Privacy protecting transparency tree for device attestation
A system includes a binary tree having leaf hashes. The leaf hashes include a device privacy protected index and a set of zero-knowledge commitments relating to a computer device. The system calculates the device privacy protected index using a verifiable random function such that a device entity path in the binary tree cannot reveal any information about any other device in the binary tree, and associates the set of zero-knowledge commitments with the device privacy protected index. The system then generates a privacy-protected attestation for the computer device using the device privacy protected index and the set of zero-knowledge commitments.
1. A computerized process comprising:
receiving into a computer processor a binary tree comprising a plurality of leaf hashes, the leaf hashes comprising a device privacy protected index and a set of zero-knowledge commitments relating to a computer device;
calculating the device privacy protected index using a verifiable random function such that a device entity path in the binary tree cannot reveal any information about any other device in the binary tree;
associating the set of zero-knowledge commitments with the device privacy protected index; and
generating a privacy-protected attestation for the computer device using the device privacy protected index and the set of zero-knowledge commitments;
wherein the binary tree comprises a Merkle binary tree; and
wherein a root of the Merkle tree is signed with a provider private key and the root is verified with an associated public key.
2. The process of claim 1 , wherein the privacy-protected attestation comprises data relating to one or more of a device credential, a device attribute, a device manufacture, device firmware, a device performance characteristic, device warranty information, on-chip firmware, and a flash drive binary.
3. The process of claim 1 , comprising calculating the device privacy protected index from a computer device identifier.
4. The process of claim 1 , wherein the set of zero-knowledge commitments comprises data relating to one or more of a commitment to a public key, a commitment to a device attribute, a commitment to a device identification, and a commitment to a solution identification.
5. The process of claim 1 , wherein the privacy-protected attestation comprises authenticating the computer device to a third party, the authenticating comprising:
communicating a device identity and a public key to the third party;
receiving a verification from the third party; and
transmitting signed attributes to the third party.
6. The process of claim 1 , wherein the privacy-protected attestation comprises an authentication or an identification between a first computer device and a second computer device.
7. The process of claim 1 , wherein the privacy-protected attestation comprises a computer device verifying its own attributes using the set of zero-knowledge commitments.
8. The process of claim 1 , wherein the verifiable random function comprises a pseudorandom function that requires a public key and a seed value.
9. A non-transitory computer-readable medium comprising instructions that when executed by a processor execute a process comprising:
receiving into a computer processor a binary tree comprising a plurality of leaf hashes, the leaf hashes comprising a device privacy protected index and a set of zero-knowledge commitments relating to a computer device;
calculating the device privacy protected index using a verifiable random function such that a device entity path in the binary tree cannot reveal any information about any other device in the binary tree;
associating the set of zero-knowledge commitments with the device privacy protected index; and
generating a privacy-protected attestation for the computer device using the device privacy protected index and the set of zero-knowledge commitments;
wherein the binary tree comprises a Merkle binary tree; and
wherein a root of the Merkle tree is signed with a provider private key and the root is verified with an associated public key.
10. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 9 , wherein the privacy-protected attestation comprises data relating to one or more of a device credential, a device attribute, a device manufacture, firmware, a device performance characteristic, device warranty information, on-chip firmware, and a flash drive binary; and wherein the set of zero-knowledge commitments comprises data relating to one or more of a commitment to a public key, a commitment to a device attribute, a commitment to a device identification, and a commitment to a solution identification.
11. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 9 , comprising instructions for calculating the device privacy protected index from a computer device identifier.
12. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 9 , wherein the privacy-protected attestation comprises instructions for authenticating the computer device to a third party, and the authenticating comprises:
communicating a device identity and a public key to the third party;
receiving a verification from the third party; and
transmitting signed attributes to the third party.
13. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 9 , wherein the privacy-protected attestation comprises an authentication or identification between a first computer device and a second computer device.
14. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 9 , wherein the privacy-protected attestation comprises a computer device verifying its own attributes using the set of zero-knowledge commitments.
15. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 9 , wherein the verifiable random function comprises a pseudorandom function that requires a public key and a seed value.
16. A system comprising:
a computer processor; and
a computer memory coupled to the computer processor;
wherein the computer processor is operatable for:
receiving into a computer processor a binary tree comprising a plurality of leaf hashes, the leaf hashes comprising a device privacy protected index and a set of zero-knowledge commitments relating to a computer device;
calculating the device privacy protected index using a verifiable random function such that a device entity path in the binary tree cannot reveal any information about any other device in the binary tree;
associating the set of zero-knowledge commitments with the device privacy protected index; and
generating a privacy-protected attestation for the computer device using the device privacy protected index and the set of zero-knowledge commitments;
wherein the binary tree comprises a Merkle binary tree; and
wherein a root of the Merkle tree is signed with a provider private key and the root is verified with an associated public key.