Permission-based control of interfacing components with a medical device
Disclosed are embodiments directed to security methods applied to connections between components in a distributed (networked) system including medical and non-medical devices, providing secure authentication, authorization, patient and device data transfer, and patient data association and privacy for components of the system.
1. A wearable cardiac monitoring system, comprising:
a wearable cardiac monitoring device (WMD);
a processor,
a discharge circuit configured to discharge a stored electrical charge through a body of a patient, the discharge circuit in communication with the processor; and
a memory in communication with the processor, the memory including a certificate store in which is stored a security certificate, the security certificate including:
information that identifies a trusted component with which the WMD has secure communication,
a public key that enables encryption of data intended to be delivered to the trusted component,
at least one data field associated with at least one function that the trusted component can perform in connection with the WMD, and
a signature that authenticates the security certificate as being attested to by a Certificate Authority;
wherein the processor is programmed to deny communication with the trusted component when the security certificate is not attested to by the Certificate Authority.
2. The wearable cardiac monitoring system of claim 1 , wherein the at least one data field comprises information that identifies a set of permissions that are authorized to the trusted component.
3. The wearable cardiac monitoring system of claim 2 , wherein the information that identifies the set of permissions comprises an element type, and the WMD authorizes permissions to the trusted component based on the element type.
4. The wearable cardiac monitoring system of claim 1 , wherein the WMD is a wearable cardioverter defibrillator (WCD).
5. The wearable cardiac monitoring system of claim 1 , wherein the processor is further programmed to deny communication with the trusted component when the security certificate has been revoked.
6. The wearable cardiac monitoring system of claim 1 , wherein the processor is further configured to retrieve a certificate revocation list (CRL) to determine whether the security certificate is revoked.
7. The wearable cardiac monitoring system of claim 1 , wherein the signature comprises a digital signature created by the Certificate Authority.
8. The wearable cardiac monitoring system of claim 1 , wherein the Certificate Authority is associated with the wearable cardiac monitoring system for providing therapy.
9. The wearable cardiac monitoring system of claim 1 , wherein the security certificate is encrypted and is decrypted using a public key associated with the Certificate Authority.
10. The wearable cardiac monitoring system of claim 1 , wherein the trusted component is further configured to communicate data from the WMD to a cloud-based server.
11. The wearable cardiac monitoring system of claim 1 , wherein the secure communication includes patient physiological data that can be used in treating a medical condition.
12. A medical communication system, comprising:
a cloud-based server configured to:
receive a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) from a trusted component requesting to communicate with a wearable cardiac monitoring device (WMD),
transmit the CSR to a Certificate Authority,
receive a security certificate from the Certificate Authority,
transmit the security certificate to the WMD, and
establish a secure communication between the WMD and the trusted component.
13. The medical communication system of claim 12 , wherein the Certificate Authority is configured to:
validate the CSR received from the cloud-based server, and
create the security certificate when the CSR is validated.
14. The medical communication system of claim 13 , wherein the security certificate includes:
information that specifically identifies the trusted component;
a public key that enables encryption of data intended to be delivered to the trusted component;
at least one data field associated with at least one function that the trusted component can perform in connection with the WMD; and
a signature that authenticates the security certificate as being attested to by the Certificate Authority.
15. The medical communication system of claim 14 , wherein the public key associated with the Certificate Authority resides within a root certificate stored in a memory.
16. The medical communication system of claim 14 , wherein the at least one data field comprises an element type having an associated set of permissions that authorize a set of tasks that the trusted component can perform in connection with the medical communication system.
17. The medical communication system of claim 14 , wherein the trusted component comprises a private key corresponding to the public key.
18. The medical communication system of claim 12 , wherein the cloud-based server is further configured to retrieve a certificate revocation list (CRL) to determine when the security certificate is revoked.
19. The medical communication system of claim 18 , wherein the cloud-based server is further configured to deny communication with the trusted component when the security certificate has been revoked.
20. A medical communication system, comprising:
a cloud-based server configured to:
receive a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) from a trusted component requesting to communicate with a wearable cardiac monitoring device (WMD),
transmit the CSR to a Certificate Authority,
receive a security certificate from the Certificate Authority, wherein the security certificate includes:
information that specifically identifies the trusted component;
a public key that enables encryption of data intended to be delivered to the trusted component;
at least one data field associated with at least one function that the trusted component can perform in connection with the WMD; and
a signature that authenticates the security certificate as being attested to by the Certificate Authority,
transmit the security certificate to the WMD, and
establish a secure communication between the WMD and the trusted component, wherein the trusted component comprises a private key corresponding to the public key.