Odd index precomputation for authentication path computation

1. An apparatus, comprising:

a computer-readable memory;

signature logic to:

compute a message hash of an input message using a secure hash algorithm;

process the message hash to generate an array of secret key components for the input message;

apply a hash chain function to the array of secret key components to generate an array of signature components, the hash chain function comprising a series of even-index hash chains and a series of odd-index has chains, wherein the even-index hash chains and the odd-index hash chains generate a plurality of intermediate node values and a one-time public key component between the secret key components and the signature components;

store at least some of the intermediate node values in the computer-readable memory for use in one or more subsequent signature operations;

compute the message hash of the input message using at least one of a Winterniz One Time Signature (WOTS) scheme or a WOTS+ scheme that invokes a secure hash algorithm (SHA) hash function

apply a L-tree operation to the public key components to compress the public key components into a single leaf node value; and

provide the single leaf node value as an input to the Merkle tree.

2. The apparatus of claim 1 , further comprising logic to:

store the intermediate node values generated and one time public key components generated by the even-index hash chains in the computer-readable memory; and

use the one-time public key components to define computations through an authentication path through a Merkle tree.

3. The apparatus of claim 1 the signature logic to:

perform a first hash operations using the single leaf node value and a first odd-index public key component to generate a first parent node in the Merkle tree; and

perform a series of hash operations using subsequent odd-index public key components to determine a root node value of the Merkle tree.

4. The apparatus of claim 3 , comprising logic to:

compare the root node value of the Merkle tree to a multi-signature public key value associated with the signing device; and

generate an authentication success signal when the root node value of the Merkle tree matches the multi-signature public key value associated with the signing device.

5. The apparatus of claim 3 , wherein:

compare the root node value of the Merkle tree to a multi-signature public key value associated with the signing device; and

generate an authentication fail signal when the root node value of the Merkle tree does not match the multi-signature public key value associated with the signing device.

6. A computer-implemented method, comprising:

computing a message hash of an input message using a secure hash algorithm;

processing the message hash to generate an array of secret key components for the input message;

applying a hash chain function to the array of secret key components to generate an array of signature components, the hash chain function comprising a series of even-index hash chains and a series of odd-index hash chains, wherein the even-index hash chains and the odd-index hash chains generate a plurality of intermediate node values and a one-time public key component between the secret key components and the signature components;

storing at least some of the intermediate node values in the computer-readable memory for use in one or more subsequent signature operations;

computing the message hash of the input message using at least one of a Winterniz One Time Signature (WOTS) scheme or a WOTS+ scheme that invokes a secure hash algorithm (SHA) hash function

applying a L-tree operation to the public key components to compress the public key components into a single leaf node value; and

providing the single leaf node value as an input to the Merkle tree.

7. The method of claim 6 , further comprising:

storing the intermediate node values generated and one time public key components generated by the even-index hash chains in the computer-readable memory; and

using the one-time public key components to define computations through an authentication path through a Merkle tree.

8. The method of claim 6 , further comprising:

performing a first hash operations using the single leaf node value and a first odd-index public key component to generate a first parent node in the Merkle tree; and

performing a series of hash operations using subsequent odd-index public key components to determine a root node value of the Merkle tree.

9. The method of claim 8 , further comprising:

comparing the root node value of the Merkle tree to a multi-signature public key value associated with the signing device; and

generating an authentication signal when the root node value of the Merkle tree matches the multi-signature public key value associated with the signing device.

10. The method of claim 8 , further comprising:

comparing the root node value of the Merkle tree to a multi-signature public key value associated with the signing device; and

generating an authentication fail signal when the root node value of the Merkle tree does not match the multi-signature public key value associated with the signing device.

11. A non-transitory computer-readable medium comprising instructions which, when executed by a processor, configure the processor to perform operations, comprising:

storing a public key associated with a signing device in a computer-readable medium;

computing a message hash of an input message using a secure hash algorithm;

processing the message hash to generate an array of secret key components for the input message;

applying a hash chain function to the array of secret key components to generate an array of signature components, the hash chain function comprising a series of even-index hash chains and a series of odd-index hash chains, wherein the even-index hash chains and the odd-index hash chains generate a plurality of intermediate node values and a one-time public key component between the secret key components and the signature components; and

storing at least some of the intermediate node values in the computer-readable memory for use in one or more subsequent signature operations;

computing the message hash of the input message using at least one of a Winterniz One Time Signature (WOTS) scheme or a WOTS+ scheme that invokes a secure hash algorithm (SHA) hash function

applying a L-tree operation to the public key components to compress the public key components into a single leaf node value; and

providing the single leaf node value as an input to the Merkle tree.

12. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 11 , further comprising instructions which, when executed by the processor, configure the processor to perform operations, comprising:

storing the intermediate node values generated and one time public key components generated by the even-index hash chains in the computer-readable memory; and

using the one-time public key components to define computations through an authentication path through a Merkle tree.

13. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 11 , further comprising instructions which, when executed by the processor, configure the processor to perform operations, comprising:

performing a first hash operations using the single leaf node value and a first odd-index public key component to generate a first parent node in the Merkle tree; and

performing a series of hash operations using subsequent odd-index public key components to determine a root node value of the Merkle tree.

14. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 13 , further comprising instructions which, when executed by the processor, configure the processor to perform operations, comprising:

comparing the root node value of the Merkle tree to a multi-signature public key value associated with the signing device; and

generating an authentication signal when the root node value of the Merkle tree matches the multi-signature public key value associated with the signing device.

15. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 13 , further comprising instructions which, when executed by the processor, configure the processor to perform operations, comprising:

comparing the root node value of the Merkle tree to a multi-signature public key value associated with the signing device; and

generating an authentication fail signal when the root node value of the Merkle tree does not match the multi-signature public key value associated with the signing device.