IP Library › Granted Patent US 12,192,338
Granted Patent B2
US 12,192,338 · App. 18/241,537 · Granted Jan 7, 2025

Methods and systems for blockchain-implemented event-lock encryption

Inventor: John Fletcher (Cambridge, GB)
Assignee: nChain Licensing AG
H04L9/0847H04L9/0825H04L9/085H04L9/3073H04L9/3297H04L9/50
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,192,338
App. No.
18/241,537
Granted
Jan 7, 2025
Kind
B2
Abstract

This invention relates to distributed systems, and more particularly to methods and systems for event-locked operations in transactions using a blockchain network. The method includes: detecting, by a first node that is a member of a congress comprising a plurality of nodes, malicious activity by a malicious node that is also a member of the congress; providing, by the first node, a partial signature on a confiscation transaction to transfer portion of digital asset(s) deposited by the malicious node to an unspendable address, wherein the digital asset(s) deposited by the malicious node; determining, by a threshold number of members of the congress, that the digital assets of the malicious node should be confiscated, and then confiscating the at least portion of digital asset(s) of the malicious node by generating a valid signature for the confiscation transaction and suspending the malicious node from further participation in the congress.

Claims (41)

1. A method of confiscating a digital asset comprising:

detecting, by a first node that is a member of a congress comprising a plurality of nodes, malicious activity by a malicious node that is also a member of the congress;

providing, by the first node, a partial signature on a confiscation transaction to transfer at least a portion of digital asset(s) deposited by the malicious node to an unspendable address, wherein the digital asset(s) were deposited by the malicious node when joining the congress;

determining, by a threshold number of members of the congress, that the digital asset(s) of the malicious node should be confiscated, wherein the determination is made by reaching a consensus on a sidechain; and

confiscating the at least a portion of digital asset(s) of the malicious node by generating a valid signature for the confiscation transaction and suspending the malicious node from further participation in the congress.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein joining the congress by a node comprises:

obtaining a congress public key;

paying into the congress public key;

receiving a key share; and

generating a private key share.

3. The method of claim 2 , wherein the first node uses its private key share, which is associated with a threshold signature scheme, to provide the partial signature.

4. The method of claim 3 , wherein generating the valid signature comprises using the private key share of the first node in cooperation with other members of the congress.

5. The method of claim 1 , wherein malicious activity comprises reporting faulty information to other members of the congress.

6. The method of claim 1 , wherein the congress serves as a bonded validator set, securing a proof-of-stake sidechain used as a broadcast channel.

7. The method of claim 1 , wherein the consensus is reached by determining that the malicious node has breached a pre-defined protocol or criteria.

8. The method of claim 1 , wherein the consensus corresponds to confirmation of a sidechain transaction containing incriminating evidence of the malicious activity.

9. A computer readable storage medium comprising computer-executable instructions which, when executed, configure a processor to perform a method of confiscating a digital asset comprising:

detecting, by a first node that is a member of a congress comprising a plurality of nodes, malicious activity by a malicious node that is also a member of the congress;

providing, by the first node, a partial signature on a confiscation transaction to transfer at least a portion of digital asset(s) deposited by the malicious node to an unspendable address, wherein the digital asset(s) were deposited by the malicious node when joining the congress;

determining, by a threshold number of members of the congress, that the digital asset(s) of the malicious node should be confiscated, wherein the determination is made by reaching a consensus on a sidechain; and

confiscating the at least a portion of digital asset(s) of the malicious node by generating a valid signature for the confiscation transaction and suspending the malicious node from further participation in the congress.

10. An electronic device comprising:

an interface device;

a processor coupled to the interface device;

a memory coupled to the processor, the memory having stored thereon computer executable instructions which, when executed, configure the processor to perform a method of confiscating a digital asset comprising:

detecting, by a first node that is a member of a congress comprising a plurality of nodes, malicious activity by a malicious node that is also a member of the congress;

providing, by the first node, a partial signature on a confiscation transaction to transfer at least a portion of digital asset(s) deposited by the malicious node to an unspendable address, wherein the digital asset(s) were deposited by the malicious node when joining the congress;

determining, by a threshold number of members of the congress, that the digital asset(s) of the malicious node should be confiscated, wherein the determination is made by reaching a consensus on a sidechain; and

confiscating the at least a portion of digital asset(s) of the malicious node by generating a valid signature for the confiscation transaction and suspending the malicious node from further participation in the congress.

11. The electronic device of claim 10 , wherein the processor includes a trusted execution environment and wherein the computer executable instructions are executed within the trusted execution environment.

12. The electronic device of claim 10 , wherein joining the congress by a node comprises:

obtaining a congress public key;

paying into the congress public key;

receiving a key share; and

generating a private key share.

13. The electronic device of claim 10 , wherein the first node uses its private key share, which is associated with a threshold signature scheme, to provide the partial signature.

14. The electronic device of claim 13 , wherein generating the valid signature comprises using the private key share of the first node in cooperation with the other members of the congress.

15. The electronic device of claim 14 , wherein malicious activity comprises reporting faulty information to other members of the congress.

16. The electronic device of claim 10 , wherein the congress serves as a bonded validator set, securing a proof-of-stake sidechain used as a broadcast channel.

17. The electronic device of claim 10 , wherein the consensus is reached by determining that the malicious node has breached a pre-defined protocol or criteria.

18. The electronic device of claim 10 , wherein the consensus corresponds to confirmation of a sidechain transaction containing incriminating evidence of the malicious activity.

Assignments (2)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jan 26, 2024
From: FLETCHER, JOHN
To: NCHAIN HOLDINGS LTD
Reel/Frame 066266/0724 →
CHANGE OF NAME Recorded Jan 26, 2024
From: NCHAIN HOLDINGS LTD
To: NCHAIN LICENSING AG
Reel/Frame 066376/0058 →
Priority Claims (1)
GB 1711878 · Jul 24, 2017 · national
Continuity (3)
Continuation 17508946 · Oct 22, 2021
Continuation 16633556
Related Publication 20240064007A1 · Feb 22, 2024
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