Multi-issuer anonymous credentials for permissioned blockchains
A user of a blockchain network may obtain credentials for the user from an issuer, the credentials based on one or more attributes of the user, wherein the issuer is selected from one or more authorized issuers, and wherein the credentials include a signature on the one or more attributes and a secret key; generate an operation composed of a payload and a second signature; compute a commitment to a public key of the issuer; prove, using a one-out-of-many proof, that the commitment is a valid commitment to a public key of one of the authorized issuers; prove, using a zero-knowledge proof, proof of knowledge of the signature and the credentials under the public key of the issuer; and prove, using a proof of knowledge, of values of the signed secret key and attributes.
1. A system comprising:
a memory; and
a processor in communication with the memory, the processor being configured to perform processes comprising:
obtaining, by a node on a blockchain network, credentials for a user of the blockchain network from an issuer, the credentials based on one or more attributes of the user,
wherein the issuer is selected from a plurality of authorized issuers for the blockchain network, and
wherein the credentials include a first signature on the one or more attributes and a secret key;
generating, by the node, an operation composed of a payload and a second signature;
computing, by the node, a commitment to a public key of the issuer;
proving, by the node using a one-out-of-many proof, that the commitment is a valid commitment to a public key of one of the plurality of authorized issuers;
proving, by the node using a zero-knowledge proof, proof of knowledge of the first signature and the credentials under the public key of the issuer; and
proving, by the node, using a proof of knowledge of values of the signed secret key and the one or more attributes to grant the user access without revealing an identity of the user.
2. The system of claim 1 , wherein the first signature is a Groth signature.
3. The system of claim 1 , wherein the payload is encrypted using a semantically-secure encryption.
4. The system of claim 1 , wherein the proof of knowledge of values is a Schnorr proof.
5. The system of claim 1 , wherein a Groth signatures scheme facilitates zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of valid credentials.
6. The system of claim 1 , wherein the user proves, using the proof of knowledge of values, the credentials are valid.
7. The system of claim 1 , wherein the credentials are only valid during an epoch.
8. A method comprising:
obtaining, by a node on a blockchain network, credentials for a user of the blockchain network from an issuer, the credentials based on one or more attributes of the user,
wherein the issuer is selected from a plurality of authorized issuers for the blockchain network, and
wherein the credentials include a first signature on the one or more attributes and a secret key;
generating, by the node, an operation composed of a payload and a second signature;
computing, by the node, a commitment to a public key of the issuer;
proving, by the node using a one-out-of-many proof, that the commitment is a valid commitment to a public key of one of the plurality of authorized issuers;
proving, by the node using a zero-knowledge proof, proof of knowledge of the first signature and the credentials under the public key of the issuer; and
proving, by the node, using a proof of knowledge of values of the signed secret key and the one or more attributes to grant the user access without revealing an identity of the user.
9. The method of claim 8 , wherein the first signature is a Groth signature.
10. The method of claim 8 , wherein the payload is encrypted using a semantically-secure encryption.
11. The method of claim 8 , wherein the proof of knowledge of values is a Schnorr proof.
12. The method of claim 8 , wherein a Groth signatures scheme facilitates zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of valid credentials.
13. The method of claim 8 , wherein the user proves, using the proof of knowledge, the credentials are valid.
14. The method of claim 8 , wherein the credentials are only valid during an epoch.
15. A computer program product comprising a computer readable storage medium having program instructions embodied therewith, the program instructions executable by a processor to cause the processor to perform a method, the method comprising:
obtaining, by a node on a blockchain network, credentials for a user of the blockchain network from an issuer, the credentials based on one or more attributes of the user, wherein the issuer is selected from a plurality of authorized issuers for the blockchain network, and
wherein the credentials include a first signature on the one or more attributes and a secret key;
generating, by the node, an operation composed of a payload and a second signature;
computing, by the node, a commitment to a public key of the issuer;
proving, by the node using a one-out-of-many proof, that the commitment is a valid commitment to a public key of one of the plurality of authorized issuers;
proving, by the node using a zero-knowledge proof, proof of knowledge of the first signature and the credentials under the public key of the issuer; and
proving, by the node, using a proof of knowledge of values of the signed secret key and the one or more attributes to grant the user access without revealing an identity of the user.
16. The computer program product of claim 15 , wherein the first signature is a Groth signature.
17. The computer program product of claim 15 , wherein the payload is encrypted using a semantically-secure encryption.
18. The computer program product of claim 15 , wherein the proof of knowledge of values is a Schnorr proof.
19. The computer program product of claim 15 , wherein a Groth signatures scheme facilitates zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of valid credentials.
20. The computer program product of claim 15 , wherein the user proves, using the proof of knowledge of values, the credentials are valid.