Cryptographically-secure autonomous detection of spoofed GNSS signals
Methods and systems for cryptographically-secure autonomous detection of spoofed GNSS signals is provided. A method is provided that includes the steps of: generating a cryptographic code, controlling a motion of at least one antenna of a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receiver system according to the cryptographic code, detecting a plurality of satellite signals during the controlled motion of the at least one antenna, and determining, based on carrier phase variations of the detected plurality of satellite signals, whether the plurality of satellite signals originated from a spoofer transmitter.
1. A method for spoofed signal detection comprising:
generating a cryptographic code with a cryptographic code generator coupled to an antenna controller;
translating, at the antenna controller, the cryptographic code into a sequence of motions;
controlling, with the antenna controller, a motion of at least one antenna of a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receiver system according to the sequence of motions;
detecting a plurality of satellite signals during the controlled motion of the at least one antenna; and
determining, at a receiver unit and based on carrier phase variations of the plurality of satellite signals, whether the plurality of satellite signals originated from a spoofer transmitter.
2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the generating of the cryptographic code comprises generating one of a random number and a pseudo-random number.
3. The method of claim 1 , further comprising: regenerating the cryptographic code at the receiver unit and determining the motion of the at least one antenna based on the regenerated cryptographic code.
4. The method of claim 1 , wherein the cryptographic code is only used by an antenna controller for controlling the motion of the at least one antenna and is not transmitted.
5. The method of claim 1 , wherein controlling the motion of the at least one antenna comprises causing physical motion of the at least one antenna relative to a mounting surface.
6. The method of claim 1 , wherein controlling the motion of the at least one antenna comprises controlling an antenna array to cause synthesized motion.
7. The method of claim 1 , wherein the determining whether the plurality of satellite signals originated from a spoofer transmitter step comprises:
correlating the motion of the at least one antenna with carrier phase histories of each of the plurality of satellite signals; and
determining whether a variance of the carrier phase histories and the motion of the at least one antenna exceeds a threshold.
8. The method of claim 1 , wherein the determining whether the plurality of satellite signals originated from a spoofer transmitter step comprises:
comparing carrier phase histories of each of the plurality of satellite signals while the at least one antenna is in motion; and
determining whether a variance between the carrier phase variations of the plurality of satellite signals exceeds a threshold.
9. The method of claim 1 , wherein the GNSS receiver system further comprises one or more electrical isolation devices for reducing variations in antenna reflected signals in a synthesized motion antenna.
10. The method of claim 1 , wherein the GNSS receiver system further comprises an electro-magnetic shielding covering one or more of its components to prevent detection of at least one of the cryptographic code and the motion of the at least one antenna.
11. A system for spoofed signal detection comprising:
a cryptographic code generator for generating a cryptographic code;
an antenna controller for translating the cryptographic code into a sequence of motions and controlling a motion of at least one antenna of a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receiver system according to the sequence of motions; and
a receiver unit configured to:
detect a plurality of satellite signals received during the controlled motion of the at least one antenna; and
determine, based on carrier phase variations of the plurality of satellite signals, whether the plurality of satellite signals originated from a spoofer transmitter.
12. The system of claim 11 , wherein the cryptographic code generator comprises one of a random number generator and a pseudo-random number generator.
13. The system of claim 11 , wherein the receiver unit is further configured to: regenerate the cryptographic code and uses the cryptographic code to determine the motion of the at least one antenna.
14. The system of claim 11 , wherein the cryptographic code is only used by the antenna controller and is not transmitted.
15. The system of claim 11 , wherein the antenna controller is configured to control the at least one antenna by causing physical motion of the at least one antenna relative to a mounting surface.
16. The system of claim 11 , wherein the antenna controller is configured to control the at least one antenna by controlling an antenna array to cause synthesized motion.
17. The system of claim 11 , wherein the receiver unit is configured to determine whether the plurality of satellite signals originated from a spoofer transmitter based on:
correlating the motion of the at least one antenna with carrier phase histories of each of the plurality of satellite signals; and
determining whether a variance of the carrier phase histories and the motion of the at least one antenna exceeds a threshold.
18. The system of claim 11 , wherein the receiver unit is configured to determine whether the plurality of satellite signals originated from a spoofer transmitter based on:
comparing carrier phase histories of each of the plurality of satellite signals while the at least one antenna is in motion; and
determining whether a variance between the carrier phase variations of the plurality of satellite signals exceeds a threshold.
19. The system of claim 11 , further comprising: one or more electrical isolation devices for reducing variations in antenna reflected signals in a synthesized motion antenna.
20. The system of claim 11 , further comprising: comprises an electro-magnetic shielding covering one or more of its components to prevent detection of at least one of the cryptographic code and the motion of the at least one antenna.
21. An apparatus for spoof signal detection comprising:
receiving a cryptographic code from a cryptographic code generator;
translating the cryptographic code into a sequence of motions;
controlling a motion of at least one antenna of a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receiver system based on the sequence of motions; and
providing a plurality of satellite signals received during the controlled motion of the at least one antenna to a receiver unit.
22. The method of claim 1 , wherein the receiver unit is configured to determine whether the plurality of satellite signals originated from a spoofer transmitter without determining or receiving the cryptographic code.