IP Library Granted Patent US 12,207,093
Granted Patent B2
US 12,207,093 · App. 18/459,629 · Granted Jan 21, 2025

Methods and systems for obfuscating entry of sensitive data at mobile devices

Inventors: Daren L. Pickering (Rugby, GB); Jonathan Stewart Vokes (London, GB); Marc Massar (Coxheath, GB); Danny K. Russell (London, GB)
Assignee: Worldpay, LLC
H04W12/30G06F21/6245G06Q20/3278H04W12/128
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,207,093
App. No.
18/459,629
Granted
Jan 21, 2025
Kind
B2
Abstract

Systems and methods are disclosed for obfuscating entry of sensitive data at a mobile device, which may be infected with a rogue application configured to steal the sensitive data. One method comprises detecting a prompt for a user to enter sensitive data at a mobile device, and activating one or more of an audio speaker and a vibration motor of the mobile device. The activation of the one or more of the audio speaker and the vibration motor is terminated in response detection conclusion of the user's entry of sensitive data the mobile device.

Claims (50)

1. A computer-implemented method for obfuscating entry of sensitive data at a mobile device, comprising:

detecting a prompt for a user to enter the sensitive data at the mobile device;

activating an audio speaker of the mobile device to generate noise data, wherein sound waves from the noise data causes the mobile device to vibrate for noisy sensor readings;

transmitting the noisy sensor readings to one or more sensors to generate false readings;

transmitting the false readings to a rogue application;

detecting a completion of the entry of the sensitive data at the mobile device; and

causing the audio speaker to cease generating the noise data.

2. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , further comprising:

transmitting the noisy sensor readings to the one or more sensors of the mobile device.

3. The computer-implemented method of claim 2 , wherein the mobile device is infected with the rogue application configured to steal the sensitive data using the one or more sensors of the mobile device.

4. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , further comprising:

transmitting a signal to the one or more sensors of the mobile device upon detecting completion of the user's entry of the sensitive data at the mobile device, wherein the signal causes the one or more sensors to cease generating the false readings and resume normal readings.

5. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , further comprising:

determining a pre-determined time period to enter the sensitive data has elapsed; and

generating instruction to the audio speaker to cease generating the noise data.

6. The computer-implemented method of claim 3 , further comprising:

generating one or more instructions to a vibration motor of the mobile device to randomly turn on or turn off during the entry of the sensitive data to deliver random motor vibrations to the one or more sensors.

7. The computer-implemented method of claim 6 , wherein the randomized motor vibrations causes a change in movement patterns of the user while entering the sensitive data and reduces pattern recognition by the rogue application.

8. The computer-implemented method of claim 2 , further comprising:

detecting a movement of the mobile device and/or movement patterns of the user while entering the sensitive data; and

altering a sensor reading of the movement of the mobile device and/or the movement patterns of the user, wherein altering the sensor reading includes turning off the one or more sensors and/or disabling a transmission of the sensor readings.

9. The computer-implemented method of claim 2 , wherein the one or more sensors include a gyroscope, an accelerometer, and/or a magnetometer.

10. A system for obfuscating entry of sensitive data at a mobile device, comprising:

one or more processors; and

a non-transitory computer readable medium storing instructions which, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to perform a method comprising:

detecting a prompt for a user to enter the sensitive data at the mobile device;

activating an audio speaker of the mobile device to generate noise data, wherein sound waves from the noise data causes the mobile device to vibrate for noisy sensor readings;

transmitting the noisy sensor readings to one or more sensors to generate false readings;

transmitting the false readings to a rogue application;

detecting a completion of the entry of the sensitive data at the mobile device; and

causing the audio speaker to cease generating the noise data.

11. The system of claim 10 , further comprising:

transmitting the noisy sensor readings to the one or more sensors of the mobile device, wherein the one or more sensors include a gyroscope, an accelerometer, and/or a magnetometer.

12. The system of claim 11 , wherein the mobile device is infected with the rogue application configured to steal the sensitive data using the one or more sensors of the mobile device.

13. The system of claim 10 , further comprising:

transmitting a signal to the one or more sensors of the mobile device upon detecting completion of the user's entry of the sensitive data at the mobile device, wherein the signal causes the one or more sensors to cease generating the false readings and resume normal readings.

14. The system of claim 10 , further comprising:

determining a pre-determined time period to enter the sensitive data has elapsed; and

generating instruction to the audio speaker to cease generating the noise data.

15. The system of claim 12 , further comprising:

generating one or more instructions to a vibration motor of the mobile device to randomly turn on or turn off during the entry of the sensitive data to deliver random motor vibrations to the one or more sensors,

wherein the randomized motor vibrations causes a change in movement patterns of the user while entering the sensitive data and reduces pattern recognition by the rogue application.

16. A non-transitory computer readable medium for obfuscating entry of sensitive data at a mobile device, the non-transitory computer readable medium storing instructions that, when executed by one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to perform an operation comprising:

detecting a prompt for a user to enter the sensitive data at the mobile device;

activating an audio speaker of the mobile device to generate noise data, wherein sound waves from the noise data causes the mobile device to vibrate for noisy sensor readings;

transmitting the noisy sensor readings to one or more sensors to generate false readings;

transmitting the false readings to a rogue application;

detecting a completion of the entry of the sensitive data at the mobile device; and

causing the audio speaker to cease generating the noise data.

17. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 16 , wherein the noisy sensor readings are transmitted to the one or more sensors of the mobile device, and wherein the mobile device is infected with the rogue application configured to steal the sensitive data using the one or more sensors of the mobile device.

Assignments (5)
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTERESTS RECORDED AT REEL/FRAMES 066626/0655, 066625/0426, 066625/0347, AND 066625/0276 Recorded Jan 12, 2026
From: WILMINGTON TRUST, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS NOTES COLLATERAL AGENT
To: WORLDPAY, LLC; WORLDPAY ISO AND ECOMMERCE, LLC; PAYMETRIC, LLC; WORLDPAY US, LLC
Reel/Frame 074314/0622 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RECORDED AT R/F 066624/0719 Recorded Jan 12, 2026
From: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., AS COLLATERAL AGENT
To: WORLDPAY, LLC
Reel/Frame 074315/0412 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Feb 19, 2024
From: WORLDPAY, LLC
To: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 066624/0719 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Feb 19, 2024
From: WORLDPAY, LLC
To: WILMINGTON TRUST, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS NOTES COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 066626/0655 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Sep 1, 2023
From: PICKERING, DAREN L.; VOKES, JONATHAN STEWART; MASSAR, MARC; RUSSELL, DANNY K.
To: WORLDPAY, LLC
Reel/Frame 064773/0922 →
Continuity (3)
Continuation 17534334 · Nov 23, 2021
Continuation 16235179 · Dec 28, 2018
Related Publication 20230413058A1 · Dec 21, 2023
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