Granted Patent B2

US 12,294,661 · App. 17/833,433 · Granted May 6, 2025

Inventors: Craig Steven Wright (London, GB); Stephane Savanah (London, GB)

Assignee: NCHAIN LICENSING AG

H04L9/3252H04L9/0825H04L9/0841H04L9/085H04L9/0891H04L9/3066H04W12/02H04W12/03H04L2209/56H04W84/18

Abstract

Claims (65)

1. A computer implemented method of determining a common secret at an electronic device (S), the electronic device being configured to communicate with a key device (C), wherein the electronic device is further associated with a first asymmetric cryptography pair having a first electronic device private key (V 1S ) and a first electronic device public key (P 1S ), and the key device is associated with a second asymmetric cryptography pair having a first key device private key (V 1C ) and a first key device public key (P 1C ), the method comprising:

determining, at the electronic device, a deterministic key (DK);

determining, at the electronic device, a second electronic device private key (V 2S ) based on at least the first electronic device private key (V 1S ) and the deterministic key (DK);

determining, at the electronic device, a second key device public key (P 2C ) based on at least the first key device public key (P 1C ) and the deterministic key (DK);

determining a secret based on at least the second electronic device private key (V 2S ) and the second key device public key (P 2C );

encrypting data at the electronic device using the determined secret or an encryption key that is based on the determined secret;

sending information indicative of the deterministic key (DK) to the key device;

determining, at the electronic device, an updated second electronic device private key (V 2S ) based on at least the first electronic device private key (V 1S ) and the deterministic key (DK);

determining, at the electronic device, an updated second key device public key (P 2C ) based on at least the first key device public key (P 1C ) and the deterministic key (DK);

determining an updated secret based on at least the updated second electronic device private key (V 2S ) and the updated second key device public key (P 2C ); and

encrypting data at the electronic device using the determined updated secret or an encryption key that is based on the determined updated secret.

2. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

storing, at the key device, the information indicative of the deterministic key (DK).

3. The method of claim 1 , wherein the deterministic key (DK) is based on a message (M).

4. The method of claim 3 , comprising a step of generating the message (M) at the electronic device, and determining the deterministic key (DK) based on determining a hash of the message (M).

5. The method of claim 3 , comprising:

requesting, at the electronic device, the information indicative of the deterministic key (DK) from the key device;

generating, at the key device, a signed message (SM) based on the message (M);

sending the signed message (SM) to the electronic device;

validating, at the electronic device, the signed message (SM); and

retrieving the message (M) such that the secret can be determined, at the electronic device, for decrypting the data.

6. The method of claim 1 , comprising a step of determining the encryption key based on the determined secret and identification information of the electronic device.

7. The method of claim 1 , comprising a step of storing, at a data storage associated with the electronic device, the first key device public key (P 1C ).

8. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

receiving, at the electronic device, the information indicative of the deterministic key (DK), from the key device;

determining the secret based on the received information indicative of the deterministic key (DK); and

decrypting, at the electronic device, the encrypted data using the secret or the encryption key that is based on the secret.

9. The method of claim 8 , comprising a step of generating, at the electronic device, an authentication message (M A ) and sending the authentication message (M A ) to the key device.

10. The method of claim 9 , comprising a step of determining a deterministic authentication key (DK A ) by determining a hash of the authentication message (M A ).

11. The method of claim 10 , comprising a step of generating, at the key device, a second asymmetric cryptography pair having a second key device private key (V 2C ) and a second key device public key (P 2C ).

12. The method of claim 11 , wherein the second key device private key (V 2C ) is based on the deterministic authentication key (DK A ) and the first key device private key (V 1C ), and the second key device public key (P 2C ) is based on the deterministic authentication key (DK A ) and the first key device public key (P 1C ).

13. The method of claim 12 , comprising:

generating, at the key device, a signed authentication message (SM A ) based on the deterministic authentication key (DK A ) and the second key device private key (V 2C );

receiving, at the electronic device, the signed authentication message (SM A ) from the key device; and

validating the signed authentication message (SM A ) with the second key device public key (P 2C ); and authenticating the key device based on a result of validating the signed authentication message (SM A ).

14. A memory device storing thereon a computer program comprising machine-readable instructions to cause a processing device of an electronic device to implement the method of claim 1 .

15. A computer system for encrypting data at an electronic device, the computer system comprising:

the electronic device being associated with a first asymmetric cryptography pair having a first electronic device private key (V 1S ) and a first electronic device public key (P 1S ),

a key device being associated with a second asymmetric cryptography pair having a first key device private key (V 1C ) and a first key device public key (P 1C ), wherein the key device is configured to communicate with the electronic device;

wherein the electronic device comprises a processor configured to:

determine a deterministic key (DK);

determine a second electronic device private key (V 2S ) based on at least the first electronic device private key (V 1S ) and the deterministic key (DK);

determine a second key device public key (P 2C ) based on at least the first key device public key (P 1C ) and the deterministic key (DK);

determine a secret based on at least the second electronic device private key (V 2S ) and the second key device public key (P 2C );

encrypt the data on the electronic device using the determined secret or an encryption key that is based on the determined secret;

determine an updated second electronic device private key (V 2S ) based on at least the first electronic device private key (V 1S ) and the deterministic key (DK);

determine an updated second key device public key (P 2C ) based on at least the first key device public key (P 1C ) and the deterministic key (DK);

determine an updated secret based on at least the updated second electronic device private key (V 2S ) and the updated second key device public key (P 2C ); and

encrypt the data on the electronic device using the determined updated secret or an encryption key that is based on the determined updated secret;

wherein information indicative of the deterministic key (DK) is stored on the key device.

16. The computer system of claim 15 , further configured to decrypt data, the processor of the electronic device being configured to:

receive the information indicative of the deterministic key (DK), from the key device;

determine the secret based on the information indicative of the deterministic key (DK); and

decrypt the data using the determined secret or the encryption key that is based on the determined secret.

17. An electronic device for encrypting data, the electronic device being configured to communicate with a key device, wherein the electronic device is associated with a first asymmetric cryptography pair having a first electronic device private key (V 1S ) and a first electronic device public key (P 1S ), and the key device is associated with a second asymmetric cryptography pair having a first key device private key (V 1C ) and a first key device public key (P 1C ), the electronic device comprising a processing device configured to:

determine a deterministic key (DK);

determine a second electronic device private key (V 2S ) based on at least the first electronic device private key (V 1S ) and the deterministic key (DK);

determine a second key device public key (P 2C ) based on at least the first key device public key (P 1C ) and the deterministic key (DK);

determine a secret based on at least the second electronic device private key (V 2S ) and the second key device public key (P 2C );

encrypt the data on the electronic device using the determined secret or an encryption key that is based on the determined secret;

determine an updated second electronic device private key (V 2S ) based on at least the first electronic device private key (V 1S ) and the deterministic key (DK);

determine an updated second key device public key (P 2C ) based on at least the first key device public key (P 1C ) and the deterministic key (DK);

determine an updated secret based on at least the updated second electronic device private key (V 2S ) and the updated second key device public key (P 2 c); and

encrypt the data on the electronic device using the determined updated secret or an encryption key that is based on the determined updated secret;

wherein information indicative of the deterministic key (DK) is sent to the key device.

Assignments (4)

Priority Claims (3)

Continuity (3)

References Cited (400)