Implicit certificate verification
A method of computing a cryptographic key to be shared between a pair of correspondents communicating with one another through a cryptographic system is provided, where one of the correspondents receives a certificate of the other correspondents public key information to be combined with private key information of the one correspondent to generate the key. The method comprises the steps of computing the key by combining the public key information and the private key information and including in the computation a component corresponding to verification of the certificate, such that failure of the certificate to verify results in a key at the one correspondent that is different to the key computed at the other correspondent.
1. A method of conjointly computing a cryptographic key and including a component in said cryptographic key for authenticating said cryptographic key, said cryptographic key to be shared between a pair of correspondents communicating with one another through a cryptographic system, one of said correspondents receiving a certificate of the other correspondent's public key information to be combined with private key information of the one correspondent to generate said cryptographic key, said method performed by a computing device, said method comprising the steps of computing said cryptographic key by combining said public key information and said private key information and including in said cryptographic key said component corresponding to verification of said certificate, such that failure of said certificate to verify results in a key at said one correspondent that is different to the key computed at said other correspondent, wherein:
said verification utilises a signature contained in said certificate; and
said component equates to a predetermined value when said certificate verifies.
2. A method according to claim 1 wherein said predetermined value is zero.
3. A method according to claim 2 wherein a random element is included in said, component to mask verification of said certificate.
4. A method according to claim 3 wherein said random element is selected to provide repetitive iterations in verification of said signature and thereby inhibit side channel attacks.
5. A method according to claim 1 wherein said cryptographic system is an elliptic curve cryptographic system.
6. A method according to claim 5 wherein said computation is performed using multiple point multiplications.
7. A method according to claim 5 wherein said certificate includes a signature performed by an elliptic curve signature protocol.
8. A method according to claim 7 wherein said signature protocol is ECDSA.
9. A method according to claim 5 wherein said public key information is representative of an elliptic curve point and combination Of public key information and said private key information includes a point multiplication.
10. A method according to claim 9 wherein verification of said signature requires multiple point multiplications.
11. A method according to claim 10 wherein said computation is performed using multiple point multiplications.
12. A method according claim 1 including the step of confirming the keys generated by said one correspondent conforms to that of the other correspondent.
13. A non-transitory computer readable medium having computer executable instructions stored thereon for execution on a computing device for conjointly computing a cryptographic key and including a component in said cryptographic key for authenticating said cryptographic key, said cryptographic key to be shared between a pair of correspondents communicating with one another through a cryptographic system, one of said correspondents receiving a certificate of the other correspondent's public key information to be combined with private key information of the one correspondent to generate said cryptographic key, said instructions comprising the steps of computing said cryptographic key by combining said public key information and said private key information and including in said cryptographic key said component corresponding to verification of said certificate, such that failure of said certificate to verify results in a key at said one correspondent that is different to the key computed at said other correspondent, wherein:
said verification utilises a signature contained in said certificate; and
said component equates to a predetermined value when said certificate verifies.
14. A non-transitory computer readable medium according to claim 13 wherein said predetermined value is zero.
15. A non-transitory computer readable medium according to claim 14 wherein a random element is included in said component to mask verification of said certificate.
16. A non-transitory computer readable medium according to claim 15 wherein said random element is selected to provide repetitive iterations in verification of said signature and thereby inhibit side channel attacks.
17. A non-transitory computer readable medium according to claim 13 wherein said cryptographic system is an elliptic curve cryptographic system.
18. A non-transitory computer readable medium according to claim 17 wherein said computation is performed using multiple point multiplications.
19. A non-transitory computer readable medium according to claim 17 wherein said certificate includes a signature performed by an elliptic curve signature protocol.
20. A non-transitory computer readable medium according to claim 19 wherein said signature protocol is ECDSA.
21. A non-transitory computer readable medium according to claim 17 wherein said public key information is representative of an elliptic curve point and combination of public key information and said private key information includes a point multiplication.
22. A non-transitory computer readable medium according to claim 21 wherein verification of said signature requires multiple point multiplications.
23. A non-transitory computer readable medium according to claim 22 wherein said computation is performed using multiple point multiplications.
24. A non-transitory computer readable medium according claim 13 including the step of confirming the keys generated by said one correspondent conforms to that of the other correspondent.