IP Library Granted Patent US 11,601,349
Granted Patent B2
US 11,601,349 · App. 16/846,117 · Granted Mar 7, 2023

System and method of detecting hidden processes by analyzing packet flows

Inventors: Khawar Deen (Sunnyvale, CA); Navindra Yadav (Cupertino, CA); Anubhav Gupta (Fremont, CA); Shashidhar Gandham (Fremont, CA); Rohit Chandra Prasad (Sunnyvale, CA); Abhishek Ranjan Singh (Pleasanton, CA); Shih-Chun Chang (San Jose, CA)
Assignee: Cisco Technology, Inc.
H04L43/045G06F3/0482G06F3/04842G06F3/04847G06F9/45558G06F16/122G06F16/137G06F16/162G06F16/17G06F16/173G06F16/174G06F16/1744G06F16/1748G06F16/235G06F16/2322G06F16/2365G06F16/248G06F16/24578G06F16/285G06F16/288G06F16/29G06F16/9535G06F21/53G06F21/552G06F21/556G06F21/566G06N20/00G06N99/00G06T11/206H04J3/0661H04J3/14H04L1/242H04L9/0866H04L9/3239H04L9/3242H04L41/046H04L41/0668H04L41/0803H04L41/0806H04L41/0816H04L41/0893H04L41/12H04L41/16H04L41/22H04L43/02H04L43/026H04L43/04H04L43/062H04L43/08H04L43/0805H04L43/0811H04L43/0829H04L43/0841H04L43/0858H04L43/0864H04L43/0876H04L43/0882H04L43/0888H04L43/10H04L43/106H04L43/12H04L43/16H04L45/306H04L45/38H04L45/46H04L45/507H04L45/66H04L45/74H04L47/11H04L47/20H04L47/2441H04L47/2483H04L47/28H04L47/31H04L47/32H04L61/5007H04L63/0227H04L63/0263H04L63/06H04L63/0876H04L63/145H04L63/1408H04L63/1416H04L63/1425H04L63/1433H04L63/1441H04L63/1458H04L63/1466H04L63/16H04L63/20H04L67/01H04L67/10H04L67/1001H04L67/12H04L67/51H04L67/75H04L69/16H04L69/22H04W72/08H04W84/18G06F2009/4557G06F2009/45587G06F2009/45591G06F2009/45595G06F2221/033G06F2221/2101G06F2221/2105G06F2221/2111G06F2221/2115G06F2221/2145H04L67/535
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 11,601,349
App. No.
16/846,117
Granted
Mar 7, 2023
Kind
B2
Abstract

A method includes capturing first data associated with a first packet flow originating from a first host using a first capture agent deployed at the first host to yield first flow data, capturing second data associated with a second packet flow originating from the first host from a second capture agent deployed outside of the first host to yield second flow data and comparing the first flow data and the second flow data to yield a difference. When the difference is above a threshold value, the method includes determining that a hidden process exists and corrective action can be taken.

Claims (36)

1. A method comprising:

capturing flow data associated with a plurality of packet flows originating from a host device, the flow data being captured via two or more agents at different network components, at least one of the one or more agents being at the host device;

computing a difference in the flow data based on a differential analysis of the flow data captured using the two or more agents;

when the difference is above a threshold value, determining a hidden process included in one of the plurality of packet flows;

predicting a presence of a malicious entity based on the determining of the hidden process; and taking a corrective action with respect to the malicious entity.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the flow data includes metadata associated with a first packet flow and a second packet flow.

3. The method of claim 1 , wherein the flow data includes first packet content of a first packet flow and second packet content of a second packet flow.

4. The method of claim 1 , wherein the two or more agents are collectors.

5. The method of claim 1 , wherein,

the flow data is received by each collector, and

each collector is configured to yield the difference.

6. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

identifying a generator of the hidden process.

7. The method of claim 1 , wherein the flow data includes network data.

8. The method of claim 1 , wherein the corrective action is shutting down the host device.

9. The method of claim 1 , wherein the corrective action includes one or more of limiting packets to and from the host device, requiring all packets to and from the host device to flow through an operating stack of the host device, or notifying an administrator.

10. A system comprising:

a processor; and

a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing instructions which, when executed by the processor, cause the processor to:

capture flow data associated with a plurality of packet flows originating from a host device, the flow data being captured via two or more agents at different network components, at least one of the one or more agents being at the host device;

compute a difference in the flow data based on a differential analysis of the flow data captured using the two or more agents;

when the difference is above a threshold value, determine a hidden process included in one of the plurality of packet flows;

predict a presence of a malicious entity based on the determining of the hidden process; and take a corrective action with respect to the malicious entity.

11. The system of claim 10 , wherein the flow data includes metadata associated with a first packet flow and a second packet flow.

12. The system of claim 10 , wherein the flow data includes first packet content of a first packet flow and second packet content of a second packet flow.

13. The system of claim 10 , wherein the two or more agents are collectors.

14. The system of claim 10 , wherein,

the flow data is received by each collector, and

each collector is configured to yield the difference.

15. The system of claim 10 , wherein the corrective action includes one of limiting packets to and from the host device, requiring all packets to and from the host device to flow through an operating stack of the host device, shutting down a host, or notifying an administrator.

16. A non-transitory computer-readable storage device that stores instructions which, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to:

capture flow data associated with a plurality of packet flows originating from a host device, the flow data being captured via two or more agents at different network components, at least one of the one or more agents being at the host device;

compute a difference in the flow data based on a differential analysis of the flow data captured using the two or more agents;

when the difference is above a threshold value, determine a hidden process included in one of the plurality of packet flows; predict a presence of a malicious entity based on the determining of the hidden process; and take a corrective action with respect to the malicious entity.

17. The non-transitory computer-readable storage device of claim 16 , wherein the flow data includes metadata associated with a first packet flow and a second packet flow.

18. The non-transitory computer-readable storage device of claim 16 , wherein the two or more agents are collectors configured to yield the difference.

Assignments (1)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Apr 10, 2020
From: DEEN, KHAWAR; YADAV, NAVINDRA; GUPTA, ANUBHAV; GANDHAM, SHASHIDHAR; PRASAD, ROHIT CHANDRA; SINGH, ABHISHEK RANJAN; CHANG, SHIH-CHUN
To: CISCO TECHNOLOGY, INC.
Reel/Frame 052373/0260 →
Continuity (3)
Continuation 15171930 · Jun 2, 2016
Provisional Application 62171899 · Jun 5, 2015
Related Publication 20200244554A1 · Jul 30, 2020