IP Library Granted Patent US 12,592,833
Granted Patent B2
US 12,592,833 · App. 18/677,163 · Granted Mar 31, 2026

Method for authentication and related devices

Inventors: Girish Shivalingappa Revadigar (Singapore, SG); Zhuo Wei (Singapore, SG); Zhen Li (Shenzhen, CN)
Assignee: SHENZHEN YINWANG INTELLIGENT TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD.
H04L9/3247H04W12/041H04W12/06
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,592,833
App. No.
18/677,163
Granted
Mar 31, 2026
Kind
B2
Abstract

A method for authentication and related devices includes obtaining a first session key B S1 generated according to a set X and a set Y. The set X is a set of samples of received signal strength indicators (RSSIs) of a wireless channel of a user equipment (UE), and the set Y is a set of samples of RSSIs of a wireless channel of a vehicle. Upon receiving a second message from the UE, wherein the second message is hashed by a second session key B S2 , extracting the second session key B S2 from the second message. When the first session key B S1 is the same as the second session key B S2 , the authentication between the UE and the vehicle is successful.

Claims (55)

1 . An apparatus, comprising:

a memory configured to store programming instructions; and

one or more processors coupled to the memory and configured to execute the instructions to cause the apparatus to:

obtain a first session key B S1 , wherein the first session key B S1 is based on L C from a server, wherein Lc is a list of common indexes combining L X_disc and L Y_disc , wherein L X_disc is a list of indexes discarded during quantization of a set X, wherein L Y_disc is a list of indexes discarded during quantization of a set Y, wherein X is a set of samples of first received signal strength indicators (RSSIs) of a wireless channel of a user equipment (UE), and wherein Y is a set of samples of second RSSIs of a wireless channel of a vehicle;

receive a first message from the UE, wherein the first message is hashed by a second session key B S2 , and wherein the second session key B S2 is based on Lc;

extract B S2 from the first message; and

authenticate a session between the UE and the vehicle when the first session key B S1 is the same as the second session key B S2 .

2 . The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the one or more processors are further configured to execute the instructions to cause the apparatus to receive a second message from the server, wherein the second message comprises (E(K pub_V ,m 10 ), S(K priv_S ,m 12 ), wherein E(k, m) denotes encryption of message m using secret key k, wherein S(k, m) denotes a digital signature on m using key k, wherein K pub_V is a public key of the vehicle, wherein K priv_S is a private key of the server, wherein m 10 =n∥CMD_AUTH_FINISH∥Bs, wherein n is a nonce, wherein CMD_AUTH_FINISH is a first command identifier (ID) for authentication finishing, wherein Bs is a session key, wherein Bs is extracted from the first message as the first session key B S1 , wherein m 12 =n∥CMD_SS∥Bs, and wherein CMD_SS is a second command ID for a session secret.

3 . The apparatus of claim 2 , wherein the first message comprises (E(K U ,m 13 ),S(K priv_D ,m 14 )), wherein E(k, m) denotes encryption of message m using a secret key k, wherein S(k, m) denotes digital signature on m using key k, wherein K U is a BLUETOOTH user device key shared between the UE and the vehicle by a trusted entity, wherein K priv_D is the private key of the UE, wherein m 13 =n∥CMD_AUTH_CHK, wherein n is a nonce, wherein CMD_AUTH_CHK is a third command ID for authentication checking, wherein m 14 =H (B S2 ,E(K U ,m 13 )), wherein H(k, m) is a cryptographic hash on m using key k, and wherein B S2 is the second session key.

4 . The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the one or more processors are further configured to execute the instructions to further cause the apparatus to:

receive a third message from the server, wherein the third message includes: (E(K pub_V ,m 10 ),S(K priv_S ,m 11 ), wherein E(k, m) denotes encryption of message m using secret key k, wherein S(k, m) denotes digital signature on m using key k, wherein K pub_V is a public key of the vehicle, wherein K priv_S is a private key of the server, wherein m 10 =n∥CMD_LIST_COM∥Lc, wherein n is a nonce, wherein CMD_LIST_COM is a first command identifier (ID) for list of common indices or items, wherein m 11 is H(E(K pub_D ,m 10 ), wherein H (k, m) is a cryptographic hash on m using key k, and wherein K pub_D is a public key of the UE; and

generate the first session key B S1 according to Lc.

5 . The apparatus of claim 4 , wherein the first message comprises (E(K U ,m 14 ),S(K priv_D ,m 15 )), wherein E(k, m) denotes encryption of message m using secret key k, wherein S(k, m) denotes digital signature on m using key k, wherein K U is a BLUETOOTH user device key shared between the UE and the vehicle by a trusted entity, wherein n is a nonce, wherein K priv_D is a private key of the UE, wherein m 14 =n∥CMD_AUTH_CHK, wherein CMD_AUTH_CHK is a second command ID for authentication checking, wherein m 15 =H (B S2 ,E(K U ,m 14 ), and wherein B S2 is the second session key.

6 . The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the one or more processors are further configured to execute the instructions to further cause the apparatus to:

obtain Y by recoding the second RSSIs; and

send Y to the server.

7 . The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the one or more processors are further configured to execute the instructions to further cause the apparatus:

obtain Y by recoding the second RSSIs;

obtain a bit string B Y and L Y_disc by applying quantization to Y; and

send the bit string B Y and L Y_disc to the server.

8 . A method comprising:

obtaining a first session key B S1 , wherein the first session key B S1 is based on Lc from a server, wherein Lc is a list of common indexes combining L X_disc and L Y_disc , wherein L X_disc is a list of indexes discarded during quantization of a set X, wherein L Y_disc is a list of indexes discarded during quantization of a set Y, wherein X is a set of samples of first received signal strength indicators (RSSIs) of a wireless channel of a user equipment (UE), and wherein Y is a set of samples of second RSSIs of a wireless channel of a vehicle;

receiving a first message from the UE, wherein the first message is hashed by a second session key B S2 , and wherein the second session key B S2 is based on Lc;

extracting B S2 from the first message; and

authenticating a session between the UE and the vehicle when the first session key B S1 is the same as the second session key B S2 .

9 . The method of claim 8 , further comprising receiving a second message from the server, wherein the second message comprises (E(K pub_V ,m 10 ),S(K priv_S ,m 12 ), wherein E(k, m) denotes encryption of message m using secret key k, wherein S(k, m) denotes a digital signature on m using key k, wherein K pub_V is a public key of the vehicle, wherein K priv_S is a private key of the server, wherein m 10 =n∥CMD_AUTH_FINISH∥Bs, wherein n is a nonce, wherein CMD_AUTH_FINISH is a first command identifier (ID) for authentication finishing, wherein Bs is a session key, wherein Bs is extracted from the first message as the first session key B S1 , wherein m 12 =n∥CMD_SS∥Bs, and wherein CMD_SS is a second command ID for a session secret.

10 . The method of claim 9 , wherein the first message comprises (E(K U ,m 13 ), S(K priv_D ,m 14 )), wherein E(k, m) denotes encryption of message m using a secret key k, wherein S(k, m) denotes digital signature on m using key k, wherein K U is a BLUETOOTH user device key shared between the UE and the vehicle by a trusted entity, wherein K priv_D is the private key of the UE, wherein m 13 =n∥CMD_AUTH_CHK, wherein n is a nonce, wherein CMD_AUTH_CHK is a third command ID for authentication checking, wherein m 14 =H(B S2 ,E(K U ,m 13 )), wherein H(k, m) is a cryptographic hash on m using key k, and wherein B S2 is the second session key.

11 . The method of claim 8 , further comprising:

receiving a third message from the server, wherein the third message includes: (E(K pub_V ,m 10 ), S(K priv_S ,m 11 ), wherein E(k, m) denotes encryption of message m using secret key k, wherein S(k, m) denotes digital signature on m using key k, wherein K pub_V is a public key of the vehicle, wherein K priv_S is a private key of the server, wherein m 10 =n∥CMD_LIST_COM∥Lc, wherein n is a nonce, wherein CMD_LIST_COM is a first command identifier (ID) for list of common indices or items, wherein m 11 is H(E(K pub_D , m 10 )), wherein H(k, m) is a cryptographic hash on m using key k, and wherein K pub_D is a public key of the UE; and

generating the first session key B S1 according to Lc.

12 . The method of claim 11 , wherein the first message comprises (E(K U ,m 14 ), S(K priv_D ,m 15 )), wherein E(k, m) denotes encryption of message m using secret key k, wherein S(k, m) denotes digital signature on m using key k, wherein K U is a BLUETOOTH user device key shared between the UE and the vehicle by a trusted entity, wherein n is a nonce, wherein K priv_D is a private key of the UE, wherein m 14 =n∥CMD_AUTH_CHK, wherein CMD_AUTH_CHK is a second command ID for authentication checking, wherein m 15 =H(B S2 ,E(K U ,m 14 )), and wherein B S2 is the second session key.

13 . The method of claim 8 , further comprising:

obtaining Y by recoding the second RSSIs; and

sending Y to the server.

14 . The method of claim 8 , further comprising:

obtaining Y by recoding the second RSSIs;

obtaining a bit string B Y and L Y_disc by applying quantization to Y; and

sending the bit string B Y and L Y_disc to the server.

15 . A computer program product stored in a non-transitory computer readable medium and comprising a computer program that, when executed by one or more processors, causes an electronic device to:

obtain a first session key B S1 , wherein the first session key B S1 is based on Lc from a server, wherein Lc is a list of common indexes combining L X_disc and L Y_disc , wherein L X_disc is a list of indexes discarded during quantization of a set X, wherein L Y_disc is a list of indexes discarded during quantization of a set Y, wherein X is a set of samples of first received signal strength indicators (RSSIs) of a wireless channel of a user equipment (UE), and wherein Y is a set of samples of second RSSIs of a wireless channel of a vehicle;

receive a first message from the UE, wherein the first message is hashed by a second session key B S2 , and wherein the second session key B S2 is based on Lc;

extract B S2 from the first message; and

authenticate a session between the UE and the vehicle when the first session key B S1 is the same as the second session key B S2 .

16 . The computer program product of claim 15 , wherein the computer program that, when executed by the one or more processors, further causes the electronic device to receive a second message from the server, wherein the second message comprises (E(K pub_V ,m 10 ),S(K priv_S ,m 12 ), wherein E(k, m) denotes encryption of message m using secret key k, wherein S(k, m) denotes a digital signature on m using key k, wherein K pub_V is a public key of the vehicle, wherein K priv_S is a private key of the server, wherein m 10 =n∥CMD_AUTH_FINISH∥Bs, wherein n is a nonce, wherein CMD_AUTH_FINISH is a first command identifier (ID) for authentication finishing, wherein Bs is a session key, wherein Bs is extracted from the first message as the first session key B S1 , wherein m 12 =n∥CMD_SS∥Bs, and wherein CMD_SS is a second command ID for a session secret.

17 . The computer program product of claim 16 , wherein the first message comprises (E(K U ,m 13 ),S(K priv_D ,m 14 )), wherein E(k, m) denotes encryption of message m using a secret key k, wherein S(k, m) denotes digital signature on m using key k, wherein K U is a BLUETOOTH user device key shared between the UE and the vehicle by a trusted entity, wherein K priv_D is the private key of the UE, wherein m 13 =n∥CMD_AUTH_CHK, wherein n is a nonce, wherein CMD_AUTH_CHK is a third command ID for authentication checking, wherein m 14 =H(B S2 ,E(K U ,m 13 )), wherein H(k, m) is a cryptographic hash on m using key k, and wherein B S2 is the second session key.

18 . The computer program product of claim 15 , wherein the computer program that, when executed by the one or more processors, further causes the electronic device to:

receive a third message from the server, wherein the third message includes: (E(K pub_V ,m 10 ),S(K priv_S ,m 11 ), wherein E(k, m) denotes encryption of message m using secret key k, wherein S(k, m) denotes digital signature on m using key k, wherein K pub_V is a public key of the vehicle, wherein K priv_S is a private key of the server, wherein m 10 =n∥CMD_LIST_COM∥Lc, wherein n is a nonce, wherein CMD_LIST_COM is a command identifier for list of common indices or items, wherein m 11 is H(E(K pub_D ,m 10 )), wherein H(k, m) is a cryptographic hash on m using key k, and wherein K pub_D is a public key of the UE; and

generate the first session key B S1 according to Lc.

19 . The computer program product of claim 15 , wherein the computer program that, when executed by the one or more processors, further causes the electronic device to:

obtain Y by recoding the second RSSIs; and

send Y to the server.

20 . The computer program product of claim 15 , wherein the computer program that, when executed by the one or more processors, further causes the electronic device to:

obtain Y by recoding the second RSSIs;

obtain a bit string B Y and L Y_disc by applying quantization to Y; and

send the bit string B Y and L Y_disc to the server.

Assignments (2)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Nov 12, 2024
From: HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD.
To: SHENZHEN YINWANG INTELLIGENT TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD.
Reel/Frame 069336/0125 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Nov 1, 2024
From: REVADIGAR, GIRISH SHIVALINGAPPA; WEI, ZHUO; LI, ZHEN
To: HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD.
Reel/Frame 069110/0642 →
Continuity (2)
Continuation PCTCN2021134667 · Nov 30, 2021
Related Publication 20240313981A1 · Sep 19, 2024
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