IP Library Granted Patent US 12,436,191
Granted Patent B2
US 12,436,191 · App. 18/063,060 · Granted Oct 7, 2025

Authenticating electronic devices via multi tone analysis

Inventors: Carl Bohman, Jr. (Springfield, OH); Aaron Jennings (Miamisburg, OH); Christian Eakins (Columbus, OH); Mark Skouson (Beavercreek, OH); Richard Ott (Dayton, OH); Jamin McCue (Upper Arlington, OH)
Assignee: United States of America as represented by the Secretary of the Air Force
G01R31/31719G01R31/2837G01R31/2841
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,436,191
App. No.
18/063,060
Granted
Oct 7, 2025
Kind
B2
Abstract

Methods and systems for authenticating electronic devices via multi tone analysis. A method for authenticating a device under test (DUT) of a type of DUT includes imparting voltage tones to the DUT. The voltage tones are proximate a frequency of interest that is associated with the type of DUT. Using a measurement response of the DUT to the voltage tones, an electronic signature of the DUT is determined. The DUT is determined to be authentic when the electronic signature of the DUT substantially matches an electronic signature of an authority DUT of the type of DUT.

Claims (29)

1. A method for authenticating an electronic device under test (DUT) of a type of DUT, the method comprising:

imparting, to the DUT, first voltage tones proximate a frequency of interest associated with the type of DUT;

determining, using measurement responses of the DUT to the voltage tones, an electronic signature of the DUT; and

determining that the DUT is authentic in response to the electronic signature of the DUT substantially matching an electronic signature of an authentic DUT of the type of DUT wherein the frequency of interest is identified for the type of DUT wherein the electronic signature of the DUT is determined using a plurality of frequencies of interest associated with the type of DUT and the measurement responses to the first voltage tones proximate to each of the plurality of frequencies of interest.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the first voltage tones comprise tones uniformly spaced in frequency and centered at the frequency of interest.

3. The method of claim 2 , further comprising:

imparting, to the DUT, second voltage tones proximate a resonant frequency.

4. The method of claim 3 , wherein the second voltage tones comprise tones uniformly spaced in frequency and centered at the resonant frequency.

5. The method of claim 3 , wherein the first voltage tones comprise tones uniformly spaced in frequency and centered at the frequency of interest and the second voltage tones comprise tones uniformly spaced in frequency and centered at the resonant frequency.

6. The method of claim 3 , wherein the first voltage tones comprise tones non-uniformly spaced in frequency and offset from the frequency of interest and the second voltage tones comprise tones non-uniformly spaced in frequency and offset from the resonant frequency.

7. The method of claim 1 , wherein the frequency of interest associated with the type of DUT is determined by:

imparting, to an authentic DUT, an electronic stimulus across a range of frequencies; and

identifying the frequency of interest from within the range of frequencies via a linear chirp response, a non-linear chirp response, an S-parameter analysis, an impulse response, a step response, a comb function response, a model-based prediction, or a combination thereof.

8. An apparatus for authenticating an electronic device of a type of electronic device, the apparatus comprising:

a signal generator operably coupled to the electronic device and configured to generate and apply an input stimulus to the electronic device, the input stimulus comprising voltage tones proximate a frequency of interest associated with a type of electronic device;

a three-way connector for operably coupling the measurement apparatus, the signal generator, and the electronic device; and

a measurement apparatus operably coupled to the electronic device and configured to measure an electronic response to the applied input stimulus, the measured electronic response defining for the electronic device a respective electronic signature;

wherein the electronic device is authentic if the electronic signature of the electronic device substantially matches an electronic signature of an authentic electronic device of the type of electronic device wherein the electronic response to the applied input stimulus comprises multiple voltage tones proximate the frequency of interest associated with the type of electronic device.

9. The apparatus of claim 8 , wherein the voltage tones comprise tones uniformly spaced in frequency and centered at the frequency of interest.

10. The apparatus of claim 8 , wherein the frequency of interest associated with the type of electronic device is determined by:

imparting, to an authentic electronic device of the type of electronic device, an electronic stimulus across a range of frequencies; and

identifying the frequency of interest from within the range of frequencies via a linear chirp response, a non-linear chirp response, an S-parameter analysis, an impulse response, a step response, a comb function response, a model-based prediction, or a combination thereof.

11. An apparatus for authenticating an electronic device of a type of electronic device, the apparatus comprising:

a signal generator operably coupled to the electronic device and configured to generate and apply an input stimulus to the electronic device, the input stimulus comprising voltage tones proximate a frequency of interest associated with a type of electronic device;

a computing device operably coupled to the measurement apparatus, the computing device configured for:

storing electronic signatures of authentic electronic devices; and

comparing an electronic signature of a device under test (DUT) to the electronic signature of the authentic electronic device of the type of electronic device wherein the electronic signature of the DUT is further determined using DUT response non-linearities characteristic of the type of DUT; and

a measurement apparatus operably coupled to the electronic device and configured to measure an electronic response to the applied input stimulus, the measured electronic response defining for the electronic device a respective electronic signature;

wherein the electronic device is authentic if the electronic signature of the electronic device substantially matches an electronic signature of an authentic electronic device of the type of electronic device.

Assignments (1)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Oct 15, 2024
From: SKOUSON, MARK; EAKINS, CHRISTIAN; JENNINGS, AARON; BOWMAN, CARL, JR; MCCUE, JAMIN; OTT, RICHARD
To: GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AS REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
Reel/Frame 068895/0008 →
Continuity (3)
Provisional Application 63346386 · May 27, 2022
Provisional Application 63286677 · Dec 7, 2021
Related Publication 20230176119A1 · Jun 8, 2023
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