IP Library Granted Patent US 9,313,205
Granted Patent B2
US 9,313,205 · App. 13/455,116 · Granted Apr 12, 2016

Restricting communication over an encrypted network connection to internet domains that share common IP addresses and shared SSL certificates

Inventor: Paul Michael Martini (San Diego, CA)
Assignee: iboss, Inc.
H04L63/101H04L29/12066H04L61/1511H04L63/0236H04L63/166
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 9,313,205
App. No.
13/455,116
Granted
Apr 12, 2016
Kind
B2
Abstract

An apparatus prevents communication by a client device to a domain that cannot be uniquely identified by relocating the DNS mapping of the domain to a destination IP Address that is uniquely identifiable and that represents a location of an apparatus that provides a data path to the domain.

Claims (79)

1. A computer-implemented method executed by one or more processors, the method comprising:

receiving, at a domain name server, a request from a client to resolve a domain name into a corresponding address;

determining that secure requests from the client directed to the domain name cannot be distinguished by the domain name server from secure requests from the client directed to at least one other domain name based on the corresponding address being shared between the domain name and the at least one other domain name;

in response to receiving the request to resolve the domain name and in response to determining that secure requests from the client directed to the domain name cannot be distinguished, associating, by the domain name server, a spoofed address with the domain name, wherein the spoofed address is configured to uniquely identify the domain name and is associated with a particular server, and wherein the spoofed address is different than the corresponding address;

in response to associating the spoofed address with the domain name, sending, by the domain name server, a response to the request to resolve the domain name, the response including the spoofed address;

receiving, at the particular server, a secure request for a resource, the secure request directed to the spoofed address;

determining, by the particular server, that the secure request is directed to the domain name based on the association between the spoofed address and the domain name, wherein the determination is made without decrypting the secure request; and

selectively allowing the secure request based at least in part on determining that the secure request is directed to the domain name.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein:

the spoofed address includes an internet protocol (IP) address,

receiving the request to resolve the domain name includes receiving a Domain Name System (DNS) request, and

sending the response to the request to resolve the domain name includes sending a DNS response.

3. The method of claim 1 , wherein the domain name is a first domain name, the method further comprising:

receiving a request to resolve a second domain name different than the first domain name;

determining that secure requests from the client directed to the second domain name can be distinguished by the domain name server; and

sending a response to the request to resolve the second domain name, the response including an address associated with the second domain name.

4. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

receiving a second request to resolve the domain name;

determining that the domain name is associated with the spoofed address; and

sending a response to the second request to resolve the domain name, the response including the spoofed address.

5. The method of claim 1 , wherein the spoofed address includes an internet protocol (IP) address and an IP port.

6. The method of claim 1 , wherein selectively allowing the secure request includes:

determining that the secure request should be blocked based at least in part on a rule associated with the domain name; and

blocking the secure request.

7. The method of claim 1 , wherein selectively allowing the secure request includes:

determining that the secure request should not be blocked based at least in part on a rule associated with the domain name; and

forwarding the secure request to an address associated with the domain name and different than the spoofed address.

8. The method of claim 1 , wherein receiving the secure request for the resource includes receiving a request according to Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS).

9. The method of claim 1 , wherein determining that secure requests directed to the domain name cannot be distinguished from secure requests directed to at least one other domain name includes determining that the domain name is included in a predetermined set of remapped domain names.

10. A non-transitory, computer-readable medium storing instructions operable when executed to cause at least one processor to perform operations comprising:

receiving, at a domain name server, a request from a client to resolve a domain name into a corresponding address;

determining that secure requests from the client directed to the domain name cannot be distinguished by the domain name server from secure requests from the client directed to at least one other domain name based on the corresponding address being shared between the domain name and the at least one other domain name;

in response to receiving the request to resolve the domain name and in response to determining that secure requests from the client directed to the domain name cannot be distinguished, associating, by the domain name server, a spoofed address with the domain name, wherein the spoofed address is configured to uniquely identify the domain name and is associated with a particular server, and wherein the spoofed address is different than the corresponding address;

in response to associating the spoofed address with the domain name, sending, by the domain name server, a response to the request to resolve the domain name, the response including the spoofed address;

receiving, at the particular server, a secure request for a resource, the secure request directed to the spoofed address;

determining, by the particular server, that the secure request is directed to the domain name based on the association between the spoofed address and the domain name, wherein the determination is made without decrypting the secure request; and

selectively allowing the secure request based at least in part on determining that the secure request is directed to the domain name.

11. The computer-readable medium of claim 10 , wherein:

the spoofed address includes an internet protocol (IP) address,

receiving the request to resolve the domain name includes receiving a Domain Name System (DNS) request, and

sending the response to the request to resolve the domain name includes sending a DNS response.

12. The computer-readable medium of claim 10 , wherein the domain name is a first domain name, the operations further comprising:

receiving a request to resolve a second domain name different than the first domain name;

determining that secure requests from the client directed to the second domain name can be distinguished by the domain name server; and

sending a response to the request to resolve the second domain name, the response including an address associated with the second domain name.

13. The computer-readable medium of claim 10 , the operations further comprising:

receiving a second request to resolve the domain name;

determining that the domain name is associated with the spoofed address; and

sending a response to the second request to resolve the domain name, the response including the spoofed address.

14. The computer-readable medium of claim 10 , wherein the spoofed address includes an internet protocol (IP) address and an IP port.

15. The computer-readable medium of claim 10 , wherein selectively allowing the secure request includes:

determining that the secure request should be blocked based at least in part on a rule associated with the domain name; and

blocking the secure request.

16. The computer-readable medium of claim 10 , wherein selectively allowing the secure request includes:

determining that the secure request should not be blocked based at least in part on a rule associated with the domain name; and

forwarding the secure request to an address associated with the domain name and different than the spoofed address.

17. The computer-readable medium of claim 10 , wherein receiving the secure request for the resource includes receiving a request according to Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS).

18. A system comprising:

memory for storing data; and

one or more processors operable to perform operations comprising:

receiving, at a domain name server, a request from a client to resolve a domain name into a corresponding address;

determining that secure requests from the client directed to the domain name cannot be distinguished by the domain name server from secure requests from the client directed to at least one other domain name based on the corresponding address being shared between the domain name and the at least one other domain name;

in response to receiving the request to resolve the domain name and in response to determining that secure requests from the client directed to the domain name cannot be distinguished, associating, by the domain name server, a spoofed address with the domain name, wherein the spoofed address is configured to uniquely identify the domain name and is associated with a particular server, and wherein the spoofed address is different than the corresponding address;

in response to associating the spoofed address with the domain name, sending, by the domain name server, a response to the request to resolve the domain name, the response including the spoofed address;

receiving, at the particular server, a secure request for a resource, the secure request directed to the spoofed address;

determining, by the particular server, that the secure request is directed to the domain name based on the association between the spoofed address and the domain name, wherein the determination is made without decrypting the secure request; and

selectively allowing the secure request based at least in part on determining that the secure request is directed to the domain name.

19. The system of claim 18 , wherein:

the spoofed address includes an internet protocol (IP) address,

receiving the request to resolve the domain name includes receiving a Domain Name System (DNS) request, and

sending the response to the request to resolve the domain name includes sending a DNS response.

20. The system of claim 18 , wherein the domain name is a first domain name, the operations further comprising:

receiving a request to resolve a second domain name different than the first domain name;

determining that secure requests from the client directed to the second domain name can be distinguished by the domain name server; and

sending a response to the request to resolve the second domain name, the response including an address associated with the second domain name.

21. The system of claim 18 , the operations further comprising:

receiving a second request to resolve the domain name;

determining that the domain name is associated with the spoofed address; and

sending a response to the second request to resolve the domain name, the response including the spoofed address.

Assignments (7)
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Dec 28, 2023
From: IBOSS, INC.
To: WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, FSB
Reel/Frame 066158/0219 →
SUPPLEMENTAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Dec 28, 2023
From: IBOSS, INC.
To: WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, FSB
Reel/Frame 066158/0266 →
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Recorded Dec 12, 2023
From: SILICON VALLEY BANK, A DIVISION OF FIRST-CITIZENS BANK TRUST COMPANY
To: IBOSS, INC.
Reel/Frame 066140/0480 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Sep 19, 2022
From: IBOSS, INC.
To: SILICON VALLEY BANK
Reel/Frame 061463/0331 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Dec 16, 2020
From: IBOSS, INC.
To: SILICON VALLEY BANK
Reel/Frame 054789/0680 →
CHANGE OF NAME Recorded Apr 23, 2014
From: PHANTOM TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
To: IBOSS, INC.
Reel/Frame 032745/0646 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Oct 14, 2013
From: MARTINI, PAUL MICHAEL
To: PHANTOM TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
Reel/Frame 031398/0993 →
Continuity (1)
Related Publication 20130283385A1 · Oct 24, 2013