Method to prevent cloning of electronic components using public key infrastructure secure hardware device
An electronic component includes a processor and a memory. The electronic component has a secure platform capable of storing at least one dual key pair and a corresponding digital signature. There is also a system including a host machine and an electronic component capable of being operated by the host machine. The electronic component has a processor, a memory, and a secure platform capable of storing at least one dual key pair and a corresponding digital signature. Another aspect describes a method, which includes reading a public key from an electronic component by a host machine, verifying the public key against a stored key in the host machine, digitally signing data using a private key from the electronic component, verifying the signed data against the stored key, and using the electronic component by the host machine only if the signed data and the public key are verified.
1. An electronic component, comprising:
a memory storing an ownership value; and
security circuitry coupled to the memory, wherein the security circuitry, in operation:
generates an asymmetric dual key pair;
securely stores, within the memory of the electronic component, a private key from the generated asymmetric dual key pair; and
authenticates the electronic component to a host machine, the authenticating including:
verifying the generated asymmetric dual key pair corresponds to a public key of the host machine;
determining whether at least one parameter stored in the memory of the electronic component violates a rule regarding the at least one stored parameter stored in the electronic device;
responsive to a determination that the at least one stored parameter does not violate the rule, and subject to the electronic component authenticating the electronic component to the host machine, enabling authorized operation of the electronic component by the host machine; and
responsive to a determination that the at least one parameter violates the rule, initiating one or more actions to invalidate the electronic component.
2. The electronic component of claim 1 , wherein the one or more actions to invalidate the electronic component includes:
deleting the dual key pair;
deleting the ownership value;
sending an indication to the host machine that the electronic component is unauthorized for use; or
various combinations of deleting the dual key pair, deleting the ownership value and sending the indication to the host machine.
3. The electronic component of claim 2 , wherein, in operation, the electronic component is disabled by the host machine responsive to the host machine receiving the indication that the electronic component is unauthorized for use.
4. The electronic component of claim 1 , wherein the securely storing the private key is controlled using the ownership value.
5. The electronic component of claim 1 , wherein the security circuitry, in operation, prevents deletion of the private key via external command unless the external command includes a representation of the ownership value.
6. The electronic component of claim 1 , wherein the circuitry, in operation, generates a digital signature corresponding to the generated asymmetric dual key pair.
7. The electronic component of claim 1 , wherein the security circuitry implements a monotonic counter configured for use with the at least one stored parameter, and wherein the at least one stored parameter comprises a value for the monotonic counter that is based on a quantity of uses of the electronic component.
8. The electronic component of claim 1 wherein the security circuitry includes processing circuitry, which, in operation, executes instructions stored in the memory, wherein the instructions cause the security circuitry to perform the authenticating of the electronic component to the host machine.
9. A system, comprising:
a host machine having a memory that stores a public key; and
an electronic component having a memory storing an ownership value and security circuitry coupled to the memory, wherein the security circuitry, in operation:
generates an asymmetric dual key pair;
securely stores, within the memory of the electronic component, a private key from the generated asymmetric dual key pair; and
authenticates the electronic component to the host machine, the authenticating including:
verifying the generated asymmetric dual key pair corresponds to the public key of the host machine;
determining whether at least one parameter stored in the memory of the electronic component violates a rule regarding the at least one stored parameter stored in the electronic device;
responsive to a determination that the at least one stored parameter does not violate the rule, and subject to the electronic component authenticating the electronic component to the host machine, enabling authorized operation of the electronic component by the host machine; and
responsive to a determination that the at least one parameter violates the rule, initiating one or more actions to invalidate the electronic component.
10. The system of claim 9 , wherein the one or more actions to invalidate the electronic component includes:
deleting the dual key pair;
deleting the ownership value;
sending an indication to the host machine that the electronic component is unauthorized for use; or
various combinations of deleting the dual key pair, deleting the ownership value and sending the indication to the host machine.
11. The system of claim 10 , wherein, in operation, the electronic component is disabled by the host machine responsive to the host machine receiving the indication that the electronic component is unauthorized for use.
12. The system of claim 9 , wherein the securely storing the private key is controlled using the ownership value.
13. The system of claim 9 , wherein the security circuitry implements a monotonic counter configured for use with the at least one stored parameter, and wherein the at least one stored parameter comprises a value for the monotonic counter that is based on a quantity of uses of the electronic component.
14. The system of claim 9 wherein the security circuitry includes processing circuitry, which, in operation, executes instructions stored in the memory of the electronic component, wherein the instructions cause the security circuitry to perform the authenticating of the electronic component to the host machine.
15. The system of claim 9 wherein the electronic component comprises a processor separate from the security circuitry.
16. A method, comprising:
storing, via security circuitry of an electronic component, an ownership value;
generating, using the security circuitry, an asymmetric dual key pair;
securely storing, within a memory of the electronic component and under control of the security circuitry, a private key from the asymmetric dual key pair; and
authenticating, under control of the security circuitry, the electronic component to a host machine, the authenticating including:
verifying the generated asymmetric dual key pair corresponds to a public key of the host machine;
determining whether at least one parameter stored in the memory of the electronic component violates a rule regarding the at least one stored parameter stored in the electronic device;
responsive to a determination that the at least one stored parameter does not violate the rule, and subject to the electronic component authenticating the electronic component to the host machine, enabling authorized operation of the electronic component by the host machine; and
responsive to a determination that the at least one parameter violates the rule, initiating one or more actions to invalidate the electronic component.
17. The method of claim 16 , wherein the one or more actions to invalidate the electronic component includes:
deleting the dual key pair;
deleting the ownership value;
sending an indication to the host machine that the electronic component is unauthorized for use; or
various combinations of deleting the dual key pair, deleting the ownership value and sending the indication to the host machine.
18. The method of claim 17 , comprising responding, by the host machine, to the indication by disabling the electronic component.
19. The method of claim 16 , comprising controlling the securely storing the private key using the ownership value.
20. The method of claim 16 , comprising implements a monotonic counter configured for use with the at least one stored parameter, and wherein the at least one stored parameter comprises a value for the monotonic counter that is based on a quantity of uses of the electronic component.