IP Library Granted Patent US 11,641,282
Granted Patent B2
US 11,641,282 · App. 17/332,415 · Granted May 2, 2023

Optical authentication of images

Inventors: Maxwell R. Murialdo (Westminster, CA); Brian Giera (San Mateo, CA); Brian M. Howell (Livermore, CA); Robert M. Panas (Dublin, CA)
Assignee: Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC
H04L9/3236G06F21/10G06F21/64G06N10/00G06T7/0002H04L9/0643H04L9/0819H04L9/0877H04L9/0894H04L9/3247H04L9/3297H04N5/22541G06F2221/0733G06T2207/10052H04L9/50
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 11,641,282
App. No.
17/332,415
Granted
May 2, 2023
Kind
B2
Abstract

Systems and methods performed for generating authentication information for an image using optical computing are provided. When a user takes a photo of an object, an optical authentication system receives light reflected and/or emitted from the object. The system also receives a random key from an authentication server. The system converts the received light to plenoptic data and uploads it to the authentication server. In addition, the system generates an optical hash of the received light using the random key, converts the generated optical hash to a digital optical hash, and uploads the digital optical hash to the authentication server. When the authentication server receives the upload, it verifies whether the time of the upload is within a certain threshold time from the sending of the random key and whether the digital optical hash was generated from the same light as the plenoptic data.

Claims (41)

1. A method performed by one or more computing systems for generating a quantum non-interactive timestamp for a plurality of images, the method comprising:

for each of the plurality of images:

receiving a photon with a quantum state that encodes information for a basis specified by an external source;

measuring an observable of the quantum state of the photon using a current basis;

updating a random key based on the measured observable of the quantum state;

generating an optical hash of the image using the updated random key;

storing the measured observable of the quantum state, the current basis, the updated random key, and the optical hash as a timestamp for the image; and

selecting a new current basis based on the optical hash,

wherein the stored measured observables of the quantum states, the stored bases,

the stored random keys, and the stored optical hashes form the quantum non-interactive timestamp for the images.

2. The method of claim 1 wherein the external source is an oracle.

3. The method of claim 1 wherein the measured observable of the quantum state is a polarization state of the photon.

4. The method of claim 1 wherein the information encoded in the photon is encoded in one of a plurality of non-orthogonal quantum states.

5. The method of claim 1 wherein the generation of the optical hash is performed by an optical hash generator.

6. One or more computing systems for generating a quantum non-interactive timestamp for a plurality of collections of data, the one or more computing systems comprising:

one or more hardware processors; and one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage mediums storing computer-executable instructions, execution of which by the one or more hardware processors causes the one or more computing systems to:

for each of the plurality of collections of data:

receive one or more photons with one or more quantum states that encode information for a basis specified by an external source;

measure an observable of the quantum states of the one or more photons using a current basis;

update a random key based on the measured observable of quantum states;

generate a hash of the collection of data using the updated random key;

store the measured observable of the quantum states, the current basis, the updated random key, and the hash as a timestamp for the collection of data; and

select a new current basis based on the hash.

7. The one or more computing systems of claim 6 wherein the generation of the hash is performed by a keyed hash function.

8. The one or more computing systems of claim 6 wherein the collection of data is of a data type selected from the group consisting of an image, a word document, a database record, and a message.

9. The one or more computing systems of claim 6 wherein the collection of data is of a data type selected from the group consisting of a hash of an image or a set of images, a hash of a word document or a set of word documents, a hash of a database record or a set of database records, and a hash of a message or a set of messages.

10. One or more computing systems for authenticating a collection of data having quantum non-interactive timestamps, the one or more computing systems comprising:

one or more hardware processors; and one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage mediums storing computer-executable instructions, execution of which by the one or more hardware processors causes the one or more computing systems to:

access the collection of data and a quantum non-interactive timestamp for the collection of data, the quantum non-interactive timestamp including a timestamp observable of the quantum state of a photon, a timestamp basis, a timestamp random key, and a timestamp hash;

access an encoded quantum state of the photon and an encoded basis that are associated with the collection of data; and

determine whether an observable error has occurred based on the timestamp observable of the quantum state not matching the encoded quantum state when the timestamp basis matches the encoded basis; and

authenticate the collection of data if no observable error has occurred.

11. The one or more computing systems of claim 10 wherein the instructions further control the one or more computing systems to:

generate an authentication random key based on the timestamp observable of the quantum state;

generate an authentication hash of the collection of data using the authentication random key; and

determine whether a hash error has occurred based on the authentication hash not matching the timestamp hash.

12. The one or more computing systems of claim 11 wherein the instructions further control the one or more computing systems to:

update an authentication basis based on the authentication hash; and

determine whether a basis error has occurred based on a subsequent timestamp basis not matching the updated authentication basis.

13. The one or more computing systems of claim 10 wherein a collection of data is an image.

14. The one or more computing system of claim 10 wherein the instructions further control the one or more computing systems to when an observable error has occurred, indicate that the collection of data represent a forgery.

Assignments (2)
CONFIRMATORY LICENSE (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS) Recorded Aug 27, 2021
From: LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL SECURITY, LLC
To: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Reel/Frame 057361/0574 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded May 27, 2021
From: MURIALDO, MAXWELL R.; GIERA, BRIAN; HOWELL, BRIAN M.; PANAS, ROBERT M.
To: LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL SECURITY, LLC
Reel/Frame 056378/0933 →
Continuity (2)
Division 16571586 · Sep 16, 2019
Related Publication 20210288815A1 · Sep 16, 2021