DATA PROCESSING DEVICE AND METHOD FOR OPERATING SUCH DATA PROCESSING DEVICE
In order to provide a data processing device ( 100 ), in particular an embedded system, such as a smart card, comprising at least one integrated circuit ( 102 ) carrying out calculations, in particular cryptographic operations, as well as a method for operating such data processing device ( 100 ) wherein costs are minimised, the requirements on the complexity of the design are decreased, the power consumption is reduced and the performance of a cryptographic operation is enhanced, it is proposed to protect the integrated circuit ( 102 ) against cryptanalysis, in particular against differential power analysis, by hiding the power consumption profiles of said calculations and by alternating between different power consumption profiles, in particular by introducing one or more counter signals ( 51; 61; 71, 81 ), for example one or more signals of at least roughly opposite amplitude relative to an average amplitude, wherein the sum of the respective amplitude of the one or more original or true signals ( 50; 60; 70, 80 ) may be at least roughly balanced out by the sum of the respective amplitude of the one or more counter signals ( 51; 61; 71, 81 ) and/or wherein the number of original or true signals ( 50; 60; 70, 80 ) is not necessarily equal to the number of counter signals ( 51; 61; 71, 81 ), with for example two counter signals ( 51; 61; 71, 81 ) on average for every original or true signal ( 50; 60; 70, 80 ).
1 . A data processing device ( 100 ), in particular an embedded system, such as a smart card, comprising at least one integrated circuit ( 102 ) carrying out calculations, in particular cryptographic operations,
characterized by
protecting the integrated circuit ( 102 ) against cryptanalysis, in particular against differential power analysis,
by hiding the power consumption profiles of said calculations and
by alternating between different power consumption profiles, in particular by introducing one or more counter signals ( 51 ; 61 ; 71 , 81 ), for example one or more signals of at least roughly opposite amplitude relative to an average amplitude, wherein the sum of the respective amplitude of the one or more original or true signals ( 50 ; 60 ; 70 , 80 ) may be at least roughly balanced out by the sum of the respective amplitude of the one or more counter signals ( 51 ; 61 ; 71 , 81 ) and/or wherein the number of original or true signals ( 50 ; 60 ; 70 , 80 ) is not necessarily equal to the number of counter signals ( 51 ; 61 ; 71 , 81 ), with for example two counter signals ( 51 ; 61 ; 71 , 81 ) on average for every original or true signal ( 50 ; 60 ; 70 , 80 ).
2 . The data processing device according to claim 1 , characterized by at least one finite state machine ( 104 ) or at least one periodical unit for controlling the order of the original or true signals ( 50 ; 60 ; 70 , 80 ) and of the introduced counter signals ( 51 ; 61 ; 71 , 81 ).
3 . The data processing device according to claim 2 , characterized by at least one non-volatile memory ( 106 ) for storing information on at least one suitable state, in particular on the last state or on the current state, of the finite state machine ( 104 ) or periodical unit wherein
the non-volatile memory ( 106 ) of the suitable state of the finite state machine ( 104 ) or of the periodical unit can be kept at power down so that the state after powering up the data processing device ( 100 ) is not the same all the time or
that the finite state machine ( 104 ) or the periodical unit can be seeded at power up.
4 . The data processing device according to claim 3 , characterized by at least one sensor ( 108 ) of physical characteristics for providing at least one seed value for the finite state machine ( 104 ) or for the periodical unit.
5 . A method for operating at least one data processing device ( 100 ), in particular at least one embedded system, such as at least one smart card, comprising at least one integrated circuit ( 102 ) carrying out calculations, in particular cryptographic operations,
characterized in
that the integrated circuit ( 102 ) is protected against cryptanalysis, in particular against differential power analysis,
by hiding the power consumption profiles of said calculations and
by alternating between different power consumption profiles, in particular by introducing one or more counter signals ( 51 ; 61 ; 71 , 81 ), for example one or more signals of at least roughly opposite amplitude relative to an average amplitude, wherein the sum of the respective amplitude of the one or more original or true signals ( 50 ; 60 ; 70 , 80 ) may be at least roughly balanced out by the sum of the respective amplitude of the one or more counter signals ( 51 ; 61 ; 71 , 81 ) and/or wherein the number of original or true signals ( 50 ; 60 ; 70 , 80 ) is not necessarily equal to the number of counter signals ( 51 ; 61 ; 71 , 81 ), with for example two counter signals ( 51 ; 61 ; 71 , 81 ) on average for every original or true signal ( 50 ; 60 ; 70 , 80 ).
6 . The method according to claim 5 , characterized in that the counter signals ( 51 ; 61 ; 71 , 81 ) are produced during different cryptographic calculations and not instantaneously at the moment of the original or true signals ( 50 ; 60 ; 70 , 80 ).
7 . The method according to claim 5 or 6 , characterized by wiping out the original or true signals ( 50 ; 60 ; 70 , 80 ) when an average over all power traces is taken.
8 . The method according to at least one of claims 5 to 7 , characterized by being based on
the D[ata]E[ncryption]S[tandard] algorithm,
the A[dvanced]E[ncryption]S[tandard] algorithm,
the R[ivest,]S[hamir and]A[dleman] algorithm,
the E[lliptic]C[urve]C[ryptosystem] algorithm, or
the S[ecure]H[ash]A[lgorithm] algorithm.
9 . The method according to at least one of claims 5 to 8 , characterized by being driven by at least one periodic signal.
10 . Use of at least one data processing device ( 100 ) according to at least one of claims 1 to 4 and/or of the method according to at least one of claims 5 to 9 for protecting digital parts of at least one integrated circuit ( 102 ), in particular for increasing the security of at least one integrated circuit ( 102 ) against unauthorized access, for example via cryptanalysis, in particular via differential power analysis.