IP Library Granted Patent US 9,509,720
Granted Patent B2
US 9,509,720 · App. 14/302,681 · Granted Nov 29, 2016

Techniques for improved run time trustworthiness

Inventors: Chris A. Shenefiel (Oakton, VA); Rafael Mantilla Montalvo (Raleigh, NC); Roy M. Brooks (New Hill, NC)
Assignee: Cisco Technology, Inc.
H04L63/20G06F21/50H04L9/088H04L63/10H04L63/102H04L63/123H04L63/1433H04L63/126
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 9,509,720
App. No.
14/302,681
Granted
Nov 29, 2016
Kind
B2
Abstract

Techniques are presented herein for attesting the trustworthiness of devices in a secure network during run-time operation. A security management device is configured to perform network trust attestation operations in order to generate an access control policy that defines access rights for a device in a network. The access control policy is assured by creating a hash value for the access control policy and then signing the hash value to generate a signed hash value. The signed hash value is integrated with the access control policy, and the access control policy is sent with the signed hash value to the operator device for verification.

Claims (53)

1. A method comprising:

at a security management device in a provider network configured to generate network trust attestation information:

receiving, from a device external to the provider network, a request to access services in the provider network;

in response to receiving the request to access the services in the provider network, generating an access control policy that defines access rights for the external device when accessing the services in the provider network;

assuring the access control policy by creating a hash value for the access control policy in response to receiving the request to access the services;

signing the hash value to generate a signed hash value;

integrating the signed hash value with the access control policy; and

sending the access control policy with the signed hash value to the device external to the provider network for verification, such that the device external to the provider network is configured to compare the signed hash value with an expected hash value associated with the security management device to verify the network trust attestation information to determine whether to access the services in the provider network, wherein the device external to the provider network receives the expected hash value associated with the security management device from a server within the provider network.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein generating comprises:

generating a mandatory access control policy; and

determining a trust assurance value associated with the mandatory access control policy.

3. The method of claim 1 , wherein sending comprises sending to the device the access control policy with the signed hash value during network run-time such that the device can determine the trustworthiness of the security management device.

4. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

determining whether the device attempts to obtain access rights beyond the access control policy; and

flagging the device as a potentially malicious device if the device attempts to obtain access rights beyond the access control policy for a predetermined number of instances.

5. The method of claim 1 , wherein signing comprises signing the access control policy by creating a hash value associated with a virtual machine hosted by the security management device.

6. The method of claim 5 , wherein sending comprises sending the access control policy with the hash value prior to a migration of the virtual machine in the network.

7. The method of claim 6 , wherein sending comprises sending the access control policy with the hash value during the virtual machine migration such that the device can determine whether or not the virtual machine has successfully migrated.

8. The method of claim 1 , wherein sending comprises sending the access control policy with the signed hash value during network run-time to enable the device to report trustworthiness of the security management device during provider network run-time.

9. The method of claim 1 , wherein the network attestation information is stored in a trusted platform module.

10. A non-transitory computer readable storage media encoded with software comprising computer executable instructions and when the software is executed at a security management device in a provider network, the instructions are operable to:

generate network trust attestation information;

receive, from a device external to the provider network, a request to access services in the provider network;

in response to receiving the request to access the services in the provider network, generate an access control policy that defines access rights for the external device when accessing the services in the provider network, and assure the access control policy by creating a hash value for the access control policy;

sign the hash value to generate a signed hash value;

integrate the signed hash value with the access control policy; and

cause the access control policy with the signed hash value to be sent to the device external to the provider network for verification, such that the device external to the provider network is configured to compare the signed hash value with an expected hash value associated with the security management device to verify the network trust attestation information to determine whether to access the services in the provider network, wherein the device external to the provider network receives the expected hash value associated with the security management device from a server within the provider network.

11. The non-transitory computer readable storage media of claim 10 , wherein the instructions operable to generate comprise instructions operable to:

generate a mandatory access control policy; and

determine a trust assurance value associated with the mandatory access control policy.

12. The non-transitory computer readable storage media of claim 10 , further comprising instructions operable to:

determine whether the device attempts to obtain access rights beyond the access control policy; and

flag the device as a potentially malicious device if the device attempts to obtain access rights beyond the access control policy for a predetermined number of instances.

13. The non-transitory computer readable storage media of claim 10 , wherein the instructions operable to sign comprise instructions operable to sign the access control policy by creating a hash value associated with a virtual machine hosted by the security management device.

14. The non-transitory computer readable storage media of claim 13 , wherein the instructions operable to send comprise instructions operable to send the access control policy with the hash value prior to a migration of the virtual machine in the network.

15. The non-transitory computer readable storage media of claim 10 , wherein the instructions operable to generate the signed hash value comprise instructions operable to store the signed hash value in a trusted platform module.

16. An apparatus comprising:

a network interface unit within a security management device in a provider network configured to send and receive communications over a network; and

a processor within the security management device coupled to the network interface unit, and configured to:

generate network trust attestation information;

receive, from a device external to the provider network, a request to access services in the provider network;

in response to receiving the request to access the services in the provider network, generate an access control policy that defines access rights for the external device when accessing the services in the provider network, and assure the access control policy by creating a hash value for the access control policy;

sign the hash value to generate a signed hash value;

integrate the signed hash value with the access control policy; and

cause the access control policy with the signed hash value to be sent to the device external to the provider network for verification, such that the device external to the provider network is configured to compare the signed hash value with an expected hash value associated with the security management device to verify the network trust attestation information to determine whether to access the services in the provider network, wherein the device external to the provider network receives the expected hash value associated with the security management device from a server within the provider network.

17. The apparatus of claim 16 , wherein the processor is further configured to:

generate a mandatory access control policy; and

determine a trust assurance value associated with the mandatory access control policy.

18. The apparatus of claim 16 , wherein the processor is further configured to:

determine whether the device attempts to obtain access rights beyond the access control policy; and

flag the device as a potentially malicious device if the device attempts to obtain access rights beyond the access control policy for a predetermined number of instances.

19. The apparatus of claim 16 , wherein the processor is further configured to sign the access control policy by creating the hash value associated with a virtual machine hosted by the security management device.

20. The apparatus of claim 16 , wherein the processor is further configured to store the signed hash value in a trusted platform module.

Assignments (1)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jun 12, 2014
From: SHENEFIEL, CHRIS A.; MANTILLA MONTALVO, RAFAEL; BROOKS, ROY M.
To: CISCO TECHNOLOGY, INC.
Reel/Frame 033088/0752 →
Continuity (1)
Related Publication 20150365436A1 · Dec 17, 2015