Multi-address population based on single address
A physical card (in some cases without any on-board source of power or computing capabilities) is configured to maintain access information for digital bearer assets. The physical card may include disposed thereon a single address operable to receive digital bearer assets in one or more transactions on a decentralized computing platform, like a blockchain-based decentralized computing platform. Other decentralized computing platforms utilize different address generation protocols, thus preventing use of a single address on those other platforms. A set of addresses is generated, each address corresponding to a given decentralized computing platform. Each address is based on a same underlying key-pair, and a primary address is selected from the set for a given card. The remaining addresses in the set are stored, without storage of the public key or private key, and returned in a response to a request for additional addresses of the currency card.
1. A method, comprising:
obtaining, with a computer system at a first geolocation, a passphrase;
generating, with the computer system at the first geolocation, an intermediate code based on the passphrase, wherein:
the intermediate code does not reveal the passphrase, and
the intermediate code is configured to be used to encrypt plaintexts to form ciphertexts that are decryptable with the passphrase;
obtaining, with a computer system at a second geolocation, the intermediate code and a private cryptographic key of a public-private cryptographic key pair, wherein:
the second geolocation is different from the first geolocation,
the computer system at the second geolocation does not have access to the passphrase, and
the public-private cryptographic key pair comprises a public cryptographic key that corresponds to a wallet address of a decentralized computing platform;
forming, with the computer system at the second geolocation, an encrypted-private-key ciphertext by encrypting the private cryptographic key with the intermediate code;
printing the encrypted-private-key ciphertext on a first substrate, wherein:
the encrypted-private-key ciphertext does not reveal the private cryptographic key, and
the encrypted-private-key ciphertext is decryptable with the passphrase to reveal the private cryptographic key in plaintext;
printing, at a different geolocation from where printing the encrypted-private-key ciphertext on the first substrate occurs, the passphrase on a second substrate;
concealing the passphrase printed on the second substrate or the encrypted-private-key ciphertext printed on the first substrate with a tamper-evident mask;
after concealing the passphrase printed on the second substrate or the encrypted-private-key ciphertext printed on the first substrate with a tamper-evident mask, obtaining the first substrate and the second substrate at the same geolocation, wherein:
people and computer systems with access to the passphrase do not have access to the encrypted-private-key ciphertext without tampering with the tamper-evident mask, or
people and computer systems with access to the encrypted-private-key ciphertext do not have access to the passphrase without tampering with the tamper-evident mask; and
attaching the first substrate to the second substrate.
2. The method of claim 1 , wherein:
the first substrate or the second substrate is a metal card.
3. The method of claim 2 , wherein:
the encrypted-private-key ciphertext or the passphrase is printed on the metal card by engraving.
4. The method of claim 1 , wherein:
the first geolocation is in a first country;
the second geolocation is in a second country that is different from the first country;
printing the encrypted-private-key ciphertext does not occur in the first country; and
printing the passphrase on the second substrate does not occur in the second country.
5. The method of claim 1 , wherein:
the first substrate with the encrypted-private-key ciphertext and the second substrate with the passphrase are not in the same country before concealing the passphrase printed on the second substrate or the encrypted-private-key ciphertext printed on the first substrate with a tamper-evident mask.
6. The method of claim 1 , wherein:
the first substrate is a card;
the second substrate is a sticker; and
the tamper-evident mask comprises means for indicating tampering.
7. The method of claim 1 , wherein:
the first substrate is a sticker;
the second substrate is a card; and
the tamper-evident mask comprises means for indicating tampering.
8. The method of claim 1 , wherein:
generating the intermediate code comprises generating a proxy re-encryption code.
9. The method of claim 1 , wherein:
the encrypted-private-key ciphertext is not decryptable with the intermediate code to reveal the private key in plaintext.
10. A method, comprising:
obtaining, with a computer system at a first geolocation, a passphrase;
generating, with the computer system at the first geolocation, an intermediate code based on the passphrase, wherein:
the intermediate code does not reveal the passphrase, and
the intermediate code is configured to be used to encrypt plaintexts to form ciphertexts that are decryptable with the passphrase;
obtaining, with a computer system at a second geolocation, the intermediate code and a private cryptographic key of a public-private cryptographic key pair, wherein:
the second geolocation is different from the first geolocation,
the computer system at the second geolocation does not have access to the passphrase, and
the public-private cryptographic key pair comprises a public cryptographic key that corresponds to a wallet address of a decentralized computing platform;
forming, with the computer system at the second geolocation, an encrypted-private-key ciphertext by encrypting the private cryptographic key with the intermediate code;
printing the encrypted-private-key ciphertext on a first substrate, wherein:
the encrypted-private-key ciphertext does not reveal the private cryptographic key, and
the encrypted-private-key ciphertext is decryptable with the passphrase to reveal the private cryptographic key in plaintext;
printing, at a different geolocation from where printing the encrypted-private-key ciphertext on the first substrate occurs, the passphrase on a second substrate, wherein the first geolocation is in a first country, the second geolocation is in a second country that is different from the first country, printing the encrypted-private-key ciphertext does not occur in the first country, and printing the passphrase on the second substrate does not occur in the second country;
concealing the passphrase printed on the second substrate or the encrypted-private-key ciphertext printed on the first substrate with a tamper-evident mask;
after concealing the passphrase printed on the second substrate or the encrypted-private-key ciphertext printed on the first substrate with a tamper-evident mask, obtaining the first substrate and the second substrate at the same geolocation; and
attaching the first substrate to the second substrate.
11. The method of claim 10 , wherein:
the first substrate or the second substrate is a metal card.
12. The method of claim 11 , wherein:
the encrypted-private-key ciphertext or the passphrase is printed on the metal card by engraving.
13. The method of claim 10 , wherein:
the first substrate is a card;
the second substrate is a sticker; and
the tamper-evident mask comprises means for indicating tampering.
14. The method of claim 10 , wherein:
the first substrate is a sticker;
the second substrate is a card; and
the tamper-evident mask comprises means for indicating tampering.
15. The method of claim 10 , wherein:
generating the intermediate code comprises generating a proxy re-encryption code.
16. The method of claim 10 , wherein:
the encrypted-private-key ciphertext is not decryptable with the intermediate code to reveal the private key in plaintext.
17. A method, comprising:
obtaining, with a computer system at a first geolocation, a passphrase;
generating, with the computer system at the first geolocation, an intermediate code based on the passphrase, wherein:
the intermediate code does not reveal the passphrase, and
the intermediate code is configured to be used to encrypt plaintexts to form ciphertexts that are decryptable with the passphrase;
obtaining, with a computer system at a second geolocation, the intermediate code and a private cryptographic key of a public-private cryptographic key pair, wherein:
the second geolocation is different from the first geolocation,
the computer system at the second geolocation does not have access to the passphrase, and
the public-private cryptographic key pair comprises a public cryptographic key that corresponds to a wallet address of a decentralized computing platform;
forming, with the computer system at the second geolocation, an encrypted-private-key ciphertext by encrypting the private cryptographic key with the intermediate code;
printing the encrypted-private-key ciphertext on a first substrate, wherein:
the encrypted-private-key ciphertext does not reveal the private cryptographic key, and
the encrypted-private-key ciphertext is decryptable with the passphrase to reveal the private cryptographic key in plaintext;
printing, at a different geolocation from where printing the encrypted-private-key ciphertext on the first substrate occurs, the passphrase on a second substrate;
concealing the passphrase printed on the second substrate or the encrypted-private-key ciphertext printed on the first substrate with a tamper-evident mask, wherein the first substrate with the encrypted-private-key ciphertext and the second substrate with the passphrase are not in the same country prior to the concealing;
after concealing the passphrase printed on the second substrate or the encrypted-private-key ciphertext printed on the first substrate with a tamper-evident mask, obtaining the first substrate and the second substrate at the same geolocation; and
attaching the first substrate to the second substrate.
18. The method of claim 17 , wherein:
the first substrate or the second substrate is a metal card.
19. The method of claim 18 , wherein:
the encrypted-private-key ciphertext or the passphrase is printed on the metal card by engraving.
20. The method of claim 17 , wherein:
the first substrate is a card;
the second substrate is a sticker; and
the tamper-evident mask comprises means for indicating tampering.
21. The method of claim 17 , wherein:
the first substrate is a sticker;
the second substrate is a card; and
the tamper-evident mask comprises means for indicating tampering.
22. The method of claim 17 , wherein:
generating the intermediate code comprises generating a proxy re-encryption code.
23. The method of claim 17 , wherein:
the encrypted-private-key ciphertext is not decryptable with the intermediate code to reveal the private key in plaintext.