IP Library Granted Patent US 12,261,830
Granted Patent B2
US 12,261,830 · App. 18/515,155 · Granted Mar 25, 2025

Electronic device for secure communications with an automobile

Inventors: Siva G. Narendra (Portland, OR); Pradeep H. Rajashekarappa (Bangalore, IN); Andrew James Thomas (Wilsonville, OR)
Assignee: SideAssure, Inc.
H04L63/0428H04L9/3271H04L63/0492H04W4/80H04L2209/80H04L2209/84H04W12/63
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,261,830
App. No.
18/515,155
Granted
Mar 25, 2025
Kind
B2
Abstract

A mobile device securely communicates with an electronic device within an automobile. The mobile device transmits encrypted spatial state information and the electronic device provides commands to the automobile in response. Spatial state information may include location, motion, or the like. Commands to the automobile may include door unlock commands, remote start commands, horn honk commands, or the like.

Claims (27)

1. An apparatus comprising:

an integrated circuit; and

a secure communication interface that includes a radio link to allow the integrated circuit to communicate with a vehicle, wherein the integrated circuit is to:

receive a first message comprising an encrypted data from the vehicle over the radio link, wherein the encrypted data is associated with a first public cryptographic key; and

send a second message to the vehicle that is associated with a private key generated in response to the first public cryptographic key, wherein the second message includes data comprising spatial state information of the apparatus and the encrypted data from the first message, wherein the apparatus encrypts the second message and transmits back to the vehicle that is decrypted with an asymmetric private key by the vehicle to authenticate the apparatus, wherein the vehicle performs an action based at least in part on the data included in the second message, wherein if the data indicates approach towards a trunk or a hatch of the vehicle, the action includes unlocking or opening the trunk or the hatch of the vehicle.

2. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the radio link is one of a near-field radio link or a far-field radio link.

3. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the spatial state information includes location, sound recorded by a microphone, and/or accelerometer data.

4. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the vehicle is configured to encrypt the first message with a key to generate the first message.

5. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the first message includes a challenge to authenticate the apparatus.

6. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the first message includes a random number to authenticate the apparatus.

7. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein if the data indicates an approach towards a door of the vehicle, the action includes unlocking or opening the door of the vehicle.

8. A method performed by a key fob, the method comprising:

receiving a first message comprising an encrypted data from a vehicle over a radio link, wherein the encrypted data is associated with a first public cryptographic key; and

transmitting a second message to the vehicle that is associated with a private key generated in response to the first public cryptographic key, wherein the second message includes data comprising spatial state information of the key fob from the first message, wherein the key fob encrypts the second message and transmits back to the vehicle that is decrypted with an asymmetric private key by the vehicle to authenticate the key fob, wherein the vehicle performs an action based at least in part on the data included in the second message, wherein if the data indicates approach towards a trunk or a hatch of the vehicle, the action includes unlocking or opening the trunk or the hatch of the vehicle.

9. The method of claim 8 , wherein transmitting the second message comprises applying one of a near-field radio link or a far-field radio link.

10. The method of claim 8 , wherein the spatial state information includes location, sound recorded by a microphone, and/or accelerometer data.

11. The method of claim 8 , wherein the vehicle is configured to encrypt the first message with a key to generate the encrypted data.

12. The method of claim 8 , wherein the first message includes a challenge to authenticate the key fob.

13. The method of claim 8 , wherein the first message includes a random number to authenticate the key fob.

14. The method of claim 8 , wherein if the data indicates an approach towards a door of the vehicle, the action includes unlocking or opening the door of the vehicle.

15. A non-transitory machine-readable storage media having machine-readable instructions stored thereon, that when executed, causes one or more integrated circuits to perform a method comprising:

receiving a first message comprising an encrypted data from a vehicle over a radio link, wherein the encrypted data is associated with a first public cryptographic key; and

transmitting a second message to the vehicle that is associated with a private key generated in response to the first public cryptographic key, wherein the second message includes data comprising spatial state information of the one or more integrated circuits from the first message, wherein the one or more integrated circuits encrypts the second message and transmits back to the vehicle that is decrypted with an asymmetric private key by the vehicle to authenticate the one or more integrated circuits, wherein the vehicle performs an action based at least in part on the data included in the second message, wherein if the data indicates approach towards a trunk or a hatch of the vehicle, the action includes unlocking or opening the trunk or the hatch of the vehicle.

16. The non-transitory machine-readable storage media of claim 15 having the machine-readable instructions stored thereon, that when executed, causes the one or more integrated circuits, wherein transmitting the second message comprises applying one of a near-field radio link or a far-field radio link.

17. The non-transitory machine-readable storage media of claim 15 having the machine-readable instructions stored thereon, that when executed, causes the one or more integrated circuits, wherein spatial state data includes location, sound recorded by a microphone, and/or accelerometer data.

18. The non-transitory machine-readable storage media of claim 15 having the machine-readable instructions stored thereon, that when executed, causes the one or more integrated circuits, wherein the vehicle is configured to encrypt the first message with a key to generate the encrypted data.

19. The non-transitory machine-readable storage media of claim 15 , wherein the first message includes a random number to authenticate the one or more integrated circuits.

Assignments (1)
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded May 10, 2024
From: SIDEASSURE, INC.
To: ROGUE VENTURE PARTNERS FUND IV, L.P.
Reel/Frame 067378/0202 →
Continuity (3)
Continuation 17933035 · Sep 16, 2022
Continuation 15986954 · May 23, 2018
Related Publication 20240348587A1 · Oct 17, 2024
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