK TRUST COMPANY, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 070824/0001 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Feb 13, 2024
From: XEROX CORPORATION
To: CITIBANK, N.A., AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 066741/0001 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Nov 20, 2023
From: XEROX CORPORATION
To: JEFFERIES FINANCE LLC, AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 065628/0019 →
CORRECTIVE ASSIGNMENT TO CORRECT THE REMOVAL OF US PATENTS 9356603, 10026651, 10626048 AND INCLUSION OF US PATENT 7167871 PREVIOUSLY RECORDED ON REEL 064038 FRAME 0001. ASSIGNOR(S) HEREBY CONFIRMS THE ASSIGNMENT. Recorded Jun 28, 2023
From: PALO ALTO RESEARCH CENTER INCORPORATED
To: XEROX CORPORATION
Reel/Frame 064161/0001 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jun 20, 2023
From: PALO ALTO RESEARCH CENTER INCORPORATED
To: XEROX CORPORATION
Reel/Frame 064038/0001 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Oct 12, 2022
From: MOSKO, MARC E.
To: PALO ALTO RESEARCH CENTER INCORPORATED
Reel/Frame 061386/0009 →
Continuity (2)
Provisional Application 63245344 · Sep 17, 2021
Related Publication 20230086475A1 · Mar 23, 2023
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