Ensuring replacement of a memory device key
The disclosed embodiments are directed to preventing the writing of malformed cryptographic keys to a memory device. In one embodiment, a system is disclosed comprising a storage array, the storage array storing a first cryptographic key; and a processor configured to: receive a command from a host processor, the command including a second cryptographic key, a first signature, a second signature, and at least one field, determine that the first signature is valid using the second cryptographic key and the at least one field, determine that the second signature is valid using the first cryptographic key, the first signature and the at least one field, and replace the first cryptographic key with the second cryptographic key after determining that both the first signature and second signature are valid.
1. A memory device comprising:
a storage array, the storage array storing a first cryptographic key; and
a processor configured to:
receive a command from a host processor, the command including a second cryptographic key, a first signature, a second signature, and at least one field,
determine that the first signature is valid using the second cryptographic key and the at least one field,
determine that the second signature is valid using the first cryptographic key, the first signature and the at least one field, and
replace the first cryptographic key with the second cryptographic key after determining that both the first signature and second signature are valid.
2. The memory device of claim 1 , wherein determining that the first signature is valid comprises computing a first hash using the second cryptographic key and the at least one field, decrypting the first signature using the second cryptographic key to generate a second hash, and determining that the first signature is valid when the first hash and second hash are equal.
3. The memory device of claim 1 , wherein determining that the second signature is valid comprises computing a first hash using the second cryptographic key, the at least one field, and the first signature, decrypting the second signature using the first cryptographic key to generate a second hash, and determining that the second signature is valid when the first hash and second hash are equal.
4. The memory device of claim 1 , wherein the processor is further configured to return an error code after determining that either the first signature is invalid or the second signature is invalid.
5. The memory device of claim 4 , wherein the processor is further configured to prevent overwriting of the first cryptographic key after returning the error code.
6. The memory device of claim 4 , wherein the error code indicates whether the first signature or the second signature is invalid.
7. The memory device of claim 1 , wherein the first cryptographic key comprise a first public key and second cryptographic key comprises a second public key.
8. A method comprising:
storing, in a storage array, a first cryptographic key;
receiving a command from a host processor, the command including a second cryptographic key, a first signature, a second signature, and at least one field;
determining that the first signature is valid using the second cryptographic key and the at least one field;
determining that the second signature is valid using the first cryptographic key, the first signature and the at least one field; and
replacing the first cryptographic key with the second cryptographic key after determining that both the first signature and second signature are valid.
9. The method of claim 8 , wherein determining that the first signature is valid comprises computing a first hash using the second cryptographic key and the at least one field, decrypting the first signature using the second cryptographic key to generate a second hash, and determining that the first signature is valid when the first hash and second hash are equal.
10. The method of claim 8 , wherein determining that the second signature is valid comprises computing a first hash using the second cryptographic key, the at least one field, and the first signature, decrypting the second signature using the first cryptographic key to generate a second hash, and determining that the second signature is valid when the first hash and second hash are equal.
11. The method of claim 8 , further comprising returning an error code after determining that either the first signature is invalid or the second signature is invalid.
12. The method of claim 11 , further comprising preventing overwriting of the first cryptographic key after returning the error code.
13. The method of claim 11 , wherein the error code indicates whether the first signature or the second signature is invalid.
14. The method of claim 8 , wherein the first cryptographic key comprise a first public key and second cryptographic key comprises a second public key.
15. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium for tangibly storing computer program instructions capable of being executed by a computer processor, the computer program instructions defining steps of:
storing, in a storage array, a first cryptographic key;
receiving a command from a host processor, the command including a second cryptographic key, a first signature, a second signature, and at least one field;
determining that the first signature is valid using the second cryptographic key and the at least one field;
determining that the second signature is valid using the first cryptographic key, the first signature and the at least one field; and
replacing the first cryptographic key with the second cryptographic key after determining that both the first signature and second signature are valid.
16. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 15 , wherein determining that the first signature is valid comprises computing a first hash using the second cryptographic key and the at least one field, decrypting the first signature using the second cryptographic key to generate a second hash, and determining that the first signature is valid when the first hash and second hash are equal.
17. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 15 , wherein determining that the second signature is valid comprises computing a first hash using the second cryptographic key, the at least one field, and the first signature, decrypting the second signature using the first cryptographic key to generate a second hash, and determining that the second signature is valid when the first hash and second hash are equal.
18. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 15 , the steps further comprising returning an error code after determining that either the first signature is invalid or the second signature is invalid.
19. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 18 , the steps further comprising preventing overwriting of the first cryptographic key after returning the error code.
20. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 18 , wherein the error code indicates whether the first signature or the second signature is invalid.