Trusted platform module certification and attestation utilizing an anonymous key system
This application is directed to trusted platform module certification and attestation utilizing an anonymous key system. In general, TPM certification and TPM attestation may be supported in a device utilizing integrated TPM through the use of anonymous key system (AKS) certification. An example device may comprise at least combined AKS and TPM resources that load AKS and TPM firmware (FW) into a runtime environment that may further include at least an operating system (OS) encryption module, an AKS service module and a TPM Certification and Attestation (CA) module. For TPM certification, the CA module may interact with the other modules in the runtime environment to generate a TPM certificate, signed by an AKS certificate, that may be transmitted to a certification platform for validation. For TPM attestation, the CA module may cause TPM credentials to be provided to the attestation platform for validation along with the TPM and/or AKS certificates.
1. A device supporting trusted platform module certification and attestation using an anonymous key system, comprising:
communication circuitry to communicate with at least a remote resource; and
combined anonymous key system and integrated trusted platform module resources to load an anonymous key system and a trusted platform module firmware module into a runtime environment in the device, the runtime environment further including at least:
operating system encryption circuitry;
anonymous key system service circuitry; and
interface circuitry to interact with at least a certification platform in the remote resource via the communication circuitry, wherein the interface circuitry is further to:
cause the anonymous key system service circuitry to request an anonymous key system certificate from the trusted platform module firmware module;
interact with the operating system encryption circuitry to generate a trusted platform module key handle and to initiate finalization of a trusted platform module certificate based on at least one of the trusted platform module key handle and the anonymous key system certificate;
interact with the trusted platform module firmware module to generate the trusted platform module certificate based on at least the trusted platform module key handle and to sign the trusted platform module certificate using the anonymous key system certificate to produce a signed trusted platform module certificate;
receive a request for trusted platform module credentials from an attestation platform in the remote resource via the communication circuitry; and
cause the operating system encryption circuitry to obtain at least the trusted platform module credentials and the trusted platform module certificate from the trusted platform module firmware module.
2. The device of claim 1 , wherein the anonymous key system service circuitry comprises an anonymous key system firmware module loaded into a first trusted execution environment and the trusted platform module firmware module comprises a separate trusted platform module firmware module loaded into a second trusted execution environment.
3. The device of claim 1 , wherein the operating system encryption circuitry is further to:
provide the signed trusted platform module certificate to the interface circuitry.
4. The device of claim 3 , wherein the interface circuitry is further to:
cause the communication circuitry to transmit the signed trusted platform module certificate to the certification platform; and
receive a message from the certification platform via the communication circuitry, the message at least indicating that signed trusted platform module certificate is valid.
5. The device of claim 1 , wherein the interface circuitry is further to:
cause the communication circuitry to transmit a response to the request, the response including at least the trusted platform module credentials for validation by the attestation platform; and
receive a message from the attestation platform via the communication circuitry, the message at least indicating at least that the trusted platform module credentials have been validated.
6. The device of claim 5 , wherein the response to the request further comprises the anonymous key system certificate or the trusted platform module certificate for the attestation platform to use in validating the trusted platform module credentials.
7. The device of claim 5 , wherein the response to the request further comprises:
the anonymous key system certificate for the attestation platform to use in validating the trusted platform module certificate; and
the trusted platform module certificate for the attestation platform to use in validating the trusted platform module credentials.
8. A method for trusted platform module certification and attestation using an anonymous key system, comprising:
loading a combined anonymous key system and trusted platform module firmware module into a runtime environment in a device, the runtime environment further including at least:
a communication module to communicate with at least a remote resource;
an operating system encryption module;
an anonymous key system service module;
an interface module to interact with at least a certification platform in a remote resource; and
triggering at least one of trusted platform module certification or trusted platform module attestation in the device;
wherein triggering trusted platform module certification comprises:
causing an anonymous key system certificate to be requested by the anonymous key system service module from the trusted platform module firmware module;
interacting with the operating system encryption module to generate a trusted platform module key handle and to initiate finalization of a trusted platform module certificate based on at least one of the trusted platform module key handle and the anonymous key system certificate;
interacting with the trusted platform module firmware module to generate the trusted platform module certificate based on at least the trusted platform module key handle and to sign the trusted platform module certificate using the anonymous key system certificate, thereby producing a signed trusted platform module certificate;
receiving a request for trusted platform module credentials from an attestation platform in the remote resource via the communication module; and
causing the operating system encryption module to obtain at least the trusted platform module credentials and the trusted platform module certificate from the trusted platform module firmware module.
9. The method of claim 8 , further comprising:
providing the signed trusted platform module certificate to the interface module.
10. The method of claim 9 , further comprising:
causing the communication module to transmit the signed trusted platform module certificate to the certification platform; and
receiving a message from the certification platform via the communication module, the message at least indicating that signed trusted platform module certificate is valid.
11. The method of claim 8 , further comprising:
causing the communication module to transmit a response to the request, the response including at least the trusted platform module credentials for validation by the attestation platform; and
receiving a message from the attestation platform via the communication module, the message at least indicating at least that the trusted platform module credentials have been validated.
12. The method of claim 11 , wherein the response to the request further comprises the anonymous key system certificate or the trusted platform module certificate for the attestation platform to use in validating the trusted platform module credentials.
13. The method of claim 11 , wherein the response to the request further comprises:
the anonymous key system certificate for the attestation platform to use in validating the trusted platform module certificate; and
the trusted platform module certificate for the attestation platform to use in validating the trusted platform module credentials.
14. At least one non-transitory machine-readable storage medium having stored thereon, individually or in combination, instructions for trusted platform module certification and attestation using an anonymous key system that, when executed by one or more hardware processors, cause the performance of the following operations comprising:
load a combined anonymous key system and trusted platform module firmware module into a runtime environment in a device, the runtime environment including at least:
a communication module to communicate with at least a remote resource;
an operating system encryption module;
an anonymous key system service module;
an interface module to interact with at least a certification platform in a remote resource; and
trigger at least one of trusted platform module certification or trusted platform module attestation in the device at least in part by:
causing an anonymous key system certificate to be requested by the anonymous key system service module from the trusted platform module firmware module;
causing the encryption module to generate a trusted platform module key handle and to initiate finalization of a trusted platform module certificate based on at least one the trusted platform module key handle and the anonymous key system certificate;
causing the trusted platform module firmware module to generate the trusted platform module certificate based on at least the trusted platform module key handle and to sign the trusted platform module certificate using the anonymous key system certificate so as to produce a signed trusted platform module certificate;
receiving a request for trusted platform module credentials from an attestation platform in the remote resource via the communication module; and
causing the operating system encryption module to obtain at least the trusted platform module credentials and the trusted platform module certificate from the trusted platform module firmware module.
15. The non-transitory medium of claim 14 , further comprising instructions that, when executed by one or more hardware processors, cause the performance of the following operations comprising:
provide the signed trusted platform module certificate to the interface module.
16. The non-transitory medium of claim 15 , further comprising instructions that, when executed by one or more hardware processors, cause the one or more hardware processors to perform the following operations comprising:
cause the communication module to transmit the signed trusted platform module certificate to the certification platform; and
receive a message from the certification platform via the communication module, the message at least indicating that signed trusted platform module certificate is valid.
17. The non-transitory medium of claim 14 , further comprising instructions that, when executed by one or more hardware processors, cause the performance of the following operations comprising:
cause the communication module to transmit a response to the request, the response including at least the trusted platform module credentials for validation by the attestation platform; and
receive a message from the attestation platform via the communication module, the message at least indicating at least that the trusted platform module credentials have been validated.
18. The non-transitory medium of claim 17 , wherein the response to the request further comprises the anonymous key system certificate or the trusted platform module certificate for the attestation platform to use in validating the trusted platform module credentials.
19. The non-transitory medium of claim 17 , wherein the response to the request further comprises:
the anonymous key system certificate for the attestation platform to use in validating the trusted platform module certificate; and
the trusted platform module certificate for the attestation platform to use in validating the trusted platform module credentials.