IP Library › Granted Patent US 10,388,097
Granted Patent B1
US 10,388,097 · App. 16/212,228 · Granted Aug 20, 2019

Blockchain-based cryptologic ballot verification

Inventors: Aleksandr Nikolaevich Ivanov (Saint Petersburg, RU); Aleksei Vladimirovich Kazennov (Saint Petersburg, RU); Georgii Valerievich Mavchun (Saint Petersburg, RU); Mikhail Rymanov (London, GB); Peter de Rooij (London, GB); John Velissarios (London, GB)
Assignees: Accenture Global Solutions Limited; DSX Holdings Limited
G07C13/00G06F21/602
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 10,388,097
App. No.
16/212,228
Granted
Aug 20, 2019
Kind
B1
Abstract

A system may facilitate a distributed ledger technology (DLT) record based (for example, blockchain-based) auditing. A node configured to support an auditor role may access a ballot to determine answers and one or more voter transactions to determine committed tokens conferred to the answers. The auditor may access summation information for the committed tokens to facilitate comparison to a voter token acting as a source token for the committed tokens. Without necessarily gaining knowledge of the vote-value conferred by the individual committed tokens, the auditor may compare the committed tokens as a sum to the voter token and confirm that the sum of the committed tokens is consistent with the voter token. The auditor may generate an indication of the result of the comparison.

Claims (69)

1. A cryptographic vote auditing method including:

providing security and accuracy of a distributed-ledger-based cryptographic ballot system by:

accessing a ballot recorded on a distributed ledger,

the ballot establishing an answer with a corresponding answer identifier;

accessing a voter transaction recorded on the distributed ledger;

accessing a first voter token referenced within the voter transaction,

the first voter token transferring a voter vote-value for a committed vote-value within committed tokens assigned by the voter transaction,

the committed tokens configured to bind voters to the committed vote-values without revealing individual ones of the committed vote-values while in a cryptographic form, where

each of the committed vote-values includes:

 a null, or

 at least a portion of a voter vote-value;

verifying a validity of the voter transaction by:

determining a verification sum,

the verification sum determined by analyzing voter summation information for each of the committed tokens, and

the verification sum determined without dependence on knowledge of individual ones of the committed vote-values, and

comparing the verification sum to the first voter token; and

responsive to verifying the validity of the voter transaction, generating a validity indication.

2. The cryptographic vote auditing method of claim 1 , further including recording the validity indication to the distributed ledger as a validity token.

3. The cryptographic vote auditing method of claim 1 , where comparing the verification sum to the first voter token includes determining a mismatch between the verification sum and the first voter token, while the first voter token is in the cryptographic form.

4. The cryptographic vote auditing method of claim 3 , where the voter summation information includes information extracted from a range-proof provided within the voter transaction.

5. The cryptographic vote auditing method of claim 3 , further including recording the validity indication to the distributed ledger to invalidate the voter transaction.

6. The cryptographic vote auditing method of claim 3 , further including recording the validity indication to the distributed ledger to request a change to the voter transaction to match the verification sum.

7. The cryptographic vote auditing method of claim 1 , further including:

accessing an organizer token established on the distributed ledger, the organizer token establishing an organizer vote-value; and

accessing an organizer transaction recorded on the distributed ledger, the organizer transaction:

referencing an organizer token designating an organizer vote value;

conferring voter tokens, the voter tokens including the first voter token, to voters via voter identifiers for the voters using the organizer token as a source token; and

providing organizer summation information for each of the voter tokens.

8. The cryptographic vote auditing method of claim 7 , where verifying the validity of the voter transaction further includes comparing the organizer token to the organizer summation information.

9. The cryptographic vote auditing method of claim 1 , where:

the method further includes accessing a range-proof within the voter transaction; and

verifying the validity of the voter transaction further includes comparing the range-proof to a first committed token of the committed tokens to determine whether a first committed vote-value transferred via the first committed token is within an allowed range for the ballot.

10. The cryptographic vote auditing method of claim 9 , further including determining that the first committed vote-value is within the allowed range for the ballot by determining that the first committed vote-value is non-negative.

11. The cryptographic vote auditing method of claim 1 , where verifying the validity of the committed tokens includes comparing a recipient identifier of the first voter token to a voter identifier for a voter that requested the voter transaction.

12. A cryptographic vote auditing system including:

network interface circuitry configured to:

access a ballot recorded on a distributed ledger, the ballot establishing an answer with a corresponding answer identifier;

access a voter transaction recorded on the distributed ledger; and

access a first voter token referenced within the voter transaction,

the first voter token transferring a voter vote-value for committed vote-value within committed tokens assigned by the voter transaction,

the committed tokens configured to bind voters to the committed vote-values without revealing individual ones of the committed vote-values while in a cryptographic form, and

each of the committed vote-values including a zero or at least a portion of a voter vote-value; and

ballot auditing circuitry in data communication with the network interface circuitry, the ballot auditing circuitry configured to:

verify a validity of the voter transaction by:

without dependence on knowledge of individual ones of the committed vote-values, determining a verification sum by analyzing voter summation information for each of the committed tokens; and

comparing the verification sum to the first voter token; and

responsive to verifying the validity of the voter transaction, generate a validity indication.

13. The cryptographic vote auditing system of claim 12 , where the ballot auditing circuitry is further configured to record the validity indication to the distributed ledger as a validity token.

14. The cryptographic vote auditing system of claim 12 , where the ballot auditing circuitry is further configured to compare the verification sum to the first voter token by determining a mismatch between the verification sum and the first voter token, while the first voter token is in the cryptographic form.

15. The cryptographic vote auditing system of claim 14 , where the voter summation information includes information extracted from a range-proof token provided within the voter transaction.

16. The cryptographic vote auditing system of claim 14 , where the ballot auditing circuitry is further configured to record the validity indication to the distributed ledger to invalidate the voter transaction.

17. The cryptographic vote auditing system of claim 14 , where the ballot auditing circuitry is further configured to record the validity indication to the distributed ledger to request a change to the voter transaction to match the verification sum.

18. The cryptographic vote auditing system of claim 12 , where the ballot auditing circuitry is further configured to:

access an organizer token established on the distributed ledger, the organizer token establishing an organizer vote-value; and

access an organizer transaction recorded on the distributed ledger, the organizer transaction:

referencing an organizer token designating an organizer vote value;

conferring voter tokens, the voter tokens including the first voter token, to voters via voter identifiers for the voters using the organizer token as a source token; and

providing organizer summation information for each of the voter tokens.

19. A product including:

machine-readable media other than a transitory signal; and

instructions stored on the machine-readable media, the instructions configured to, when executed cause a machine to:

access a ballot recorded on a distributed ledger, the ballot establishing an answer with a corresponding answer identifier;

access a voter transaction recorded on the distributed ledger;

access a first voter token referenced within the voter transaction, the first voter token transferring a voter vote-value for committed vote-value within committed tokens assigned by the voter transaction, the committed tokens configured to bind voters to the committed vote-values without revealing individual ones of the committed vote-values while in a cryptographic form, each of the committed vote-values including a null or at least a portion of a voter vote-value;

verify a validity of the voter transaction by:

without dependence on knowledge of individual ones of the committed vote-values, determining a verification sum by analyzing voter summation information for each of the committed tokens; and

comparing the verification sum to the first voter token; and

responsive to verifying the validity of the voter transaction, generate a validity indication.

20. The product of claim 19 , where the instructions are further configured to verify the validity of the committed tokens by comparing a recipient identifier of the first voter token to a voter identifier for a voter that requested the voter transaction.

Assignments (2)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jun 27, 2019
From: IVANOV, ALEKSANDR NIKOLAEVICH; KAZENNOV, ALEKSEI VLADIMIROVICH; MAVCHUN, GEORGII VALERIEVICH; RYMANOV, MIKHAIL
To: DSX HOLDINGS LIMITED
Reel/Frame 049612/0546 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Dec 13, 2018
From: ROOIJ, PETER DE; VELISSARIOS, JOHN
To: ACCENTURE GLOBAL SOLUTIONS LIMITED
Reel/Frame 047769/0270 →
Priority Claims (1)
RU 2018103253 · Jan 29, 2018 · national