IP Library Granted Patent US 11,989,288
Granted Patent B2
US 11,989,288 · App. 18/343,421 · Granted May 21, 2024

Dynamic monitoring and securing of factory processes, equipment and automated systems

Inventors: Matthew C. Putman (Brooklyn, NY); John B. Putman (Celebration, FL); Vadim Pinskiy (Wayne, NJ); Damas Limoge (Brooklyn, NY); Andrew Sundstrom (Brooklyn, NY); James Williams, III (New York, NY)
Assignee: Nanotronics Imaging, Inc.
G06F21/552G05B19/4155G05B23/0275G06F21/554G06F21/56G06N3/063G06N3/08G05B2219/31368G06F2221/034
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 11,989,288
App. No.
18/343,421
Granted
May 21, 2024
Kind
B2
Abstract

A system including a deep learning processor receives one or more control signals from one or more of a factory's process, equipment and control (P/E/C) systems during a manufacturing process. The processor generates expected response data and expected behavioral pattern data for the control signals. The processor receives production response data from the one or more of the factory's P/E/C systems and generates production behavioral pattern data for the production response data. The process compares at least one of: the production response data to the expected response data, and the production behavioral pattern data to the expected behavioral pattern data to detect anomalous activity. As a result of detecting anomalous activity, the processor performs one or more operations to provide notice or cause one or more of the factory's P/E/C systems to address the anomalous activity.

Claims (51)

1. A manufacturing system, comprising:

a process station configured to perform a step of a manufacturing process;

a station controller programmed to control an operation of the process station;

a deep learning controller in communication with the process station and the station controller, wherein the deep learning controller is trained to identify anomalous activity in the manufacturing process;

a first signal splitter positioned between the station controller and the process station, the first signal splitter having an input, a first output, and a second output, the first signal splitter configured to receive a control signal transmitted from the station controller to the process station, duplicate the control signal, and provide a first portion of the duplicated control signal to the deep learning controller via the first output and a second portion of the duplicated control signal to the process station via the second output; and

a second signal splitter positioned downstream of the process station, the second signal splitter having a second input, a third output, and a fourth output, the second signal splitter configured to receive control values output by the process station, duplicate the control values, and provide a first portion of the duplicated control values to the deep learning controller via the third output and a second portion of the duplicated control values is provided to the station controller via the fourth output.

2. The manufacturing system of claim 1 , wherein the deep learning controller is further configured to generate expected response data and expected behavioral pattern data based on the first portion of the duplicated control signal and the first portion of the duplicated control values.

3. The manufacturing system of claim 2 , wherein the deep learning controller is further configured to compare the expected response data to actual response data generated during the step of the manufacturing process.

4. The manufacturing system of claim 2 , wherein the deep learning controller is further configured to compare the expected behavioral pattern data to actual behavioral pattern data during the step of the manufacturing process.

5. The manufacturing system of claim 1 , wherein the deep learning controller is further configured to identify that the anomalous activity is a malware attack.

6. The manufacturing system of claim 5 , wherein the deep learning controller is further configured to execute an alert protocol when the anomalous activity is a malware attack.

7. The manufacturing system of claim 6 , wherein the alert protocol is digitally shutting down the manufacturing process.

8. The manufacturing system of claim 6 , wherein the alert protocol is an electronic notification.

9. The manufacturing system of claim 6 , wherein the alert protocol is digitally adjusting setpoints associated with downstream process stations.

10. A system for identifying anomalous activity in a manufacturing process comprising:

a processor; and

a memory having programming instructions stored thereon, which, when executed by the processor, causes the system to perform operations comprising:

receiving a first portion of a control signal from a station controller, wherein the control signal is duplicated, by a first signal splitter having a single input, a first output, and a second output, the first signal splitter receiving the control signal from the station controller, and duplicating the control signal to generate the first portion of the control signal and a second portion of the control signal, the second portion sent to a process station associated with the station controller via the first signal splitter;

receiving a first portion of control values from the process station, wherein the control values are duplicated, by a second signal splitter having a second signal input, a third output, and a fourth output, the second signal splitter receiving the control values from the process station, and duplicating the control values to generate the first portion of the control values and a second portion of the control values, the second portion provided to the station controller;

generating expected response data or expected behavioral pattern data based on the first portion of the control signal and the first portion of the control values; and

identifying whether there is anomalous activity in the manufacturing process based on the expected response data or the expected behavioral pattern data.

11. The system of claim 10 , identifying whether there is anomalous activity in the manufacturing process comprises:

comparing the expected response data to actual response data generated during the manufacturing process.

12. The system of claim 10 , identifying whether there is anomalous activity in the manufacturing process comprises:

comparing the expected behavioral pattern data to actual behavioral pattern data during the manufacturing process.

13. The system of claim 10 , wherein the operations further comprise:

determining that the anomalous activity is a malware attack.

14. The system of claim 13 , wherein the operations further comprise:

responsive to determining that the anomalous activity is a malware attack, initiating a remedial action, the remedial action comprising one or more of:

digitally shutting down the manufacturing process,

generating an electronic notification to be pushed to an administrator, or

digitally adjusting setpoints associated with downstream processes.

15. A computer-implemented method of detecting anomalous activity in a manufacturing process comprising:

receiving a first portion of a control signal from a station controller, wherein the control signal is duplicated, by a first signal splitter having a single input, a first output, and a second output, the first signal splitter receiving the control signal from the station controller, and duplicating the control signal to generate the first portion of the control signal and a second portion of the control signal, the second portion sent to a process station associated with the station controller via the first signal splitter;

receiving a first portion of control values from the process station, wherein the control values are duplicated, by a second signal splitter having a second signal input, a third output, and a fourth output, the second signal splitter receiving the control values from the process station, and duplicating the control values to generate the first portion of the control values and a second portion of the control values, the second portion provided to the station controller;

generating expected response data or expected behavioral pattern data based on the first portion of the control signal and the first portion of the control values; and

identifying whether there is anomalous activity in the manufacturing process based on the expected response data or the expected behavioral pattern data.

16. The computer-implemented method of claim 15 , identifying whether there is anomalous activity in the manufacturing process comprises:

comparing the expected response data to actual response data generated during the manufacturing process.

17. The computer-implemented method of claim 15 , identifying whether there is anomalous activity in the manufacturing process comprises:

comparing the expected behavioral pattern data to actual behavioral pattern data during the manufacturing process.

18. The computer-implemented method of claim 15 , further comprising:

determining that the anomalous activity is a malware attack.

19. The computer-implemented method of claim 18 , further comprising:

responsive to determining that the anomalous activity is a malware attack, initiating a remedial action, the remedial action comprising one or more of:

digitally shutting down the manufacturing process,

generating an electronic notification to be pushed to an administrator, or

digitally adjusting setpoints associated with downstream processes.

20. The computer-implemented method of claim 18 , wherein determining that the anomalous activity is a malware attack comprises:

generating a confidence level associated with a prediction that there is anomalous activity in the manufacturing process; and

determining that the confidence level falls within a range of values associated with a malware attack.

Assignments (2)
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Nov 30, 2023
From: NANOTRONICS IMAGING, INC.; NANOTRONICS HEALTH LLC; CUBEFABS INC.
To: ORBIMED ROYALTY & CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES IV, LP
Reel/Frame 065726/0001 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jun 30, 2023
From: PUTMAN, MATTHEW C.; PUTMAN, JOHN B.; PINSKIY, VADIM; LIMOGE, DAMAS; SUNDSTROM, ANDREW; WILLIAMS, JAMES, III
To: NANOTRONICS IMAGING, INC.
Reel/Frame 064128/0237 →
Continuity (10)
Continuation 17445657 · Aug 23, 2021
Continuation 16904984 · Jun 18, 2020
Continuation In Part 16781193 · Feb 4, 2020
Provisional Application 62983487 · Feb 28, 2020
Provisional Application 62950588 · Dec 19, 2019
Provisional Application 62938158 · Nov 20, 2019
Provisional Application 62932063 · Nov 7, 2019
Provisional Application 62931453 · Nov 6, 2019
Provisional Application 62912291 · Oct 8, 2019
Related Publication 20230359730A1 · Nov 9, 2023