IP Library Granted Patent US 9,537,846
Granted Patent B2
US 9,537,846 · App. 14/253,411 · Granted Jan 3, 2017

Integrity check optimization systems and methods in live connectivity frames

Inventors: Mahesh Jethanandani (Saratoga, CA); Ankur Saxena (San Jose, CA); Ashesh Mishra (San Jose, CA)
Assignee: Ciena Corporation
H04L63/08H04L63/1441H04L63/162
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 9,537,846
App. No.
14/253,411
Granted
Jan 3, 2017
Kind
B2
Abstract

A method, a network element, and a network include determining an authentication mechanism between two nodes in a network path; operating the network path; performing connectivity check between the two nodes in the network path; and authenticating specific frames in the connectivity check between the two nodes with the authentication mechanism responsive to the specific frames affecting a state of the network path. The frames can be Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD), Continuity Check Messages (CCMs), etc. Advantageously, the method, network element, and network reduce the computational load of providing authentication while maintaining secure authentication for important frames, i.e., ones that affect the state of the network path.

Claims (32)

1. A method, comprising:

determining an authentication mechanism between two nodes in a network path;

operating the network path;

performing connectivity check between the two nodes in the network path, wherein the connectivity check comprises any of Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD), IEEE 802.1ag-2007, and G.8013/Y.1731; and

authenticating only specific frames affecting a state of the network path in the connectivity check between the two nodes with the authentication mechanism, and wherein the specific frames comprise any of i) BFD control packets with a P or an F flag enabled therein, ii) any of BFD control packets, BFD echo packets, or Continuity Check Message (CCM) frames indicating any of a Remote Defect Indication (RDI), an Alarm Indication Signal (AIS), and a change in operating parameters, and iii) any frames related to Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) [RFC2328], Intermediate System-Intermediate System (IS-IS) [RFC1195], and Routing Information Protocol (RIP) [RFC2453] predetermined to affect the state of the network path.

2. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

transmitting other frames in the connectivity check besides the specific frames without the authentication mechanism.

3. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

operating the network path as pure Layer-2 or Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) with Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM) mechanisms, wherein the connectivity check is part of the OAM mechanisms.

4. The method of claim 1 , wherein the connectivity check comprises Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD), and the specific frames comprise BFD control packets with a P or an F flag enabled therein, and further comprising:

enabling an A flag in the BFD control packets of the specific frames and using the authentication mechanism.

5. The method of claim 1 , wherein the authentication mechanism is performed in software at the two nodes.

6. A network element, comprising:

one or more ports communicatively coupled to an end node in a network path; and

a controller configured to:

determine an authentication mechanism with the end node;

cause the network path to operate with the end node;

performing connectivity check with the end node in the network path, wherein the connectivity check comprises any of Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD), IEEE 802.1ag-2007, and G.8013/Y.1731; and

authenticate only specific frames in the connectivity check with the end node with the authentication mechanism, and wherein the specific frames comprise any of i) BFD control packets with a P or an F flag enabled therein, ii) any of BFD control packets, BFD echo packets, or Continuity Check Message (CCM) frames indicating any of a Remote Defect Indication (RDI), an Alarm Indication Signal (AIS), and a change in operating parameters, and iii) any frames related to Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) [RFC2328], Intermediate System-Intermediate System (IS-IS) [RFC1195], and Routing Information Protocol (RIP) [RFC2453] predetermined to affect the state of the network path.

7. The network element of claim 6 , wherein the controller is further configured to:

transmit other frames in the connectivity check besides the specific frames without the authentication mechanism.

8. The network element of claim 6 , wherein the controller is further configured to:

cause the network path to be operated as pure Layer-2 or Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) with Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM) mechanisms, wherein the connectivity check is part of the OAM mechanisms.

9. The network element of claim 6 , wherein the connectivity check comprises Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD), and the specific frames comprise BFD control packets with a P or an F flag enabled therein, and wherein the controller is further configured to:

cause an A flag to be enabled in the BFD control packets of the specific frames and using the authentication mechanism.

10. The network element of claim 6 , wherein the authentication mechanism is performed in software by the controller.

11. A network, comprising:

a first node; and

a second node communicatively coupled to the first node and forming a network path operating pure Layer-2 or Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) with Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM) mechanisms;

wherein a plurality of frames are exchanged between the first node and the second node as part of the OAM mechanisms, and the plurality of frames are classified as one of affecting a state of the network path or not affecting the state of the network path, and wherein the OAM mechanisms comprise any of Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD), IEEE 802.1ag-2007, and G.8013/Y.1731; and

wherein the first node and the second node are configured to authenticate only specific frames, and wherein the specific frames comprise any of i) BFD control packets with a P or an F flag enabled therein, ii) any of BFD control packets, BFD echo packets, or Continuity Check Message (CCM) frames indicating any of a Remote Defect Indication (RDI), an Alarm Indication Signal (AIS), and a change in operating parameters, and iii) any frames related to Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) [RFC2328], Intermediate System-Intermediate System (IS-IS) [RFC1195], and Routing Information Protocol (RIP) [RFC2453] predetermined to affect the state of the network path.

12. The network of claim 11 , wherein the plurality of frames utilize Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD).

Assignments (6)
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Nov 20, 2023
From: BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.
To: CIENA CORPORATION
Reel/Frame 065630/0232 →
PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Nov 8, 2019
From: CIENA CORPORATION
To: BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 050969/0001 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Oct 30, 2019
From: DEUTSCHE BANK AG NEW YORK BRANCH
To: CIENA CORPORATION
Reel/Frame 050938/0389 →
PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Jul 16, 2014
From: CIENA CORPORATION
To: BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., AS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT
Reel/Frame 033347/0260 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Jul 15, 2014
From: CIENA CORPORATION
To: DEUTSCHE BANK AG NEW YORK BRANCH
Reel/Frame 033329/0417 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Apr 15, 2014
From: JETHANANDANI, MAHESH; SAXENA, ANKUR; MISHRA, ASHESH
To: CIENA CORPORATION
Reel/Frame 032678/0762 →
Continuity (1)
Related Publication 20150295909A1 · Oct 15, 2015