Remote attestation of modular devices with multiple cryptoprocessors
A methodology for requesting at least one signed security measurement from at least one module with a corresponding cryptoprocessor is provided. The methodology includes receiving the at least one signed security measurement from the at least one module with the corresponding cryptoprocessor; validating the at least one signed security measurement; generating a signed dossier including all validated signed security measurements in a secure enclave, the signed dossier being used by an external network device for remote attestation of the device.
1. A method comprising:
requesting at least one signed security measurement from at least one module with a corresponding cryptoprocessor, the at least one module existing within a physical device;
receiving the at least one signed security measurement from the at least one module with the corresponding cryptoprocessor;
validating the at least one signed security measurement; and
generating a signed dossier including all validated signed security measurements in a secure enclave, the signed dossier being used by an external network device for remote attestation of the physical device;
wherein the generating the signed dossier includes signing the dossier with a key which represents a virtual device representation of the physical device and is not tied to a specific hardware component associated with the physical device.
2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the at least one signed security measurement contains integrity measurements from the corresponding cryptoprocessor.
3. The method of claim 1 , wherein the requesting the at least one signed security measurement includes sending a nonce plus signed timeticks, as well as reset and restart counters.
4. The method of claim 1 , wherein the key comprises an asymmetric cipher with a private key component stored in the secure enclave used for generating the signed dossier.
5. The method of claim 1 , wherein the signed dossier is securely distributed between multiple secure enclaves.
6. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium comprising instructions stored therein which, when executed by at least one processor, cause the at least one processor to perform operations comprising:
request a plurality of signed security measurements from a plurality of modules with corresponding cryptoprocessors, the plurality of modules existing within a physical device;
receive the plurality of signed security measurements from the plurality of modules with corresponding cryptoprocessors;
validate the plurality of signed security measurement; and
generate a signed dossier including all validated signed security measurements in a secure enclave, the signed dossier being used by an external network device for remote attestation of the physical device;
wherein the generate the signed dossier includes signing the dossier with a key which represents a virtual device representation of the physical device and is not tied to a specific hardware component associated with the physical device.
7. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 6 , wherein the plurality of modules contain at least one line card or a route processor.
8. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 7 , wherein the key comprises an asymmetric cipher with a private key component stored in the secure enclave used for generating the signed dossier.
9. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 7 , wherein the signed dossier is securely distributed between multiple secure enclaves.
10. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 6 , wherein the plurality of signed security measurements contain integrity measurements from the corresponding cryptoprocessor.
11. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 6 , wherein the request of the plurality of signed security measurements includes sending a nonce plus signed timeticks, as well as reset and restart counters.
12. A system comprising:
a computing device, the computing device comprising:
at least one module with a corresponding cryptoprocessor;
a secure enclave; and
a supervisor cryptoprocessor configured to:
request at least one signed security measurement from the at least one module with the corresponding cryptoprocessor, the at least one module existing within a physical device;
receive the at least one signed security measurement from the at least one module with the corresponding cryptoprocessor;
validate the at least one signed security measurement; and
generate a sign dossier including all validated signed security measurements in the secure enclave, the signed dossier being used by an external network device for remote attestation of the physical device;
wherein the generate the signed dossier includes signing the dossier with a key which represents a virtual device representation of the physical device and is not tied to a specific hardware component associated with the physical device.
13. The system of claim 12 , wherein the at least one module is a line card or a route processor.
14. The system of claim 13 , wherein the key comprises an asymmetric cipher with a private key component stored in the secure enclave used for generating the signed dossier.
15. The system of claim 13 , wherein the signed dossier is securely distributed between multiple secure enclaves.
16. The system of claim 12 , wherein the at least one signed security measurement contains integrity measurements from the corresponding cryptoprocessor.
17. The system of claim 12 , wherein the request of the at least one signed security measurement includes a nonce plus signed timeticks, as well as reset and restart counters.