IP Library Granted Patent US 11,074,345
Granted Patent B2
US 11,074,345 · App. 16/427,109 · Granted Jul 27, 2021

Rootkit detection system

Inventors: Joel Dawson (Oak Ridge, TN); Ali Passian (Oak Ridge, TN)
Assignee: UT-BATTELLE, LLC
G06F21/566G06F1/28G06F21/54G06F2221/033
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 11,074,345
App. No.
16/427,109
Granted
Jul 27, 2021
Kind
B2
Abstract

A system and method (referred to as the system) detect infectious code. The system injects a repetitive software code that causes malware in a monitored device to render a detectable direct current power consumption profile. A guide wave generator generates a guide wave signal that establishes an observational window that is applied to data that represent a direct current source power consumption of the monitored device. An extraction device extracts a portion of the data that represent the direct current source power consumption of the monitored device. A deviation engine identifies the malware on the monitored device without processing data associated with a prior identification of the malware or identifying a source of the malware or identifying a location of the malware on the monitored device.

Claims (39)

1. A non-transitory computer-readable medium having stored thereon software instructions that, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to:

injecting, by an injection module, a repetitive software code that causes a malware in a monitored device to render a detectable direct current power consumption profile;

generating, by a guide wave generator, a guide wave signal that establishes an observational window, that is applied to data that represent a direct current source power consumption of a monitored device;

extracting, by an extraction device, a portion of the data that represent the direct current source power consumption of the monitored device;

comparing, by a deviation engine, a plurality of operating characteristics of the monitored device against a plurality of normal operating state characteristics of the monitored device without identifying a baseline factor from a second device or identifying a second data generated from the second devices; and

identifying, by the deviation engine based on the comparing, the malware on the monitored device, without processing data associated with a prior identification of the malware or identifying a source of the malware or identifying a location of the malware on the monitored device.

2. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 1 where repetitive software code causes the execution of a plurality of repetitive tasks that render a distinctive power trace.

3. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 1 where repetitive software code causes the execution of a plurality of application programming interface call functions that render a distinctive power trace.

4. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 1 where the data renders a representation of the direct current source power consumption of a monitored device during the execution of the repetitive software code.

5. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 4 where the guide wave causes the extraction device to amplify a portion of the representation of the direct current source power consumption extracted by the extraction device.

6. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 5 where the guide wave causes the extraction device to attenuate a second portion of the representation of the direct current source power consumption extracted by the extraction device.

7. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim where the comparing comprises an execution of a probability density algorithm.

8. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 7 where the comparing comprises an execution of an entropy algorithm.

9. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 1 further comprising generating, by the monitored device, training data indicative of a potential infectious state without identifying the malware.

10. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 9 further comprising training a deviation model on the data indicative of the potential infectious state.

11. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 9 where the training data is generated during an incubation state before a full infection state occurs.

12. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 9 further comprising draining traffic from the monitored device when the deviation model predicts a potentially infected operating state.

13. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 9 further comprising notifying a server cluster when the deviation model predicts a potentially infected operating state.

14. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 9 further comprising determining when the monitored device should stop receiving a new processing session when the deviation model predicts a potentially infected operating state.

15. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 9 further comprising determining when to allowing an operating session to expire when the deviation model predicts a potentially infected operating state.

16. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 9 further comprising determining when to allowing an operating session to expire when the deviation model predicts a potentially infected operating state.

17. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 9 where identifying, by a deviation engine, the malware on the monitored device occurs when a rendered signal exceeds a predetermined threshold.

18. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 9 where the extraction device comprises a lock-in analyzer that operates in an analog domain.

19. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 9 where the extraction device comprises a field programmable array that operates in a digital domain.

20. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 9 where the extraction device comprises a homodyne detector.

21. A method of detecting infectious software code, comprising:

injecting, by an injection module, a repetitive software code that causes a malware in a monitored device to render a detectable direct current power consumption profile;

generating, by a guide wave generator, a guide wave signal that establishes an observational window, that is applied to data that represent a direct current source power consumption of a monitored device;

extracting, by an extraction device, a portion of the data that represent the direct current source power consumption of the monitored device;

comparing, by a deviation engine, a plurality of operating characteristics of the monitored device against a plurality of normal operating state characteristics of the monitored device without identifying a baseline factor from a second device of identifying a second data generated from the second devices; and

identifying, by the deviation engine based on the comparing, the malware on the monitored device, without processing data associated with a prior identification of the malware or identifying a source of the malware or identifying a location of the malware on the monitored device.

22. A system that detects infectious software code, comprising:

an injection module that injects a repetitive software code that causes a malware in a monitored device to render a detectable direct current power consumption profile;

a guide wave generator that generates a guide wave signal that establishes an observational window that is applied to data that represent a direct current source power consumption of a monitored device;

an extraction device that extracts a portion of the data that represent the direct current source power consumption of the monitored device; and

a deviation engine that

compares a plurality of operating characteristics of the monitored device against a plurality of normal operating state characteristics of the monitored device without identifying a baseline factor from a second device or identifying a second data generated from the second devices to render a comparison, and detects based on the comparison, the malware on the monitored device, without processing data associated with a prior identification of the malware or identifying a source of the malware or identifying a location of the malware on the monitored device.

23. The method of claim 21 where the comparing comprises using a probability density function that compares entropy between the monitored device's current operating state to the monitored device's normal operating state.

24. The system of claim 22 where the comparison uses a probability density function that compares entropy between the monitored device's current operating state to the monitored device's normal operating state.

Assignments (2)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Aug 13, 2019
From: DAWSON, JOEL; PASSIAN, ALI
To: UT-BATTELLE, LLC
Reel/Frame 050035/0151 →
CONFIRMATORY LICENSE Recorded Aug 5, 2019
From: UT-BATTELLE, LLC
To: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Reel/Frame 049955/0818 →
Continuity (1)
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