IP Library › Granted Patent US 8,874,922
Granted Patent B2
US 8,874,922 · App. 13/351,872 · Granted Oct 28, 2014

Systems and methods for multi-layered authentication/verification of trusted platform updates

Inventors: Muhammed Jaber (Austin, TX); Mukund Khatri (Austin, TX)
Assignee: Dell Products L.P.
G06F21/572G06F21/57
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 8,874,922
App. No.
13/351,872
Filed
Jan 17, 2012
Granted
Oct 28, 2014
Kind
B2
Art Unit
2434
USPC
713/176
Abstract

In accordance with the present disclosure, a system and method for multilayered authentication of trusted platform updates is described. The method may include storing first cryptographic data in a personality module of an information handling system, with the first cryptographic data corresponding to a verified firmware component. A second cryptographic data may also be determined, with the second cryptographic data corresponding to an unverified firmware component. The unverified firmware component may be stored in a memory element of the information handling system, and the second cryptographic data may be determined using a processor of the information handling system. The method may further include determining if the first cryptographic data matches the second cryptographic data and updating firmware in the information handling system with the unverified firmware component if the first cryptographic data matches the second cryptographic data, and the unverified firmware component includes a digital signature of a manufacturer.

Claims (60)

1. A system incorporating multilayered authentication of trusted platform updates, comprising:

a processor;

at least one firmware component coupled to the processor;

a first cryptographic data, wherein the first cryptographic data corresponds to a previously verified firmware component;

a personality module coupled to the processor, wherein the personality module comprises information specific to a system BIOS comprising at least information related to boot order and wherein the personality module stores the first cryptographic data; and

an update policy, wherein the update policy is pushed to the personality module, and wherein the update policy reflects additional limitations on updates to the at least one firmware component comprising at least allowable versions of upgrade updates and downgrade updates;

wherein the processor:

retrieves the first cryptographic data from a personality module,

determines second cryptographic data, wherein the second cryptographic data corresponds to an unverified firmware component,

determines if the first cryptographic data matches the second cryptographic data, and

allows an update of the at least one firmware component with the unverified firmware component if:

the first cryptographic data matches the second cryptographic data, and

the unverified firmware component includes a digital signature of a manufacturer.

2. The system of claim 1 , wherein the first cryptographic data comprises:

a hash algorithm;

a digital signature value, wherein the digital signature value comprises a first hash value encrypted with a private key, and wherein the first hash value is determined by applying the hash algorithm to the verified firmware component; and

a public key corresponding to the private key.

3. The system of claim 2 , wherein the second cryptographic data comprises a second hash value, wherein the second hash value is determined by applying the hash algorithm to the unverified firmware component.

4. The system of claim 3 , wherein the first cryptographic data matches the second cryptographic data if the first hash value matches the second hash value.

5. The system of claim 4 , wherein the at least one firmware component comprises a first basic input/output system (“BIOS”), the previously verified firmware component comprises a second BIOS, and unverified firmware component comprises a third BIOS.

6. The system of claim 5 , wherein the first hash value is determined by applying the hash algorithm to at least part of the second BIOS payload, and wherein the second hash value is determined by applying the hash algorithm to at least part of the third BIOS payload.

7. The system of claim 4 , wherein the at least one firmware component comprises a first baseboard management controller (“BMC”) firmware, the previously verified firmware component comprises a second BMC firmware, and the unverified firmware component comprises a third BMC firmware.

8. The system of claim 7 , wherein the first hash value is determined by applying the hash algorithm to at least part of the second BMC firmware payload, and wherein the second hash value is determined by applying the hash algorithm to at least part of the third BMC firmware payload.

9. A method for multilayered authentication of trusted platform updates, comprising:

storing first cryptographic data in a personality module of an information handling system, wherein the first cryptographic data corresponds to a previously verified firmware component and wherein the personality module comprises information specific to a system BIOS comprising at least information related to boot order;

pushing an update policy to the personality module, wherein the update policy reflects additional limitations on updates to the verified firmware component comprising at least allowable versions of upgrade updates and downgrade updates;

determining second cryptographic data, wherein the second cryptographic data corresponds to an unverified firmware component, wherein the unverified firmware component is stored in a memory element of the information handling system, and wherein the second cryptographic data is determined using a processor of the information handling system;

determining if the first cryptographic data matches the second cryptographic data; and

updating firmware in the information handling system with the unverified firmware component if:

the first cryptographic data matches the second cryptographic data, and

the unverified firmware component includes a digital signature of a manufacturer.

10. The method of claim 9 , further comprising the step of determining the first cryptographic data, wherein determining the first cryptographic data comprises the steps of:

applying a hash algorithm to the verified firmware component to obtain a first hash value; and

generating a digital signature value by encrypting the first hash value with a private key.

11. The method of claim 10 , wherein the first cryptographic data comprises the hash algorithm, the digital signature value, and a public key corresponding to the private key.

12. The method of claim 11 , wherein determining the second cryptographic data the cryptographic data comprises the steps of:

retrieving the hash algorithm from the personality module, and

applying the hash algorithm to the unverified firmware component to determine a second hash value.

13. The method of claim 12 , wherein determining if the first cryptographic data matches the second cryptographic data comprises the steps of:

retrieving the digital signature value and the public key from the personality module;

decrypting the digital signature value using the public key to determine the first hash value; and

comparing the first hash value to the second hash value.

14. The method of claim 13 , wherein the verified firmware component comprises a first basic input/output system (“BIOS”), and the unverified firmware component comprises a second BIOS.

15. The method of claim 14 , wherein applying the hash algorithm to the verified firmware component comprises applying the hash algorithm to a header file of the first BIOS, and wherein applying the hash algorithm to the unverified firmware component comprises applying the hash algorithm to a header file of the second BIOS.

16. The method of claim 13 , wherein the verified firmware component comprises a first baseboard management controller (“BMC”) firmware, and wherein the unverified firmware component comprises a second BMC firmware.

17. The method of claim 16 , wherein applying the hash algorithm to the verified firmware component comprises applying the hash algorithm to a header file of the first BMC firmware, and wherein applying the hash algorithm to the unverified firmware component comprises applying the hash algorithm to a header file of the second BMC firmware.

18. A method for multilayered authentication of trusted platform updates, comprising:

determining first cryptographic data, wherein the first cryptographic data comprises a digital signature value corresponding to a verified firmware component;

pushing an update policy to a personality module, wherein the update policy reflects additional limitations on updates to the verified firmware component comprising at least allowable versions of upgrade updates and downgrade updates;

storing the first cryptographic data and the update policy in a personality module of an information handling system, wherein the personality module comprises information specific to a system BIOS comprising at least information related to boot order;

determining second cryptographic data using a processor in the information handling system, wherein the second cryptographic data comprises a hash value corresponding to an unverified firmware component, wherein the unverified firmware component comprises a firmware version;

determining if the first cryptographic data matches the second cryptographic data, wherein determining if the first cryptographic data matches the second cryptographic data comprises the steps of:

decrypting the digital signature value using a public key to obtain a hash value corresponding to the verified firmware component, and

comparing the hash value corresponding to the verified firmware component to the hash value corresponding to the unverified firmware component; and

updating firmware in the information handling system with the unverified firmware component if:

the first cryptographic data matches the second cryptographic data,

the unverified firmware component includes a digital signature of a manufacturer, and

the update policy allows an update to the firmware version of the unverified firmware component.

19. The method of claim 18 , wherein determining first cryptographic data comprises applying a hash algorithm to at least a portion of the verified firmware component.

20. The method of claim 19 , wherein determining the second cryptographic data comprises applying the hash algorithm to at least a portion of the unverified firmware component.

Assignments (15)
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST IN PATENTS PREVIOUSLY RECORDED AT REEL/FRAME (053546/0001) Recorded Jun 23, 2022
From: THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST COMPANY, N.A., AS NOTES COLLATERAL AGENT
To: DELL MARKETING L.P. (ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO CREDANT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.); DELL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C.; DELL PRODUCTS L.P.; DELL USA L.P.; EMC CORPORATION; DELL MARKETING CORPORATION (SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO FORCE10 NETWORKS, INC. AND WYSE TECHNOLOGY L.L.C.); EMC IP HOLDING COMPANY LLC
Reel/Frame 071642/0001 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST IN PATENTS PREVIOUSLY RECORDED AT REEL/FRAME (045455/0001) Recorded May 20, 2022
From: THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST COMPANY, N.A., AS NOTES COLLATERAL AGENT
To: DELL MARKETING CORPORATION (SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO ASAP SOFTWARE EXPRESS, INC.); DELL MARKETING L.P. (ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO CREDANT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.); DELL USA L.P.; DELL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C.; DELL PRODUCTS L.P.; DELL MARKETING CORPORATION (SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO FORCE10 NETWORKS, INC. AND WYSE TECHNOLOGY L.L.C.); EMC CORPORATION (ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO MAGINATICS LLC); EMC IP HOLDING COMPANY LLC (ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO MOZY, INC.); SCALEIO LLC
Reel/Frame 061753/0001 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST IN PATENTS PREVIOUSLY RECORDED AT REEL/FRAME (040136/0001) Recorded Apr 26, 2022
From: THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST COMPANY, N.A., AS NOTES COLLATERAL AGENT
To: DELL MARKETING CORPORATION (SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO ASAP SOFTWARE EXPRESS, INC.); DELL MARKETING L.P. (ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO CREDANT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.); DELL USA L.P.; DELL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C.; DELL PRODUCTS L.P.; DELL MARKETING CORPORATION (SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO FORCE10 NETWORKS, INC. AND WYSE TECHNOLOGY L.L.C.); EMC CORPORATION (ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO MAGINATICS LLC); EMC IP HOLDING COMPANY LLC (ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO MOZY, INC.); SCALEIO LLC
Reel/Frame 061324/0001 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Nov 3, 2021
From: CREDIT SUISSE AG, CAYMAN ISLANDS BRANCH
To: ASAP SOFTWARE EXPRESS, INC.; AVENTAIL LLC; CREDANT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; DELL USA L.P.; DELL INTERNATIONAL, L.L.C.; DELL MARKETING L.P.; DELL PRODUCTS L.P.; DELL SOFTWARE INC.; DELL SYSTEMS CORPORATION; EMC CORPORATION; EMC IP HOLDING COMPANY LLC; FORCE10 NETWORKS, INC.; MAGINATICS LLC; MOZY, INC.; SCALEIO LLC; WYSE TECHNOLOGY L.L.C.
Reel/Frame 058216/0001 →
SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Apr 22, 2020
From: CREDANT TECHNOLOGIES INC.; DELL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C.; DELL MARKETING L.P.; DELL PRODUCTS L.P.; DELL USA L.P.; EMC CORPORATION; FORCE10 NETWORKS, INC.; WYSE TECHNOLOGY L.L.C.; EMC IP HOLDING COMPANY LLC
To: THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST COMPANY, N.A.
Reel/Frame 053546/0001 →
SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Mar 21, 2019
From: CREDANT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; DELL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C.; DELL MARKETING L.P.; DELL PRODUCTS L.P.; DELL USA L.P.; EMC CORPORATION; FORCE10 NETWORKS, INC.; WYSE TECHNOLOGY L.L.C.; EMC IP HOLDING COMPANY LLC
To: THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST COMPANY, N.A.
Reel/Frame 049452/0223 →
SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Sep 21, 2016
From: ASAP SOFTWARE EXPRESS, INC.; AVENTAIL LLC; CREDANT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; DELL USA L.P.; DELL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C.; DELL MARKETING L.P.; DELL PRODUCTS L.P.; DELL SOFTWARE INC.; DELL SYSTEMS CORPORATION; EMC CORPORATION; EMC IP HOLDING COMPANY LLC; FORCE10 NETWORKS, INC.; MAGINATICS LLC; MOZY, INC.; SCALEIO LLC; SPANNING CLOUD APPS LLC; WYSE TECHNOLOGY L.L.C.
To: CREDIT SUISSE AG, CAYMAN ISLANDS BRANCH, AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 040134/0001 →
SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Sep 21, 2016
From: ASAP SOFTWARE EXPRESS, INC.; AVENTAIL LLC; CREDANT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; DELL USA L.P.; DELL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C.; DELL MARKETING L.P.; DELL PRODUCTS L.P.; DELL SOFTWARE INC.; DELL SYSTEMS CORPORATION; EMC CORPORATION; EMC IP HOLDING COMPANY LLC; FORCE10 NETWORKS, INC.; MAGINATICS LLC; MOZY, INC.; SCALEIO LLC; SPANNING CLOUD APPS LLC; WYSE TECHNOLOGY L.L.C.
To: THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST COMPANY, N.A., AS NOTES COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 040136/0001 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Sep 14, 2016
From: BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., AS COLLATERAL AGENT
To: DELL MARKETING L.P.; ASAP SOFTWARE EXPRESS, INC.; APPASSURE SOFTWARE, INC.; COMPELLENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; CREDANT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; DELL INC.; DELL PRODUCTS L.P.; DELL USA L.P.; DELL SOFTWARE INC.; FORCE10 NETWORKS, INC.; PEROT SYSTEMS CORPORATION; SECUREWORKS, INC.; WYSE TECHNOLOGY L.L.C.
Reel/Frame 040040/0001 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Sep 14, 2016
From: BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST COMPANY, N.A., AS COLLATERAL AGENT
To: DELL MARKETING L.P.; ASAP SOFTWARE EXPRESS, INC.; APPASSURE SOFTWARE, INC.; COMPELLENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; CREDANT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; DELL INC.; DELL PRODUCTS L.P.; DELL USA L.P.; DELL SOFTWARE INC.; FORCE10 NETWORKS, INC.; PEROT SYSTEMS CORPORATION; SECUREWORKS, INC.; WYSE TECHNOLOGY L.L.C.
Reel/Frame 040065/0618 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Sep 13, 2016
From: BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., AS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT
To: DELL MARKETING L.P.; ASAP SOFTWARE EXPRESS, INC.; APPASSURE SOFTWARE, INC.; COMPELLANT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; CREDANT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; DELL INC.; DELL PRODUCTS L.P.; DELL USA L.P.; DELL SOFTWARE INC.; FORCE10 NETWORKS, INC.; PEROT SYSTEMS CORPORATION; SECUREWORKS, INC.; WYSE TECHNOLOGY L.L.C.
Reel/Frame 040065/0216 →
PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT (ABL) Recorded Jan 2, 2014
From: DELL INC.; APPASSURE SOFTWARE, INC.; ASAP SOFTWARE EXPRESS, INC.; BOOMI, INC.; COMPELLENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; CREDANT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; DELL MARKETING L.P.; DELL PRODUCTS L.P.; DELL SOFTWARE INC.; DELL USA L.P.; FORCE10 NETWORKS, INC.; GALE TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; PEROT SYSTEMS CORPORATION; SECUREWORKS, INC.; WYSE TECHNOLOGY L.L.C.
To: BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., AS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT
Reel/Frame 031898/0001 →
PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT (TERM LOAN) Recorded Jan 2, 2014
From: DELL INC.; APPASSURE SOFTWARE, INC.; ASAP SOFTWARE EXPRESS, INC.; BOOMI, INC.; COMPELLENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; CREDANT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; DELL MARKETING L.P.; DELL PRODUCTS L.P.; DELL SOFTWARE INC.; DELL USA L.P.; FORCE10 NETWORKS, INC.; GALE TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; PEROT SYSTEMS CORPORATION; SECUREWORKS, INC.; WYSE TECHNOLOGY L.L.C.
To: BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 031899/0261 →
PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT (NOTES) Recorded Jan 2, 2014
From: APPASSURE SOFTWARE, INC.; ASAP SOFTWARE EXPRESS, INC.; BOOMI, INC.; COMPELLENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; CREDANT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; DELL INC.; DELL MARKETING L.P.; DELL PRODUCTS L.P.; DELL SOFTWARE INC.; DELL USA L.P.; FORCE10 NETWORKS, INC.; GALE TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; PEROT SYSTEMS CORPORATION; SECUREWORKS, INC.; WYSE TECHNOLOGY L.L.C.
To: BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST COMPANY, N.A., AS FIRST LIEN COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 031897/0348 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jan 17, 2012
From: JABER, MUHAMMED; KHATRI, MUKUND
To: DELL PRODUCTS L.P.
Reel/Frame 027543/0868 →
Continuity (1)
Related Publication 20130185564A1 · Jul 18, 2013