IP Library Granted Patent US 12,585,777
Granted Patent B2
US 12,585,777 · App. 18/630,863 · Granted Mar 24, 2026

Processing device and method for secure booting thereof

Inventor: Myunghoon Choi (Seongnam-si, KR)
Assignee: REBELLIONS INC.
G06F21/572G06F9/4401G06F21/575G06F21/64
View Patent ↗
Loading inventors, assignments & file history…
Monitor This Case
Get email alerts when status or documents change.
Order Certified Copies
Most orders are placed with the USPTO same day — all within 24 business hours.
Order via The Patent Place →
Pre-filled with this patent's details
Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,585,777
App. No.
18/630,863
Granted
Mar 24, 2026
Kind
B2
Abstract

Provided are a processing device and a method for secure booting thereof, in which the processing device includes a security core that operates a Root of Trust and sequentially performs an integrity check on first firmware and second firmware through the Root of Trust, a main core that sequentially operates the first firmware and the second firmware, a non-volatile memory storing the first firmware and the second firmware, and a first volatile memory that loads the first firmware and the second firmware from a main core domain of the main core and operates the loaded firmware with the main core.

Claims (46)

1 . A processing device comprising:

a security core that operates a Root of Trust and sequentially performs, through the Root of Trust, a first integrity check on first firmware and a second integrity check on second firmware;

a main core that sequentially performs a first operation of the first firmware and a second operation of the second firmware;

a non-volatile memory that stores the first firmware and the second firmware;

a first volatile memory that loads the first firmware and the second firmware from a main core domain of the main core and operates the loaded firmware with the main core,

wherein the first integrity check is performed before the first operation,

wherein the second integrity check is performed before the second operation, and

wherein the first operation is performed in parallel with the second integrity check.

2 . The processing device according to claim 1 , wherein the security core transfers, after the first integrity check, the first firmware to the first volatile memory, and transfers, after the second integrity check, the second firmware to the first volatile memory.

3 . The processing device according to claim 1 , wherein the security core includes a main-security interface that controls data transfer from the main core to the security core, and a security-main interface that controls data transfer from the security core to the main core.

4 . The processing device according to claim 3 , wherein the security core includes a first area accessible to the main core through the main-security interface,

wherein the main core includes a second area accessible to the security core through the security-main interface, and

wherein the first area is smaller than the second area.

5 . The processing device according to claim 1 , wherein a time of the first operation and a time of the second integrity check overlap with each other.

6 . The processing device according to claim 1 , wherein the security core performs a third integrity check on third firmware, and

wherein the main core performs a third operation of the third firmware.

7 . The processing device according to claim 6 , wherein the security core sequentially performs the first integrity check, the second integrity check, and the third integrity check, and

wherein the main core sequentially performs the first operation, the second operation, and the third operation.

8 . The processing device according to claim 6 , wherein the third integrity check is performed before the third operation, and

wherein the second operation is performed in parallel with the third integrity check.

9 . The processing device according to claim 8 , wherein a time of the second operation and a time of the third integrity check overlap with each other.

10 . The processing device according to claim 1 , further comprising:

at least one neural processor that receives a task descriptor from the main core and performs a task; and

a shared memory shared by the at least one neural processor.

11 . The processing device according to claim 1 , further comprising:

a second volatile memory for the security core to load the Root of Trust.

12 . The processing device according to claim 11 , wherein the second volatile memory is separated from the first volatile memory.

13 . The processing device according to claim 1 , further comprising:

a plurality of neural processors, each of which receives a task generated by the main core, and

a global interconnection that transfers data among the plurality of neural processors, the main core, and the security core.

14 . The processing device according to claim 13 , wherein each of the plurality of neural processors generates a completion report for the task and transfers the generated completion report to the main core.

15 . A method for secure booting of a processing device, the method comprising:

operating, by a security core, a Root of Trust;

performing, by the security core, a first integrity check on first firmware and a second integrity check on second firmware sequentially; and

performing, by a main core, a first operation of the first firmware on which the first integrity check is performed, and a second operation of the second firmware on which the second integrity check is performed,

wherein the first operation is performed in parallel with the second integrity check.

16 . The method according to claim 15 , further comprising:

stopping, by the security core, an operation of the main core if tampering with at least one of the first firmware or the second firmware is detected in at least one of the first integrity check or the second integrity check.

17 . The method according to claim 16 , further comprising:

initializing, by the security core, all data in a first volatile memory after stopping the operation of the main core, wherein the first volatile memory loads the first firmware and the second firmware from a main core domain of the main core and operates the loaded first firmware and the loaded second firmware with the main core.

18 . The method according to claim 17 , further comprising:

executing, by the security core, a recovery mode to replace the first firmware and the second firmware if tampering with at least one of the first firmware or the second firmware is detected, wherein the main core is limited in operation during the recovery mode.

19 . The method according to claim 18 , further comprising:

terminating, by the security core, the recovery mode, and resuming, by the security core, the operation of the main core, if the first firmware and the second firmware are normalized.

20 . The method according to claim 15 , wherein the operating the Root of Trust includes loading the Root of Trust from an immutable memory, and

wherein the immutable memory is inaccessible to the main core and accessible to the security core.

Assignments (1)
MERGER AND CHANGE OF NAME Recorded May 22, 2025
From: REBELLIONS INC.; SAPEON KOREA INC.
To: REBELLIONS INC.
Reel/Frame 071355/0107 →
Priority Claims (1)
KR 10-2022-0157678 · Nov 22, 2022 · national
Continuity (2)
Continuation 18511927 · Nov 16, 2023
Related Publication 20250356015A1 · Nov 20, 2025
References Cited (11)
US 11899795B2 · Lee · 2024 [cited by applicant]
US 11983274B1 · Choi · 2024 [cited by examiner]
US 20070083760A1 · Cho · 2007 [cited by examiner]
US 20130263262A1 · Forristal · 2013 [cited by applicant]
US 20220121750A1 · Lee · 2022 [cited by examiner]
KR 1020140054204A · 2014 [cited by applicant]
KR 1020180092596A · 2018 [cited by applicant]
KR 102126931B1 · 2020 [cited by applicant]
KR 1020220050290A · 2022 [cited by applicant]
Office Action for KR 10-2023-0087977 by Korean Intellectual Property Office dated Mar. 10, 2025. [cited by applicant]
Kim, Jin-Woo et al. (2019) “An Implementation of Secure book Using TPM in Embedded System,” Journal of The Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology. vol. 29, No. 5. doi: 10.13089/JKIISC.2019.29.5949. [cited by applicant]