Techniques for genuine device assurance by establishing identity and trust using certificates

1. A method, comprising:

verifying that firmware of a device deployed in an industrial process control and automation system is trusted and contains a root of trust by;

verifying that a protected storage of the device contains a private or secret key associated with a device certificate that is stored in a persistent storage of the device;

obtaining the device certificate from the protected storage;

generating a random challenge value;

providing a signature for the challenge value using the device's private or secret key; and

verifying the device certificate of the device using the root of trust by verifying the signature using the device's private or secret key;

determining that the device is a genuine device in response to verifying the root of trust and that the protected storage contains the private or secret key associated with the device certificate and verifying the device certificate; and

allowing use of the device.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein verifying that the protected storage contains the private or secret key associated with the device certificate further comprises:

verifying the device certificate using an intermediate certificate using the root of trust;

and

continue allowing use of the device.

3. The method of claim 1 , wherein the protected storage comprises a security integrated circuit.

4. The method of claim 1 , wherein verifying that the firmware of the device is trusted comprises performing a secure boot process.

5. The method of claim 1 , wherein verifying the device certificate of the device using the root of trust comprises:

validating the device certificate using an intermediate certificate authority's certificate; and

validating the intermediate certificate authority's certificate using the root of trust.

6. The method of claim 1 , wherein the root of trust comprises at least one of:

a trusted certificate and a trusted public key.

7. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

in response to determining that the device is a genuine device, allowing the device to be placed into normal operation.

8. A device deployed in an industrial process control and automation system, comprising:

a persistent storage configured to store a device certificate;

a protected storage configured to store a private or secret key associated with the device certificate; and

at least one processing device configured to:

verify that firmware of the device contained in the protected storage is trusted and contains a root of trust by;

verifying that the protected storage contains the private or secret key associated with the device certificate that is stored in a persistent storage of the device;

obtaining the device certificate from the protected storage;

generating a random challenge value;

providing a signature for the challenge value using the device's private or secret key; and

verifying the device certificate using the root of trust by verifying the signature using the device's private or secret key;

determining that the device is a genuine device in response to verifying that the protected storage contains the private or secret key associated with the device certificate and verifying the device certificate; and

allowing use of the device.

9. The device of claim 8 , wherein, to verify that the protected storage contains the private or secret key associated with the device certificate, the at least one processing device is configured to:

verifying the device certificate using an intermediate certificate using the root of trust;

and

continue allowing use of the device.

10. The device of claim 8 , wherein:

the persistent storage comprises a non-volatile memory; and

the protected storage comprises a security integrated circuit.

11. The device of claim 8 , wherein, to verify that the firmware of the device is trusted, the at least one processing device is configured to perform a secure boot process.

12. The device of claim 8 , wherein, to verify the device certificate of the device using the root of trust, the at least one processing device is configured to:

validate the device certificate using an intermediate certificate authority's certificate; and

validate the intermediate certificate authority's certificate using the root of trust.

13. The device of claim 8 , wherein the root of trust comprises at least one of:

a trusted certificate and a trusted public key.

14. The device of claim 8 , wherein the protected storage comprises a tamper-resistant or tamper-proof cryptographic integrated circuit chip.

15. A non-transitory computer readable medium containing instructions that when executed cause at least one processing device of an apparatus deployed in an industrial process control and automation system to:

verify that firmware of the apparatus is trusted and contains a root of trust by;

verifying that the protected storage contains the private or secret key associated with the device certificate that is stored in a persistent storage of the apparatus;

obtaining the device certificate from the protected storage;

generating a random challenge value;

providing a signature for the challenge value using the device's private or secret key; and

verifying the device certificate using the root of trust by verifying the signature using the device's private or secret key;

determining that the device is a genuine device in response to verifying that the protected storage contains the private or secret key associated with the device certificate and verifying the device certificate; and

allowing use of the device.

16. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 15 , wherein the instructions that when executed cause the at least one processing device to verify that the protected storage contains the private or secret key associated with the device certificate comprise:

instructions that when executed cause the at least one processing device to:

verify the device certificate using an intermediate certificate using the root of trust;

and

continue allowing use of the device.

17. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 15 , wherein the instructions that when executed cause the at least one processing device to verify that the firmware of the apparatus is trusted comprise:

instructions that when executed cause the at least one processing device to perform a secure boot process.

18. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 15 , wherein the instructions that when executed cause the at least one processing device to verify the device certificate of the apparatus using the root of trust comprise:

instructions that when executed cause the at least one processing device to:

validate the device certificate using an intermediate certificate authority's certificate; and

validate the intermediate certificate authority's certificate using the root of trust.

19. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 15 , wherein the root of trust comprises at least one of: a trusted certificate and a trusted public key.

20. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 15 , further comprising instructions that when executed cause the at least one processing device to:

in response to determining that the apparatus is a genuine device, allow the apparatus to be placed into normal operation.