Re-training intrusion detection fingerprints in the presence of an attacker
Systems, apparatuses, and methods to establish ground truth for an intrusion detection system in the presence of an attacker electronic control unit transmitting masqueraded messages on a communication bus, such as an in-vehicle network bus, are provided.
1. A method, comprising:
generating an equalized distribution from one or more authentic messages transmitted, by an attacked electronic control unit (ECU), with a unique message identification (MID) based on a number of expected authentic messages and a total number of a plurality of messages received with the unique MID;
subtracting the equalized distribution from an accumulated distribution for messages transmitted with the unique MID to generate an attacker distribution;
determining, for one or more of a plurality of other distributions, whether an error between the attacker distribution and a one of the plurality of other distributions is less than or equal to a threshold error; and
generating a retrained distribution for the unique MID based on a difference between the attacker distribution and the accumulated distribution for messages transmitted with the unique MID responsive to a determination that the error between the attacker distribution and the one of the plurality of other distributions is less than or equal to the threshold error.
2. The method of claim 1 , comprising updating a fingerprint associated with the unique MID based on the retrained distribution.
3. The method of claim 2 , comprising flagging an ECU associated with the one of the plurality of other distributions as an attacker ECU responsive to the determination that the error between the attacker distribution and the one of the plurality of other distributions is less than or equal to the threshold error.
4. The method of claim 2 , comprising:
generating the retrained distribution for the unique MID responsive to a determination that the error between the attacked distribution and the one or more of the plurality of other distributions is not less than or equal to the threshold error, comprising:
generating a second equalized distribution from inauthentic messages transmitted, by an attacker ECU, with the unique MID based on the number of expected authentic messages and the total number of the plurality of messages received with the unique MID;
subtracting the second equalized distribution from the accumulated distribution for messages transmitted with the unique MID to generate an authentic distribution;
determining whether and error between a distribution of a first message of the plurality of messages received with the unique MID and the authentic distribution is less than or equal to the threshold error; and
updating the fingerprint associated with the unique MID based on the distribution of the first message responsive to a determination that the error between the distribution of the first message of the plurality of messages received with the unique MID and the authentic distribution is less than or equal to the threshold error.
5. The method of claim 4 , generating the retrained distribution for the unique MID responsive to a determination that the error between the attacked distribution and the one or more of the plurality of other distributions is not less than or equal to the threshold error, comprising:
determining whether and error between a distribution of a second message of the plurality of messages received with the unique MID and the authentic distribution is less than or equal to the threshold error; and
updating the fingerprint associated with the unique MID based on the distribution of the second message responsive to a determination that the error between the distribution of the second message of the plurality of messages received with the unique MID and the authentic distribution is less than or equal to the threshold error.
6. The method of claim 3 , comprising:
observing physical characteristics of a plurality of messages transmitted on a communication bus during a retraining period, wherein each of the plurality of messages comprise an indication of one of a plurality of unique MIDs, the unique MID a one of the plurality of unique MIDs;
updating, for each of the plurality of unique MIDs, a distribution associated the plurality of unique MIDs based on the observed physical characteristics of the plurality of messages; and
determining, for each of the plurality of messages:
whether a distribution based on the observed physical characteristics of the one of the plurality of messages is within the threshold error to a one of the updated distributions associated with the plurality of MIDs, and
incrementing a malicious frame counter based on a determination that the distribution based on the observed physical characteristics of the one of the plurality of messages is within the threshold error to the one of the updated distributions associated with the plurality of MIDs.
7. The method of claim 6 , wherein the observed physical characteristics are an analog voltage associated with the message transmission.
8. The method of claim 6 , wherein the bus is an in-vehicle network.
9. A computing apparatus comprising:
a processing circuitry; and
a memory storing instructions that, when executed by the processing circuitry, cause the apparatus to:
generate an equalized distribution from one or more authentic messages transmitted, by an attacked electronic control unit (ECU), with a unique message identification (MID) based on a number of expected authentic messages and a total number of a plurality of messages received with the unique MID;
subtract the equalized distribution from an accumulated distribution for messages transmitted with the unique MID to generate an attacker distribution;
determine, for one or more of a plurality of other distributions, whether an error between the attacker distribution and a one of the plurality of other distributions is less than or equal to a threshold error; and
generate a retrained distribution for the unique MID based on a difference between the attacker distribution and the accumulated distribution for messages transmitted with the unique MID responsive to a determination that the error between the attacker distribution and the one of the plurality of other distributions is less than or equal to the threshold error.
10. The computing apparatus of claim 9 , the instructions when executed by the processing circuitry cause the apparatus to update a fingerprint associated with the unique MID based on the retrained distribution.
11. The computing apparatus of claim 10 , the instructions when executed by the processing circuitry cause the apparatus to flag an ECU associated with the one of the plurality of other distributions as an attacker ECU responsive to the determination that the error between the attacker distribution and the one of the plurality of other distributions is less than or equal to the threshold error.
12. The computing apparatus of claim 10 , the instructions when executed by the processing circuitry cause the apparatus to:
generate the retrained distribution for the unique MID responsive to a determination that the error between the attacked distribution and the one or more of the plurality of other distributions is not less than or equal to the threshold error, comprising:
generate a second equalized distribution from inauthentic messages transmitted, by an attacker ECU, with the unique MID based on the number of expected authentic messages and the total number of the plurality of messages received with the unique MID;
subtract the second equalized distribution from the accumulated distribution for messages transmitted with the unique MID to generate an authentic distribution;
determine whether and error between a distribution of a first message of the plurality of messages received with the unique MID and the authentic distribution is less than or equal to the threshold error; and
update the fingerprint associated with the unique MID based on the distribution of the first message responsive to a determination that the error between the distribution of the first message of the plurality of messages received with the unique MID and the authentic distribution is less than or equal to the threshold error.
13. The computing apparatus of claim 12 , the instructions when executed by the processing circuitry cause the apparatus to:
determine whether and error between a distribution of a second message of the plurality of messages received with the unique MID and the authentic distribution is less than or equal to the threshold error; and
update the fingerprint associated with the unique MID based on the distribution of the second message responsive to a determination that the error between the distribution of the second message of the plurality of messages received with the unique MID and the authentic distribution is less than or equal to the threshold error.
14. The computing apparatus of claim 11 , the instructions when executed by the processing circuitry cause the apparatus to:
observe physical characteristics of a plurality of messages transmitted on a communication bus during a retraining period, wherein each of the plurality of messages comprise an indication of one of a plurality of unique MIDs, the unique MID a one of the plurality of unique MIDs;
update, for each of the plurality of unique MIDs, a distribution associated the plurality of unique MIDs based on the observed physical characteristics of the plurality of messages; and
determine, for each of the plurality of messages:
whether a distribution based on the observed physical characteristics of the one of the plurality of messages is within the threshold error to a one of the updated distributions associated with the plurality of MIDs, and
incrementing a malicious frame counter based on a determination that the distribution based on the observed physical characteristics of the one of the plurality of messages is within the threshold error to the one of the updated distributions associated with the plurality of MIDs.
15. The computing apparatus of claim 14 , wherein the observed physical characteristics are an analog voltage associated with the message transmission.
16. The computing apparatus of claim 14 , wherein the bus is an in-vehicle network.
17. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, the computer-readable storage medium including instructions that when executed by processing circuitry of an intrusion detection system (IDS), cause the IDS to:
generate an equalized distribution from one or more authentic messages transmitted, by an attacked electronic control unit (ECU), with a unique message identification (MID) based on a number of expected authentic messages and a total number of a plurality of messages received with the unique MID;
subtract the equalized distribution from an accumulated distribution for messages transmitted with the unique MID to generate an attacker distribution;
determine, for one or more of a plurality of other distributions, whether an error between the attacker distribution and a one of the plurality of other distributions is less than or equal to a threshold error; and
generate a retrained distribution for the unique MID based on a difference between the attacker distribution and the accumulated distribution for messages transmitted with the unique MID responsive to a determination that the error between the attacker distribution and the one of the plurality of other distributions is less than or equal to the threshold error.
18. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 17 , the instructions when executed by the processing circuitry of the IDS cause the IDS to update a fingerprint associated with the unique MID based on the retrained distribution.
19. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 18 , the instructions when executed by the processing circuitry of the IDS cause the IDS to flag an ECU associated with the one of the plurality of other distributions as an attacker ECU responsive to the determination that the error between the attacker distribution and the one of the plurality of other distributions is less than or equal to the threshold error.
20. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 18 , the instructions when executed by the processing circuitry of the IDS cause the IDS to:
generate the retrained distribution for the unique MID responsive to a determination that the error between the attacked distribution and the one or more of the plurality of other distributions is not less than or equal to the threshold error, comprising:
generate a second equalized distribution from inauthentic messages transmitted, by an attacker ECU, with the unique MID based on the number of expected authentic messages and the total number of the plurality of messages received with the unique MID;
subtract the second equalized distribution from the accumulated distribution for messages transmitted with the unique MID to generate an authentic distribution;
determine whether and error between a distribution of a first message of the plurality of messages received with the unique MID and the authentic distribution is less than or equal to the threshold error; and
update the fingerprint associated with the unique MID based on the distribution of the first message responsive to a determination that the error between the distribution of the first message of the plurality of messages received with the unique MID and the authentic distribution is less than or equal to the threshold error.
21. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 20 , the instructions when executed by the processing circuitry of the IDS cause the IDS to:
determine whether and error between a distribution of a second message of the plurality of messages received with the unique MID and the authentic distribution is less than or equal to the threshold error; and
update the fingerprint associated with the unique MID based on the distribution of the second message responsive to a determination that the error between the distribution of the second message of the plurality of messages received with the unique MID and the authentic distribution is less than or equal to the threshold error.
22. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 19 , the instructions when executed by the processing circuitry of the IDS cause the IDS to:
observe physical characteristics of a plurality of messages transmitted on a communication bus during a retraining period, wherein each of the plurality of messages comprise an indication of one of a plurality of unique MIDs, the unique MID a one of the plurality of unique MIDs;
update, for each of the plurality of unique MIDs, a distribution associated the plurality of unique MIDs based on the observed physical characteristics of the plurality of messages; and
determine, for each of the plurality of messages:
whether a distribution based on the observed physical characteristics of the one of the plurality of messages is within the threshold error to a one of the updated distributions associated with the plurality of MIDs, and
incrementing a malicious frame counter based on a determination that the distribution based on the observed physical characteristics of the one of the plurality of messages is within the threshold error to the one of the updated distributions associated with the plurality of MIDs.
23. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 22 , wherein the observed physical characteristics are an analog voltage associated with the message transmission.
24. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 22 , wherein the bus is an in-vehicle network.