IP Library Granted Patent US 12,483,415
Granted Patent B2
US 12,483,415 · App. 18/186,664 · Granted Nov 25, 2025

Identifying deep fake content via smart devices

Inventor: Avesta Hojjati (Austin, TX)
Assignee: DigiCert, Inc.
H04L9/3236G06V10/26G06V20/582H04L9/3247H04L9/3263
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,483,415
App. No.
18/186,664
Granted
Nov 25, 2025
Kind
B2
Abstract

A method of identifying deep fake content includes receiving content at a smart device; determining whether the content includes a hidden object therein; responsive the content including the hidden object, determining a hash in the hidden object; determining a local hash for the content by the smart device; and determining legitimacy of the content based on the hash in the hidden object and the local hash. The hidden object can be a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Web Token (JWT).

Claims (41)

1 . A method of identifying deep fake content, the method comprising steps of:

creating a hidden object using certificates from entities involved with creation of content, wherein the hidden object is a has generated from certificates associated with the entities involved with creation of the content;

receiving content at a smart device;

determining whether the content includes the hidden object therein;

responsive to the content including the hidden object, determining a hash in the hidden object;

determining a local hash for the content by the smart device; and

determining legitimacy of the content based on the hash in the hidden object and the local hash, wherein determining legitimacy includes identifying deepfake content within the content based on the hash in the hidden object and the local hash.

2 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the hidden object is a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Web Token (JWT).

3 . The method of claim 2 , wherein the JWT is embedded in the content using Least Significant Bit (LSB) steganography.

4 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the smart device is a smart television and the content is video.

5 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the steps further include:

determining the legitimacy by verifying a signature of the hidden object with a public key.

6 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the steps further include:

subsequent to the determining legitimacy, providing a visible indication on the smart device.

7 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the content is a traffic sign, the smart device is a vehicle having one or more cameras, and the determining legitimacy includes determining whether the traffic sign is one of real or fake.

8 . A non-transitory computer-readable medium comprising instructions that, when executed, cause one or more processors to perform steps of:

creating a hidden object using certificates from entities involved with creation of content, wherein the hidden object is a has generated from certificates associated with the entities involved with creation of the content;

receiving content at a smart device;

determining whether the content includes the hidden object therein;

responsive to the content including the hidden object, determining a hash in the hidden object;

determining a local hash for the content by the smart device; and

determining legitimacy of the content based on the hash in the hidden object and the local hash, wherein determining legitimacy includes identifying deepfake content within the content based on the hash in the hidden object and the local hash.

9 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 8 , wherein the hidden object is a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Web Token (JWT).

10 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 9 , wherein the JWT is embedded in the content using Least Significant Bit (LSB) steganography.

11 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 8 , wherein the smart device is a smart television and the content is video.

12 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 8 , wherein the steps further include:

determining the legitimacy by verifying a signature of the hidden object with a public key.

13 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 8 , wherein the steps further include:

subsequent to the determining legitimacy, providing a visible indication on the smart device.

14 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 8 , wherein the content is a traffic sign, the smart device is a vehicle having one or more cameras, and the determining legitimacy includes determining whether the traffic sign is one of real or fake.

15 . A smart device comprising:

a display communicably coupled to one or more processors; and

memory storing instructions that, when executed, cause the one or more processors to:

receive content to display on the display responsive to a hidden object being created using certificates from entities involved with creation of content, wherein the hidden object is a has generated from certificates associated with the entities involved with creation of the content;

determine whether the content includes the hidden object therein;

responsive to the content including the hidden object, determine a hash in the hidden object;

determine a local hash for the content by the smart device; and

determine legitimacy of the content based on the hash in the hidden object and the local hash, wherein determining legitimacy includes identifying deepfake content within the content based on the hash in the hidden object and the local hash.

16 . The smart device of claim 15 , wherein the hidden object is a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Web Token (JWT).

17 . The smart device of claim 16 , wherein the JWT is embedded in the content using Least Significant Bit (LSB) steganography.

18 . The smart device of claim 15 , wherein the smart device is a smart television and the content is video.

Assignments (3)
FIRST LIEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AGREEMENT SUPPLEMENT Recorded Sep 24, 2025
From: DIGICERT, INC.
To: HPS INVESTMENT PARTNERS, LLC, AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 072947/0203 →
SECOND LIEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECURITY AGREEMENT SUPPLEMENT Recorded Jul 30, 2025
From: DIGICERT, INC.
To: UBS AG, STAMFORD BRANCH, AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 072295/0001 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Mar 20, 2023
From: HOJJATI, AVESTA
To: DIGICERT, INC.
Reel/Frame 063036/0874 →
Continuity (2)
Continuation In Part 17660130 · Apr 21, 2022
Related Publication 20230344639A1 · Oct 26, 2023
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