Distributed key secret for rewritable blockchain
A system includes circuitry for rewriting blockchains in a non-tamper-evident or tamper-evident operation using a key secret held in portions by multiple individually untrusted parties. The blockchains may include a series of blocks secured by integrity codes that may prevent non-tamper-evident rewrites by non-trusted parties that are not in possession of the key secret or individually-untrusted parties in possession of only a portion of the key secret. In some cases, multiple individually-untrusted parties may combine their portions into the key secret. As a group, the multiple individually-untrusted parties may perform non-tamper-evident operation with respect to at least one integrity code within the blockchain.
1. A method comprising:
receiving, at processing circuitry, a first portion of a key secret via a key secret exchange protocol;
combining, with the processing circuitry, the first portion with a second portion of the key secret to obtain the key secret;
determining, with the processing circuitry, to rewrite original data in a selected block of a blockchain with altered data that is different than the original data previously stored in the selected block; and
determining, with the processing circuitry and using the key secret, collision data, where:
the collision data includes the altered data,
the collision data comprises data coding-consistent with a previously determined integrity output stored within a specific block of the blockchain that follows the selected block,
the previously determined integrity output comprises an integrity output generated responsive to and coding-consistent with the original data, and
rewriting the original data with the collision data does not introduce coding-inconsistency with the previously determined integrity output.
2. The method of claim 1 , where the specific block follows the selected block within the blockchain.
3. The method of claim 1 , where the specific block comprises a block adjacent to the selected block within the blockchain.
4. The method of claim 1 , where receiving the first portion of the key secret via the key secret exchange protocol comprises:
receiving the first portion of the key secret via a public key exchange protocol.
5. The method of claim 1 , where receiving the first portion of the key secret via the key secret exchange protocol comprises:
performing the key secret exchange protocol under authority of multiple individually-untrusted parties.
6. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
accessing the second portion of the key secret in a protected memory prior to combining the first and second portions of the key secret.
7. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
granting, using the key secret, a third portion of the key secret to a previously untrusted party.
8. The method of claim 7 , where granting the third portion of the key secret comprises:
decrypting, using the key secret, a cache storing multiple portions of the key secret.
9. The method of claim 1 , where determining to rewrite the original data in the selected block of the blockchain with the altered data comprises:
determining to remove a detectable rewrite artifact left by performing a rewrite without access to the first portion, the second portion, or both.
10. A system comprising:
communication interface circuitry configured to receive, at processing circuitry, a first portion of a key secret via a key secret exchange protocol; and
rewrite circuitry in data communication with the communication interface circuitry, the rewrite circuitry configured to:
combine the first portion with a second portion of the key secret to obtain the key secret;
determine to rewrite original data in a selected block of a blockchain with altered data that is different than the original data previously stored in the selected block; and
determine, using the key secret, collision data, where:
the collision data includes the altered data,
the collision data comprises data coding-consistent with a previously determined integrity output stored within a specific block of the blockchain that follows the selected block,
the previously determined integrity output comprises an integrity output generated responsive to and coding-consistent with the original data, and
the collision data does not introduce coding-inconsistency with the previously determined integrity output when the original data is rewritten with the collision data.
11. The system of claim 10 , where the specific block follows the selected block within the blockchain.
12. The system of claim 10 , where the specific block comprises a block adjacent to the selected block within the blockchain.
13. The system of claim 10 , where the communication interface circuitry is configured to:
receive the first portion of the key secret via the key secret exchange protocol by receiving the first portion of the key secret via a public key exchange protocol.
14. The system of claim 10 , where the communication interface circuitry is configured to:
receive the first portion of the key secret the key secret exchange protocol by performing the key secret exchange protocol under authority of multiple individually untrusted parties.
15. The system of claim 10 , where the rewrite circuitry is further configured to:
access the second portion of the key secret in a protected memory prior to combining the first and second portions of the key secret.
16. The system of claim 10 , where the rewrite circuitry is further configured to:
grant, using the key secret, a third portion of the key secret to a previously untrusted party.
17. The system of claim 16 , where the rewrite circuitry is configured to:
grant the third portion of the key secret by decrypting, using the key secret, a cache storing multiple portions of the key secret.
18. The system of claim 10 , where the rewrite circuitry is configured to:
determine to rewrite the original data in the selected block of the blockchain with the altered data by determining to remove a detectable rewrite artifact left by performing a rewrite without access to the first portion, the second portion, or both.
19. A product comprising:
a machine-readable medium other than a transitory signal; and
instructions stored on the machine-readable medium, the instructions configured to, when executed, cause a machine to:
receive, at processing circuitry, a first portion of a key secret via a key secret exchange protocol;
combine, with the processing circuitry, the first portion with a second portion of the key secret to obtain the key secret;
determine, with the processing circuitry, to rewrite original data in a selected block of a blockchain with altered data that is different than the original data previously stored in the selected block; and
determine, with the processing circuitry and using the key secret, collision data, where:
the collision data includes the altered data,
the collision data comprises data coding-consistent with a previously determined integrity output stored within a specific block of the blockchain that follows the selected block,
the previously determined integrity output comprises an integrity output generated responsive to and coding-consistent with the original data, and
the collision data does not introduce coding-inconsistency with the previously determined integrity output when the original data is rewritten with the collision data.
20. The product of claim 19 , where the instructions configured to cause the machine to determine to rewrite the original data in the selected block of the blockchain with the altered data by:
determining to remove a detectable rewrite artifact left by performing a rewrite without access to the first portion, the second portion, or both.