IP Library › Granted Patent US 12,335,733
Granted Patent B1
US 12,335,733 · App. 17/391,658 · Granted Jun 17, 2025

Wireless signal validation using a one-way function and an initially unknown input

Inventors: Gregory Gutt (Herndon, VA); Tim Flynn (New York, NY); David G. Lawrence (Santa Clara, CA)
Assignee: Satelles, Inc.
H04W12/122G01S19/05H04L9/3242H04W12/03H04W12/63H04W84/06
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,335,733
App. No.
17/391,658
Granted
Jun 17, 2025
Kind
B1
Abstract

For validation of wireless signals, a wireless receiver receives a validation signal that includes information from a target signal. By using digital signature, message authentication code (MAC), and/or hashing, the validation signal is verified to be from a trusted source. By comparing the information from the verified validation signal with the target signal, the target signal is confirmed to be genuine or not a spoofing signal. In one approach, the validation signal is provided from a different transmission source than the target signal. In another approach, modulation estimation rather than known modulation is used as the information for the validation signal for comparison with the target signal despite not knowing the spread pattern of the coding. In yet another approach, a one-way function is used to generate a pseudorandom code to spread a first component of the a first signal below the noise floor. The input to the one-way function is a second component sent at a time later than the time.

Claims (44)

1. A method for validation of wireless signals, the method comprising:

receiving wirelessly, by a receiver and from a first transmission source, a first signal having a first component spread below a level of noise with a spreading code unknown to the receiver, the spreading code being based on a one-way function with an input to the one-way function unknown to the receiver when receiving the first signal; then

receiving wirelessly, by the receiver, a second signal including the input, the second signal received from a second transmission source different than the first transmission source;

replicating, from the input received in the second signal, at least part of the spreading code; and

validating the first signal based on the replicated at least part of the spreading code, the validating distinguishing between the first signal as authentic and a spoof.

2. The method of claim 1 wherein replicating comprises replicating based on performing the one-way function with the input comprising a reverse hash chain link.

3. The method of claim 2 wherein receiving the second signal comprises receiving the reverse hash chain link above the level of the noise.

4. The method of claim 1 wherein the one-way function comprises a digital signature or a hash chain, and wherein replicating comprises replicating with the one-way function given the input.

5. A method for validation of wireless signals, the method comprising:

receiving wirelessly, by a receiver, a first signal having a first component spread below a level of noise with a spreading code unknown to the receiver, the spreading code being based on a one-way function with an input to the one-way function unknown to the receiver when receiving the first signal; then

receiving wirelessly, by the receiver, a second signal including the input;

replicating, from the input received in the second signal, at least part of the spreading code; and

validating the first signal based on the replicated at least part of the spreading code;

wherein validating comprises correlating the replicated spreading code with the first signal and validating where a peak magnitude of the correlating is above a threshold.

6. A method for validation of wireless signals, the method comprising:

receiving wirelessly, by a receiver, a first signal having a first component spread below a level of noise with a spreading code unknown to the receiver, the spreading code being based on a one-way function with an input to the one-way function unknown to the receiver when receiving the first signal; then

receiving wirelessly, by the receiver, a second signal including the input;

replicating, from the input received in the second signal, at least part of the spreading code; and

validating the first signal based on the replicated at least part of the spreading code;

wherein validating comprises correlating the replicated spreading code with the first signal and validating where multiple peaks do not occur.

7. The method of claim 6 wherein receiving the first and second signals comprise receiving first and second target signals broadcast from a satellite.

8. The method of claim 7 wherein receiving the first and second signals comprises receiving where the satellite is a low earth orbit satellite.

9. A method for validation of wireless signals, the method comprising:

receiving wirelessly, by a receiver, a first signal having a first component with modulation unknown to the receiver at the time of reception;

receiving wirelessly, by the receiver, a second signal having a second component, the second signal received at a later time than the first signal, the second component having information about the unknown modulation; and

validating the first component using the information about the initially unknown modulation provided by the second component, wherein validating comprises estimating coding using the information and comparing the estimated coding to the first signal, where the comparison confirms that the first signal is genuine.

10. The method of claim 9 further comprising:

storing data from the first component in the receiver while receiving the first signal and before receiving the second signal.

11. The method of claim 9 wherein the unknown modulation is a spreading code.

12. The method of claim 9 wherein the unknown modulation is under a noise floor of the receiver.

13. The method of claim 9 wherein the unknown modulation is derived from a cryptographically secure one-way function of the second component.

14. The method of claim 13 wherein one-way function is a hash chain.

15. The method of claim 9 wherein validating comprises validating the second component to have come from a trusted source.

16. The method of claim 15 wherein validating comprises validating the second component using (1) a message authentication code and hash chain link or (2) a digital signature.

17. The method of claim 9 wherein validating comprises:

replicating, from the information received in the second signal, at least part of the modulation; and

validating the first component based on the replicated at least part of the modulation.

18. The method of claim 17 wherein validating comprises correlating the replicated at least part of the modulation with the first component.

19. The method of claim 18 wherein correlating comprises checking for signs of spoofing in a correlation.

20. A method for validation of wireless signals, the method comprising:

receiving wirelessly, by a receiver, a first signal having a first component spread below a level of noise with a spreading code unknown to the receiver, the spreading code being based on a one-way function with an input to the one-way function unknown to the receiver when receiving the first signal; then

receiving wirelessly, by the receiver, a second signal including the input, the second signal comprising the reverse hash chain link received above the level of the noise;

replicating, from the input received in the second signal, at least part of the spreading code, the replicating being based on performing the one-way function with the input comprising a reverse hash chain link; and

validating the first signal based on the replicated at least part of the spreading code.

Assignments (2)
PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Jun 13, 2024
From: SATELLES, INC.
To: DEUTSCHE BANK AG NEW YORK BRANCH, AS COLLATERAL AGENT
Reel/Frame 067723/0734 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Aug 3, 2021
From: GUTT, GREGORY; FLYNN, TIM; LAWRENCE, DAVID G.
To: SATELLES, INC.
Reel/Frame 057067/0400 →
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