IP Library Granted Patent US 12,641,434
Granted Patent B2
US 12,641,434 · App. 18/678,080 · Granted May 26, 2026

Attack detection for ultra-wideband high-rate pulse optimization

Inventors: Ajinder Pal Singh (Allen, TX); Daniel Lee (Salt Lake City, UT)
Assignee: Infineon Technologies AG
H04W12/122H04B1/7163
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,641,434
App. No.
18/678,080
Granted
May 26, 2026
Kind
B2
Abstract

Systems, methods, and circuitries are provided for determining the likelihood that a malicious signal component is present in a UWB signal. In one example, a UWB receiver device is configured to receive a UWB signal during a ranging round; correlate the received UWB signal with a reference STS template to generate a correlation output; based on the correlation output, compute a channel quality indicator that characterizes a noise level of the channel; compute an attack-detection figure of merit (A-D FOM) based on the channel quality indicator, a block error of the received UWB signal, or a frequency error of the received UWB signal; and provide data indicative of the A-D FOM to a controller device.

Claims (51)

1 . A method, comprising:

with a UWB receiver device,

receiving a UWB signal during a ranging round;

correlating the received UWB signal with a reference secure training sequence (STS) template to generate a correlation output;

determining a distance between a transmitter of the received UWB signal based on the received UWB signal and the UWB receiver device based on the correlation output and one or more secure ranging parameters, wherein the one or more secure ranging parameters are received from a controller device;

based on the correlation output, computing a channel quality indicator that characterizes a noise level of the channel;

computing an attack-detection figure of merit (A-D FOM) based on the channel quality indicator, a block error of the received UWB signal, or a frequency error of the received UWB signal; and

providing data indicative of the A-D FOM to the controller device, and

with the controller device,

receiving the data indicative of the A-D FOM from the UWB receiver device; and

generating a security signal when the A-D FOM exceeds a threshold value.

2 . The method of claim 1 , comprising, with the controller device,

optimizing the secure ranging parameters based on the A-D FOM; and

transmitting data indicative of the optimized secure ranging parameters to the UWB receiver device for use by the UWB receiver device in processing UWB signals received in subsequent ranging rounds.

3 . The method of claim 2 , wherein the one or more secure ranging parameters comprise parameters related to a back-search time window, noise floor estimation, or a peak detection threshold.

4 . The method of claim 1 , comprising, with the controller device,

tagging the data indicative of the A-D FOM with an indication of a geographic location of the controller device to generate geo-tagged A-D FOM data; and

transmitting the geo-tagged A-D FOM data or data derived from the geo-tagged A-D FOM data to a second device that hosts a repository of geo-tagged A-D FOM data.

5 . The method of claim 1 , comprising, with the UWB receiver device,

computing the channel quality indicator for the ranging round based on a main peak to early peak (MPEP) differential of the correlation output, an early peak to noise floor differential of the correlation output, and a noise floor of the correlation output.

6 . The method of claim 1 , comprising, with the UWB receiver device, computing the A-D FOM based on comparison of a block error value to a threshold or a pattern of block failures.

7 . The method of claim 1 , comprising, with the UWB receiver device, computing the A-D FOM by detecting high energy pulses in the UWB signal at a fractional frequency with respect to a frequency of pulses in an intended UWB signal.

8 . A controller device, comprising a processor and a memory, the processor configured to, when executing instructions stored in the memory, cause the controller device to,

receive data indicative of an attack-detection figure of merit (A-D FOM), wherein the A-D FOM is based on a correlation between a UWB signal received by a first UWB receiver device and a reference STS template, a block error of the UWB signal, or a frequency error of the UWB signal; and

determine at least one optimized secure ranging parameter based on the A-D FOM; and

provide the at least one optimized secure ranging parameter to a UWB receiver device for use in processing of subsequently received UWB signals.

9 . The controller device of 8 , wherein the processor is configured to cause the controller device to

provide the at least one optimized secure ranging parameter to a second UWB receiver device for use in processing received UWB signals wherein the second UWB receiver device is different from the first UWB receiver device.

10 . The controller device of claim 8 , wherein the at least one optimized secure ranging parameter comprises parameters related to a back-search time window, noise floor estimation, or a peak detection threshold.

11 . The controller device of 8 , wherein the processor is configured to cause the controller device to

tag the A-D FOM with an indication of a geographic location of the controller device to generate geo-tagged A-D FOM data; and

transmit the geo-tagged A-D FOM data or data derived from the geo-tagged A-D FOM data to a second device that hosts a repository of tagged A-D FOM data.

12 . The controller device of claim 8 , wherein the processor is configured to

determine a geographic location of the controller device; and

determine the at least one optimized secure ranging parameter based on geo-tagged A-D FOM data mapped to the geographic location.

13 . The controller device of claim 8 , wherein the processor is configured to cause the controller device to

request channel classification information for a current location of the controller device from a second device, wherein the channel classification is based on A-D FOM data collected from a plurality of UWB receiver devices; and

determine the at least one optimized secure ranging parameter based on the channel classification information received from the second device.

14 . The controller device of 8 , wherein the processor is configured to cause the controller device to generate a security signal in response to the A-D FOM exceeding a threshold.

15 . An ultra-wideband (UWB) receiver device comprising a processor and a memory, the processor configured to, when executing instructions stored in the memory, cause the device to:

receive a UWB signal during a ranging round;

correlate the received UWB signal with a reference secure training sequence (STS) template to generate a correlation output;

based on the correlation output,

compute a channel quality indicator that characterizes a noise level of the channel; and

compute an attack-detection figure of merit (A-D FOM) based on the channel quality indicator, a block error of the received UWB signal, or a frequency error of the received UWB signal; and

provide data indicative of the A-D FOM to a controller device.

16 . The UWB receiver device of claim 15 , wherein the processor is configured to provide the A-D FOM periodically or in response to a request from the controller device.

17 . The UWB receiver device of claim 15 , wherein the processor is configured to compute the channel quality indicator for the ranging round based on a main peak to early peak (MPEP) differential of the correlation output, an early peak to noise floor differential of the correlation output, and a noise floor of the correlation output.

18 . The UWB receiver device of claim 15 , wherein the processor is configured to compute the A-D FOM based on comparison of a block error value to a threshold or a pattern of block failures.

19 . The UWB receiver device of claim 15 , wherein the processor is configured to compute the A-D FOM by detecting high energy pulses in the UWB signal at a fractional frequency with respect to a frequency of pulses in an intended UWB signal.

20 . The UWB receiver device of claim 19 , wherein the processor is configured to detect the high energy pulses in the UWB signal based on a fast Fourier transform of the UWB signal.

Assignments (2)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jan 21, 2025
From: CYPRESS SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION
To: INFINEON TECHONOLGIES AG
Reel/Frame 069932/0821 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded May 30, 2024
From: SINGH, AJINDER PAL; LEE, DANIEL
To: CYPRESS SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION
Reel/Frame 067561/0503 →
Continuity (2)
Continuation In Part 18636365 · Apr 16, 2024
Related Publication 20250324259A1 · Oct 16, 2025
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