IP Library › Granted Patent US 12,277,996
Granted Patent B2
US 12,277,996 · App. 18/432,390 · Granted Apr 15, 2025

Apparatus and method for hardware metering using memory-type camouflaged cell

Inventor: Jae-Mun Oh (Daejeon, KR)
Assignee: ELECTRONICS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH INSTITUTE
G11C7/24
View Patent ↗
Loading inventors, assignments & file history…
Monitor This Case
Get email alerts when status or documents change.
Order Certified Copies
Most orders are placed with the USPTO same day — all within 24 business hours.
Order via The Patent Place →
Pre-filled with this patent's details
Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,277,996
App. No.
18/432,390
Granted
Apr 15, 2025
Kind
B2
Abstract

Disclosed herein is an apparatus for hardware metering using a memory-type camouflaged cell. The apparatus includes memory including at least one camouflaged memory cell in which a key is hidden by a designer in advance and a controller for controlling whether to block the supply of power to the memory. The controller may perform reading a key from a corresponding key location in the multiple memory cells of the memory based on key location information stored in the controller when a key is input from the outside, determining whether the key input from the outside is the same as the key read from the memory, setting an authentic flag based on the determination result, and performing control based on the set authentic flag such that the memory operates normally or the supply of power is blocked.

Claims (32)

1. An apparatus for hardware metering using a memory-type camouflaged cell, comprising:

memory including multiple memory cells, at least one of which is a camouflaged memory cell in which a key is hidden by a designer in advance, the at least one camouflaged memory cell being identified by the designer only; and

a controller configured to control whether to block supply of power to the memory,

wherein the controller is further configured to perform:

reading the hidden key from a key location among the multiple memory cells of the memory based on key location information when a key and the key location information are input from an outside;

determining whether the key input from the outside is identical to the key read from the memory;

setting an authentic flag based on a determination result; and

performing control based on the set authentic flag such that the memory operates normally or such that the supply of power is blocked and the memory is unavailable.

2. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the camouflaged memory cell is configured such that an output signal thereof is adjusted based on two or more transistors having different threshold voltages.

3. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein setting the authentic flag is configured to set the authentic flag to ‘1’ when the key input from the outside is identical to the key read from the hidden memory, and to set the authentic flag to ‘0’ when the key input from the outside is not identical to the hidden key read from the memory.

4. The apparatus of claim 3 , wherein:

the controller is further configured to perform outputting the set authentic flag to the outside, and

performing the control is configured to perform the control such that the memory operates normally through fusing of the memory in response to a request from the outside when the authentic flag is ‘1’.

5. The apparatus of claim 3 , wherein:

performing the control is configured to perform the control such that the supply of power to the memory is blocked when the authentic flag is ‘0’.

6. An apparatus for hardware metering using a memory-type camouflaged cell, comprising:

memory including multiple memory cells, at least one of which is a camouflaged memory cell in which a key is hidden by a designer in advance, the at least one camouflaged memory cell being identified by the designer only and a memory cell in which a message is stored; and

a controller configured to control whether to block supply of power to the memory,

wherein the controller is further configured to perform:

reading the message from the memory based on a message location stored in the controller in advance and outputting the message when a key location is input from an outside;

performing a Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) operation based on the message and on the key that is read from the memory based on the key location input from the outside;

in response to an outer HMAC input from the outside, determining whether the outer HMAC is identical to an inner HMAC;

setting an authentic flag based on a determination result; and

performing control based on the set authentic flag such that the memory operates normally or such that the supply of power is blocked and the memory is unavailable.

7. The apparatus of claim 6 , wherein the camouflaged memory cell is configured such that an output signal thereof is adjusted based on two or more transistors having different threshold voltages.

8. The apparatus of claim 6 , wherein the outer HMAC is acquired by performing the HAMC operation using a key and the message that is output to the outside.

9. The apparatus of claim 6 , wherein setting the authentic flag is configured to set the authentic flag to ‘1’ when the outer HMAC is identical to the inner HMAC, and to set the authentic flag to ‘0’ when the outer HMAC is not identical to the inner HMAC.

10. The apparatus of claim 9 , wherein:

the controller is further configured to perform outputting the set authentic flag to the outside, and

performing the control is configured to perform the control such that the memory operates normally through fusing of the memory in response to a request from the outside when the authentic flag is ‘1’.

11. The apparatus of claim 9 , wherein:

performing the control is configured to perform the control such that the supply of power to the memory is blocked when the authentic flag is ‘0’.

Assignments (1)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Feb 5, 2024
From: OH, JAE-MUN
To: ELECTRONICS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Reel/Frame 066347/0041 →
Priority Claims (1)
KR 10-2021-0090527 · Jul 9, 2021 · national
Continuity (2)
Continuation 17501910 · Oct 14, 2021
Related Publication 20240177753A1 · May 30, 2024
References Cited (15)
US 9543295B2 · Yamamoto et al. · 2017 [cited by applicant]
US 11100011B2 · Ben-Simon et al. · 2021 [cited by applicant]
US 20090085737A1 · Estevez et al. · 2009 [cited by applicant]
US 20140351886A1 · Edge · 2014 [cited by examiner]
US 20150248568A1 · Offenberg · 2015 [cited by examiner]
US 20180275900A1 · Teranishi et al. · 2018 [cited by applicant]
US 20230161715A1 · Lee et al. · 2023 [cited by applicant]
JP 2016111446A · 2016 [cited by applicant]
JP 2020095723A · 2020 [cited by applicant]
KR 1020150114363A · 2015 [cited by applicant]
KR 1020160028959A · 2016 [cited by applicant]
Farinaz Koushanfar et al., “Hardware metering,” DAC(Design Automation Conference), 2001. [cited by applicant]
Yousra M. Alkabani et al., “Active Hardware Metering for Intellectual Property Protection and Security,” 16th USENIX Security Symposium, 2007. [cited by applicant]
Farinaz Koushanfar, “Hardware Metering: A Survey,” Introduction to Hardware Security and Trust, 2011. [cited by applicant]
Ujjwal Guin et al., “Counterfeit Integrated Circuits: A Rising Threat in the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain,” Proceedings of the IEEE, 2014. [cited by applicant]