IP Library Granted Patent US 12,248,579
Granted Patent B1
US 12,248,579 · App. 18/587,346 · Granted Mar 11, 2025

AI-based vehicle cybersecurity with 5G/6G sub-network topology

Inventors: David E. Newman (Poway, CA); R. Kemp Massengill (Palos Verdea, CA)
G06F21/572B60R16/0231G06F8/61G06F8/65G06F11/1433G06F2221/034
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,248,579
App. No.
18/587,346
Granted
Mar 11, 2025
Kind
B1
Abstract

Cybersecurity is a critical requirement for current and future vehicles, to protect against catastrophic cyber attacks. Vehicles today (including land vehicles, waterborne vehicles, and aircraft including such embodiments as airplanes, helicopters, and air taxis) are constructed with myriad separate sensors and actuators, which generally have only limited cyber protections—a worrying vulnerability. Therefore, procedures are disclosed for a vehicle-wide 5G/6G network in which each ECU (electronic control unit) is a separate user device. Each ECU is also the manager of a set of sensors and actuators, forming a local sub-network with tightly regulated wireless protocols. Each ECU and each end sensor/actuator may include an AI model to detect and defeat cyber attacks. Each sensor/actuator boots from ROM and executes from ROM, performs its specific tasks on demand, and then communicates the results solely with its ECU in a nested-star topology, thereby providing vehicle-wide cybersecurity on par with 3GPP standards.

Claims (46)

1. A vehicle comprising:

a) an internal wireless network contained in the vehicle, the internal wireless network comprising an internal base station and an internal core network;

b) a plurality of electronic control units (“ECUs”), each ECU registered as a user device on the internal wireless network and configured to communicate wirelessly with the internal base station on managed communication channels; and

c) for each ECU, two or more end devices associated with the ECU, each end device comprising a sensor or an actuator, the sensor or actuator operably connected to a processor comprising a programmable read-only memory (“PROM”), the processor operably connected to a wireless transceiver configured for wireless communication with the ECU;

d) wherein the internal base station or internal core network comprises a transceiver configured to communicate, using a Doppler-corrected wireless link, with an external base station or external core network at a fixed site external to the vehicle; and

e) wherein each communication between an end device and the associated ECU comprises exactly one of:

i) a command transmitted from the ECU to the end device; or

ii) a message comprising data or a pre-configured reply, transmitted from the end device to the ECU.

2. The vehicle of claim 1 , wherein the managed communication channels between each ECU and the internal base station are configured according to 5G or 6G technologies.

3. The vehicle of claim 1 , comprising at least one of:

a) a roadway vehicle comprising an automobile, a truck, or a bus;

b) a railroad vehicle comprising a passenger train or a freight train;

c) a waterborne vehicle comprising a boat or ship or submarine;

d) an airborne vehicle comprising a passenger airliner, a freight aircraft, a private plane, a helicopter, or an air taxi.

4. The vehicle of claim 1 , wherein:

a) each end device is configured to accept messages from the associated ECU, and to reject or ignore all messages received from all other sources; and

b) each ECU is configured to accept messages received from an end device associated with the ECU, and to accept messages received from the base station, and to reject or ignore all messages received from all other sources, other than the associated end devices and the base station.

5. The vehicle of claim 1 , wherein for each end device:

a) the PROM contains instructions comprising a boot sequence and an operating system;

b) the processor is configured to execute instructions of the boot sequence and the operating system; and

c) the processor is further configured to avoid executing instructions from all other sources, other than the boot sequence and the operating system contained in the PROM.

6. The vehicle of claim 1 , wherein for each end device:

a) the PROM contains a single-use key table comprising one or more single-use keys;

b) the end device is configured to receive an installation message from the ECU associated with the end device, the installation message comprising an index and encrypted firmware;

c) the processor is configured to retrieve a particular single-use key from the single-use key table, selected according to the index; and

d) the processor of the end device is further configured to use the particular single-use key to decrypt the encrypted firmware, and to install the decrypted firmware in the PROM.

7. The vehicle of claim 6 , wherein for each end device:

a) the PROM includes a write-enable function that enables alteration of one or more instructions in the PROM;

b) the write-enable feature is protected by a password; and

c) the installation message comprises information enabling the processor to determine the password.

8. A vehicle comprising:

a) an internal wireless network contained in the vehicle, the internal wireless network comprising an internal base station and an internal core network;

b) a plurality of electronic control units (“ECUs”), each ECU registered as a user device on the internal wireless network and configured to communicate wirelessly with the internal base station on managed communication channels; and

c) for each ECU, two or more end devices associated with the ECU, each end device comprising a sensor or an actuator, the sensor or actuator operably connected to a processor comprising a programmable read-only memory (“PROM”), the processor operably connected to a wireless transceiver configured for wireless communication with the ECU;

d) wherein the internal base station or internal core network comprises a transceiver configured to communicate, using a Doppler-corrected wireless link, with an external base station or external core network at a fixed site external to the vehicle:

e) wherein each end device is configured to accept messages from the associated ECU, and to reject or ignore all messages received from all other sources; and

f) wherein each ECU is configured to accept messages received from an end device associated with the ECU, and to accept messages received from the base station, and to reject or ignore all messages received from all other sources, other than the associated end devices and the base station.

9. A vehicle comprising:

a) an internal wireless network contained in the vehicle, the internal wireless network comprising an internal base station and an internal core network;

b) a plurality of electronic control units (“ECUs”), each ECU registered as a user device on the internal wireless network and configured to communicate wirelessly with the internal base station on managed communication channels; and

c) for each ECU, two or more end devices associated with the ECU, each end device comprising a sensor or an actuator, the sensor or actuator operably connected to a processor comprising a programmable read-only memory (“PROM”), the processor operably connected to a wireless transceiver configured for wireless communication with the ECU;

d) wherein the internal base station or internal core network comprises a transceiver configured to communicate, using a Doppler-corrected wireless link, with an external base station or external core network at a fixed site external to the vehicle;

e) wherein for each end device:

i. the PROM contains instructions comprising a boot sequence and an operating system;

ii. the processor is configured to execute instructions of the boot sequence and the operating system; and

iii. the processor is further configured to avoid executing instructions from all other sources, other than the boot sequence and the operating system contained in the PROM.

Assignments (1)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Apr 2, 2025
From: MASSENGILL, R. KEMP
To: THE MASSENGILL FAMILY TRUST
Reel/Frame 070719/0345 →
Continuity (5)
Provisional Application 63610930 · Dec 15, 2023
Provisional Application 63600989 · Nov 20, 2023
Provisional Application 63591038 · Oct 17, 2023
Provisional Application 63588678 · Oct 6, 2023
Provisional Application 63578649 · Aug 24, 2023
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