Key agreement and re-keying over a bidirectional communication path
A key agreement method is carried out by a first system in conjunction with a second system over a bidirectional communication path, including generating a first key pair having a first public key and a first private key, sending the first public key to the second system, receiving a second public key generated by the second system, and calculating a master key based upon the first private key, the second public key, a long-term private key, and a long-term public key. The long-term private key was generated by the first system during a previous key-agreement method as part of a long-term key pair. The long-term public key was generated by the second system and received during the previous key-agreement method. The previous key-agreement method required a secret to be known to the first system and the second system, thus conferring authentication based on the secret to the long-term public key.
1. A method of key confirmation carried out by a first system in conjunction with a second system over a bidirectional communication path between the first system and the second system, the method comprising:
calculating a value in a known manner using a master key, the master key having been calculated at the first system based upon (i) a first private key generated by the first system as part of a first key pair, (ii) a second public key generated by the second system and received from the second system, (iii) a long-term private key generated by the first system as part of a long-term key pair during a previous key-agreement method with the second system, and (iv) a long-term public key generated by the second system and received from the second system during the previous key-agreement method;
receiving a key confirmation value from the second system; and
determining whether the calculated value is identical to the key confirmation value received from the second system,
wherein the previous key-agreement method required a secret to be known to the first system and to the second system, thus conferring authentication based on the secret to the long-term public key, and
wherein the first public key, the second public key, the long-term public key, and a public key of the long-term key pair are all independent of the secret.
2. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
determining, where the calculated value is identical to the key confirmation value received from the second system, that the second system is in possession of the master key and that the second system calculated the key confirmation value in the known manner using the master key.
3. The method of claim 2 , further comprising:
sending the calculated value to the second system for verification.
4. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
determining, where the calculated value is not identical to the key confirmation value received from the second system, that the second system is not in possession of the master key or that the second system did not calculate the key confirmation value in the known manner.
5. The method of claim 1 , wherein the first system and the second system have agreed upon a string, and the known manner comprises performing a hash of a combination of the master key and the string.
6. The method of claim 5 , wherein the string comprises a portion of the public key of the long-term key pair.
7. The method of claim 5 , wherein one of the first system and the second system comprises a host system offering one or more services and wherein the string is indicative of the one or more services.
8. The method of claim 2 , further comprising:
using the master key to encrypt one or more messages to be exchanged between the first system and the second system over the bidirectional communication path.
9. A first system for carrying out a key confirmation method in conjunction with a second system over a bidirectional communication path between the first system and the second system, comprising:
means for calculating a value in a known manner using a master key, the master key having been calculated at the first system based upon (i) a first private key generated by the first system as part of a first key pair, (ii) a second public key generated by the second system and received from the second system, (iii) a long-term private key generated by the first system as part of a long-term key pair during a previous key-agreement method, and (iv) a long-term public key generated by the second system and received during the previous key-agreement method;
means for receiving a key confirmation value from the second system; and
means for determining whether the calculated value is identical to the key confirmation value received from the second system,
wherein the previous key-agreement method required a secret to be known to the first system and to the second system, thus conferring authentication based on the secret to the long-term public key, and
wherein the first public key, the second public key, the long-term public key, and a public key of the long-term key pair are all independent of the secret.
10. The first system of claim 9 , further comprising:
means for determining, where the calculated value is identical to the key confirmation value received from the second system, that the second system is in possession of the master key and that the second system calculated the key confirmation value in the known manner using the master key.
11. The first system of claim 10 , further comprising:
means for sending the calculated value to the second system for verification.
12. The first system of claim 9 , wherein the first system and the second system have agreed upon a string, and the known manner comprises performing a hash of a combination of the master key and the string.
13. The first system of claim 9 , further comprising:
means for using the master key to encrypt one or more messages to be exchanged between the first system and the second system over the bidirectional communication path.
14. A first system, comprising:
a memory; and
a processing unit coupled to the memory, wherein the processing unit is configured to carry out a key confirmation method in conjunction with a second system by:
calculating a value in a known manner using a master key, the master key having been calculated at the first system based upon (i) a first private key generated by the first system as part of a first key pair, (ii) a second public key generated by the second system and received from the second system, (iii) a long-term private key generated by the first system as part of a long-term key pair during a previous key-agreement method, and (iv) a long-term public key generated by the second system and received from the second system during the previous key-agreement method;
receiving a key confirmation value from the second system; and
determining whether the calculated value is identical to the key confirmation value received from the second system,
wherein the previous key-agreement method required a secret to be known to the first system and to the second system, thus conferring authentication based on the secret to the long-term public key, and
wherein the first public key, the second public key, the long-term public key, and a public key of the long-term key pair are all independent of the secret.
15. The first system of claim 14 , the processing unit further configured to:
determine, where the calculated value is identical to the key confirmation value received from the second system, that the second system is in possession of the master key and that the second system calculated the key confirmation value in the known manner using the master key.
16. The first system of claim 14 , wherein the first system and the second system have agreed upon a string, and the known manner comprises performing a hash of a combination of the master key and the string.
17. The first system of claim 14 , the processing unit further configured to use the master key to encrypt one or more messages to be exchanged between the first system and the second system over the bidirectional communication path.
18. Computer-readable non-transitory storage medium or mediums encoded with instructions that cause a device with a processor to perform a key confirmation method carried out by a first system in conjunction with a second system over a bidirectional communication path between the first system and the second system, said method comprising:
calculating a value in a known manner using a master key, the master key having been calculated at the first system based upon (i) a first private key generated by the first system as part of a first key pair, (ii) a second public key generated by the second system and received from the second system, (iii) a long-term private key generated by the first system as part of a long-term key pair during a previous key-agreement method, and (iv) a long-term public key generated by the second system and received from the second system during the previous key-agreement method;
receiving a key confirmation value from the second system; and
determining whether the calculated value is identical to the key confirmation value received from the second system,
wherein the previous key-agreement method required a secret to be known to the first system and to the second system, thus conferring authentication based on the secret to the long-term public key, and
wherein the first public key, the second public key, the long-term public key, and a public key of the long-term key pair are all independent of the secret.
19. The computer-readable non-transitory storage medium or mediums of claim 18 , wherein the key confirmation method further comprises:
determining, where the calculated value is identical to the key confirmation value received from the second system, that the second system is in possession of the master key and that the second system calculated the key confirmation value in the known manner using the master key.
20. The computer-readable non-transitory storage medium or mediums of claim 18 , wherein the first system and the second system have agreed upon a string, and the known manner comprises performing a hash of a combination of the master key and the string.
21. The computer-readable non-transitory storage medium or mediums of claim 18 , wherein the key confirmation method further comprises:
using the master key to encrypt one or more messages to be exchanged between the first system and the second system over the bidirectional communication path.