Methods and apparatus for establishing a secure communication channel
A method for establishing a secure communication channel between an off-card entity and an embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card (eUICC) is provided. The method involves establishing symmetric keys that are ephemeral in scope. Specifically, an off-card entity, and each eUICC in a set of eUICCs managed by the off-card entity, possess long-term Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) information. When a secure communication channel is to be established between the off-card entity and an eUICC, the eUICC and the off-card entity can authenticate one another in accordance with the respectively-possessed PKI information (e.g., verifying public keys). After authentication, the off-card entity and the eUICC establish a shared session-based symmetric key for implementing the secure communication channel. Specifically, the shared session-based symmetric key is generated according to whether perfect or half forward security is desired. Once the shared session-based symmetric key is established, the off-card entity and the eUICC can securely communicate information.
1. A method for establishing a secure connection between a server and an embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card (eUICC) included in a mobile device, wherein the eUICC is associated with a long-term public key (PK eUICC ) and a long-term private key (SK eUICC ), the method comprising:
at the server, which is associated with a long-term public key (PK server ) and a long-term private key (SK server ):
receiving, from the mobile device, a request to establish the secure connection with the mobile device;
receiving, from the eUICC, public key infrastructure (PKI) information comprising: i) a signature based on SK eUICC , and ii) PK eUICC ;
authenticating an identity of the eUICC by verifying that the signature is based on SK eUICC ;
generating, subsequent to the authenticating, an ephemeral public key (ePK server ) and an ephemeral private key (eSK server );
signing ePK server using SK server to produce a signed ePK server ;
providing the signed ePK server to the mobile device;
receiving, from the mobile device, an ephemeral key (ePK eUICC ) that is signed using SK eUICC ;
generating a shared symmetric key using eSK server and ePK eUICC ; and
establishing the secure connection using the shared symmetric key.
2. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
transmitting, over the secure connection, an electronic Subscriber Identity Module (eSIM) to the eUICC.
3. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
providing, over the secure connection, an update to an electronic Subscriber Identity Module (eSIM) managed by the eUICC.
4. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
causing, over the secure connection, the eUICC to remove an electronic Subscriber Identity Module (eSIM) managed by the eUICC.
5. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
caching, within a security domain associated with the eUICC, the shared symmetric key for establishing a different secure connection at a later time with the mobile device.
6. A method for establishing a secure connection between a server and an embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card (eUICC) included in a mobile device, wherein the eUICC is associated with a long-term public key (PK eUICC ) and a long-term private key (SK eUICC ), the method comprising:
at the server, which is associated with a long-term public key (PK server ) and a long-term private key (SK server ):
receiving, from the mobile device, a request to establish the secure connection with the mobile device;
receiving, from the eUICC, public key infrastructure (PKI) information comprising: i) a signature, and ii) PK eUICC ;
authenticating an identity of the eUICC, wherein the authenticating comprises determining that the signature is based on SK eUICC ;
generating, subsequent to the authenticating, an ephemeral public key (ePK server ) and an ephemeral private key (eSK server );
signing ePK server using SK server to produce a signed ePK server ;
providing the signed ePK server to the mobile device;
generating a shared symmetric key using eSK server and PK eUICC ; and
establishing the secure connection using the shared symmetric key.
7. The method of claim 6 , further comprising:
transmitting, over the secure connection, an electronic Subscriber Identity Module (eSIM) to the eUICC.
8. The method of claim 6 , further comprising:
providing, over the secure connection, an update to an electronic Subscriber Identity Module (eSIM) managed by the eUICC.
9. A non-transitory computer readable medium comprising instructions that when executed by a server cause the server to establish a secure connection between a server and an embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card (eUICC) included in a mobile device, wherein the eUICC is associated with a long-term public key (PK eUICC ) and a long-term private key (SK eUICC ) and the server is associated with a long-term public key (PK server ) and a long-term private key (SK server ), by performing operations comprising:
receiving, from the mobile device, a request to establish the secure connection with the mobile device;
receiving, from the eUICC, public key infrastructure (PKI) information comprising: i) a signature based on SK eUICC , and ii) PK eUICC ;
authenticating an identity of the eUICC by verifying that the signature is based on SK eUICC ;
generating, subsequent to the authenticating, an ephemeral public key (ePK server ) and an ephemeral private key (eSK server );
signing ePK server using SK server to produce a signed ePK server ;
providing the signed ePK server to the mobile device;
receiving, from the mobile device, an ephemeral key (ePK eUICC ) that is signed using SK eUICC ;
generating a shared symmetric key using eSK server and ePK eUICC ; and
establishing the secure connection using the shared symmetric key.
10. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 9 , wherein the operations further comprise:
transmitting, over the secure connection, an electronic Subscriber Identity Module (eSIM) to the eUICC.
11. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 9 , wherein the operations further comprise:
providing, over the secure connection, an update to an electronic Subscriber Identity Module (eSIM) managed by the eUICC.
12. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 9 , wherein the operations further comprise:
causing, over the secure connection, the eUICC to remove an electronic Subscriber Identity Module (eSIM) managed by the eUICC.
13. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 9 , wherein the operations further comprise:
caching, within a security domain associated with the eUICC, the shared symmetric key for establishing a different secure connection at a later time with the mobile device.
14. A server comprising:
a memory; and
a processor, wherein the memory comprises instructions that when executed by the processor cause the server to establish a secure connection between the server and an embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card (eUICC) included in a mobile device, wherein the eUICC is associated with a long-term public key (PK eUICC ) and a long-term private key (SK eUICC ), and wherein the server is associated with a long-term public key (PK server ) and a long-term private key (SK server ), by performing operations comprising:
receiving, from the mobile device, a request to establish the secure connection with the mobile device,
receiving, from the eUICC, public key infrastructure (PKI) information comprising: i) a signature, and ii) PK eUICC ,
authenticating an identity of the eUICC, wherein the authenticating comprises determining that the signature is based on SK eUICC ,
generating, subsequent to the authenticating, an ephemeral public key (ePK server ) and an ephemeral private key (eSK server ),
signing ePK server using SK server to produce a signed ePK server ,
providing the signed ePK server to the mobile device,
generating a shared symmetric key using eSK server and PK eUICC , and
establishing the secure connection using the shared symmetric key.
15. The server of claim 14 , wherein the operations further comprise:
transmitting, over the secure connection, an electronic Subscriber Identity Module (eSIM) to the eUICC.
16. The server of claim 14 , wherein the operations further comprise:
providing, over the secure connection, an update to an electronic Subscriber Identity Module (eSIM) managed by the eUICC.
17. The server of claim 14 , wherein the operations further comprise:
causing, over the secure connection, the eUICC to remove an electronic Subscriber Identity Module (eSIM) managed by the eUICC.
18. The server of claim 14 , wherein the operations further comprise:
caching, within a security domain associated with the eUICC, the shared symmetric key for establishing a different secure connection at a later time with the mobile device.