Methods and devices for securing keys for a nonsecured, distributed environment with applications to virtualization and cloud-computing security and management

1. A method for securing keys for a non-secure computing-environment, the method comprising the steps of:

(a) initially concealing at least one location-specific secure-key of a set of N location-specific secure-keys to undergo a previous initial concealment, wherein N is a positive whole number greater than one, wherein said at least one location-specific secure-key and at least one respective secure-key value were initially transmitted in concealed form, during said previous initial concealment of said at least one location-specific secure-key, from at least one entity selected from the group consisting of: a user device that initially encrypted a clear form of said at least one location-specific secure-key and a clear form of said at least one respective secure-key value during an initialization phase, and a trusted computing resource; and

(b) upon receiving from a client computing device an encryption request for protecting a secret item in the computing-environment, creating an encrypted item by repetitively encrypting said secret item with each of said set of N location-specific secure-keys in order:

(i) to prevent said at least one location-specific secure-key and said at least one respective secure-key value from ever being known in an unconcealed form on any computing resource in any computing-environment other than during said previous initial concealment;

wherein each said location-specific secure-key of said set corresponds to an exclusive, respective encryption location, wherein said locations are regions of memory located in different, physically-distinct computing resources operationally connected to the computing-environment.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein said previous initial concealment of said at least one location-specific secure-key is performed using at least one technique selected from the group consisting of: blinding encryption, partially-homomorphic encryption, and fully-homomorphic encryption.

3. The method of claim 1 , the method further comprising the step of:

(c) upon receiving from a client computing device a decryption request for said encrypted item, repetitively decrypting said encrypted item with each of said set of N location-specific secure-keys, wherein at least one said location-specific secure-key undergoes previous initial concealment in order:

(i) to prevent said at least one location-specific secure-key and at least one respective secure-key value from ever being known in an unconcealed form on any computing resource in any computing-environment other than during said previous initial concealment.

4. The method of claim 3 , the method further comprising the step of:

(d) prior to said encrypting or subsequent to said step of decrypting, exchanging said secret item with an authorized requester while said secret item remains unknown to the computing-environment, thereby providing a secure, virtualized key-management system.

5. The method of claim 1 , wherein said encrypting and said previous initial concealment of said at least one location-specific secure-key can be performed on any element of a collection of computing resources operationally connected to the computing-environment, and wherein said previous initial concealment is performed differently on each said element, thereby preventing leakage of a concealed key from one said element from compromising any other said element.

6. The method of claim 1 , wherein said at least one location-specific secure-key undergoes said previous initial concealment further in order:

(ii) to allow useful mathematical operations to be performed:

(A) on an unencrypted value of said secret item while said secret item remains encrypted, and said secret item is never known in an unencrypted form on any computing resource in any computing-environment other than during said previous initial concealment; and

(B) on unconcealed values of said location-specific secure-keys while said at least one location-specific secure-key remains in a concealed form, and said at least one location-specific secure-key is never known in an unconcealed form on any computing resource in any computing-environment other than during said previous initial concealment; and

wherein said useful mathematical operations include at least one operation selected from the group consisting of: XOR, addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, modular addition, modular subtraction, modular multiplication, modular division, and combinations thereof.

7. A device for securing keys for a non-secure computing-environment, the device comprising:

(a) a server including:

(i) a CPU for performing computational operations;

(ii) a memory module for storing data; and

(iii) a network connection for communicating across a network; and

(b) a protection module, residing on said server, configured for:

(i) initially concealing at least one location-specific secure-key of a set of N location-specific secure-keys to undergo a previous initial concealment, wherein N is a positive whole number greater than one, wherein said at least one location-specific secure-key and at least one respective secure-key value were initially transmitted in concealed form, during said previous initial concealment of said at least one location-specific secure-key, from at least one entity selected from the group consisting of: a user device that initially encrypted a clear form of said at least one location-specific secure-key and a clear form of said at least one respective secure-key value during an initialization phase, and a trusted computing resource; and

(ii) upon receiving an encryption request for protecting a secret item in the computing-environment, creating an encrypted item by repetitively encrypting said secret item with each of said set of N location-specific secure-keys in order:

(A) to prevent said at least one location-specific secure-key and said at least one respective secure-key value from ever being known in an unconcealed form on any computing resource in any computing-environment other than during said previous initial concealment;

wherein each said location-specific secure-key of said set corresponds to an exclusive, respective encryption location, wherein said locations are regions of memory located in different, physically-distinct computing resources operationally connected to the computing-environment.

8. The device of claim 7 , wherein said previous initial concealment of said at least one location-specific secure-key is performed using at least one technique selected from the group consisting of: blinding encryption, partially-homomorphic encryption, and fully-homomorphic encryption.

9. The device of claim 7 , wherein said protection module is further configured for:

(iii) upon receiving from a client computing device a decryption request for said encrypted item, repetitively decrypting said encrypted item with each of said set of N location-specific secure-keys, wherein at least one said location-specific secure-key undergoes previous initial concealment in order:

(A) to prevent said at least one location-specific secure-key and at least one respective secure-key value from ever being known in an unconcealed form on any computing resource in any computing-environment other than during said previous initial concealment.

10. The device of claim 9 , wherein said protection module is further configured for:

(iv) prior to said encrypting or subsequent to said decrypting, exchanging said secret item with an authorized requester while said secret item remains unknown to the computing-environment, thereby providing a secure, virtualized key-management system.

11. The device of claim 7 , wherein said encrypting and said previous initial concealment of said at least one location-specific secure-key can be performed on any element of a collection of computing resources operationally connected to the computing-environment, and wherein said previous initial concealment is performed differently on each said element, thereby preventing leakage of a concealed key from one said element from compromising any other said element.

12. The device of claim 7 , wherein said at least one location-specific secure-key undergoes said previous initial concealment further in order:

(B) to allow useful mathematical operations to be performed:

(I) on an unencrypted value of said secret item while said secret item remains encrypted, and said secret item is never known in an unencrypted form on any computing resource in any computing-environment other than during said previous initial concealment; and

(II) on unconcealed values of said location-specific secure-keys while said at least one location-specific secure-key remains in a concealed form, and said at least one location-specific secure-key is never known in an unconcealed form on any computing resource in any computing-environment other than during said previous initial concealment; and

wherein said useful mathematical operations include at least one operation selected from the group consisting of: XOR, addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, modular addition, modular subtraction, modular multiplication, modular division, and combinations thereof.

13. A non-transitory computer-readable medium, having computer-readable code embodied on the non-transitory computer-readable medium, the computer-readable code comprising:

(a) program code for initially concealing at least one location-specific secure-key of a set of N location-specific secure-keys to undergo a previous initial concealment, wherein N is a positive whole number greater than one, wherein said at least one location-specific secure-key and at least one respective secure-key value were initially transmitted in concealed form, during said previous initial concealment of said at least one location-specific secure-key, from at least one entity selected from the group consisting of: a user device that initially encrypted a clear form of said at least one location-specific secure-key and a clear form of said at least one respective secure-key value during an initialization phase, and a trusted computing resource; and

(b) program code for, upon receiving from a client computing device an encryption request for protecting a secret item in a computing-environment, creating an encrypted item by repetitively encrypting said secret item with each of said set of N location-specific secure-keys in order:

(i) to prevent said at least one location-specific secure-key and said at least one respective secure-key value from ever being known in an unconcealed form on any computing resource in any computing-environment other than during said previous initial concealment;

wherein each said location-specific secure-key of said set corresponds to an exclusive, respective encryption location, wherein said locations are regions of memory located in different, physically-distinct computing resources operationally connected to the computing-environment.

14. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 13 , wherein said previous initial concealment includes at least one technique selected from the group consisting of: blinding encryption, partially-homomorphic encryption, and fully-homomorphic encryption.

15. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 13 , the computer-readable code further comprising:

(c) program code for, upon receiving a decryption request for said encrypted item, for repetitively decrypting said encrypted item with each of said set of N location-specific secure-keys, wherein at least one said location-specific secure-key undergoes previous initial concealment in order:

(i) to prevent said at least one location-specific secure-key and at least one respective secure-key value from ever being known in unconcealed form on any computing resource in any computing-environment other than during said previous initial concealment.

16. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 15 , the computer-readable code further comprising:

(d) program code for, prior to said encrypting or subsequent to said decrypting, exchanging said secret item with an authorized requester while said secret item remains unknown to said computing-environment, thereby providing a secure, virtualized key-management system.

17. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 13 , wherein said encrypting and said previous initial concealment of said at least one location-specific secure-key can be performed on any element of a collection of computing resources operationally connected to said computing-environment, wherein said previous initial concealment is configured to be performed differently on each said element, thereby preventing leakage of a concealed key from one said element from compromising any other said element.

18. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 13 , wherein said at least one location-specific secure-key undergoes said previous initial concealment further in order:

(ii) to allow useful mathematical operations to be performed:

(A) on an unencrypted value of said secret item while said secret item remains encrypted, and said secret item is never known in an unencrypted form on any computing resource in any computing-environment other than during said previous initial concealment; and

(B) on unconcealed values of said location-specific secure-keys while said at least one location-specific secure-key remains in a concealed form, and said at least one location-specific secure-key is never known in an unconcealed form on any computing resource in any computing-environment other than during said previous initial concealment; and

wherein said useful mathematical operations include at least one operation selected from the group consisting of: XOR, addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, modular addition, modular subtraction, modular multiplication, modular division, and combinations thereof.