Mutual approval for privacy-preserving computing
Various embodiments are generally directed to the providing for mutual authentication and secure distributed processing of multi-party data. In particular, an experiment may be submitted to include the distributed processing of private data owned by multiple distrustful entities. Private data providers may authorize the experiment and securely transfer the private data for processing by trusted computing nodes in a pool of trusted computing nodes.
1. An apparatus, comprising:
a network interface;
a processor coupled to the network interface;
memory coupled to the processor, the memory comprising instructions executable by the processor;
a trusted execution environment (TEE) coupled to the processor, the TEE comprising:
a secure co-processor; and
secure memory coupled to the secure co-processor, the secure memory comprising TEE instructions, the TEE instructions executable by the secure co-processor, which when executed by the secure co-processor cause the secure co-processor to:
establish, via the processor and the network interface, a first secure channel with a private data provider of a plurality of private data providers in a pool of private data sources,
receive, via the first secure channel, a first encryption key and encrypted private data from the private data provider,
establish, via the processor and the network interface, a second secure channel with an experiment orchestrator,
receive, via the second secure channel, a second encryption key and a portion of an experiment description, and
apply one or more processes to the encrypted private data based in part on the first encryption key, the second encryption key and the experiment description.
2. The apparatus of claim 1 , the TEE instructions, when executed by the secure co-processor cause the secure co-processor to decrypt the encrypted private data based on the encryption keys.
3. The apparatus of claim 1 , the TEE instructions, when executed by the secure co-processor cause the secure co-processor to send an information element to the experiment orchestrator to include an indication of a root of trust of the apparatus.
4. The apparatus of claim 1 , the apparatus a trusted computing node in a pool of distributed trusted computing nodes.
5. The apparatus of claim 1 , the experiment description comprising a directed acyclic graph (DAG).
6. The apparatus of claim 5 , the DAG comprising a plurality of map, reduce, or analytic operations to be performed on private data, the private data corresponding to private data available from the plurality of private data providers in the pool of private data sources.
7. An apparatus, comprising:
a network interface; and
a trusted execution environment (TEE) coupled to the network interface, the TEE comprising:
a secure co-processor; and
secure memory coupled to the secure co-processor, the secure memory comprising TEE instructions executable by the secure co-processor, which when executed, cause the secure co-processor to:
establish a secure channel with a private data provider of a plurality of private data providers in a pool of private data sources,
send, via the secure channel, a first information element to the private data provider, the first information element to include an indication of an experiment description that operates on private data available from the plurality of private data providers in the pool of private data sources,
receive, via the secure channel, a second information element from the private data provider, the second information element to include an indication of whether the experiment description is approved, and
authenticate a trusted computing node to admit the trusted computing node to a pool of trusted computing nodes.
8. The apparatus of claim 7 , the TEE instructions, when executed by the secure co-processor cause the secure co-processor to:
receive a root of trust from the trusted computing node, and
authenticate the trusted computing node based on the root of trust.
9. The apparatus of claim 7 , the TEE instructions, when executed by the secure co-processor cause the secure co-processor to:
send, via the secure channel, a third information element to the private data provider, the third information element to include an indication of the authenticity of the trusted computing node; and
receive, via the secure channel, a fourth information element from the private data provider, the fourth information element to include an indication of whether the trusted computing node is authorized to receive the private data.
10. The apparatus of claim 7 , the TEE instructions, when executed by the secure co-processor cause the secure co-processor to receive a third information element from an experiment portal, the third information element to include an indication of the experiment description.
11. The apparatus of claim 7 , the experiment description a directed acyclic graph.
12. At least one non-transitory machine-readable storage medium comprising instructions that when executed by a secure co-processor of a trusted execution environment (TEE) of an apparatus comprising a network interface, cause the TEE to:
establish, via the network interface, a first secure channel with a private data provider of a plurality of private data providers in a pool of private data sources;
receive, via the first secure channel, a first encryption key and encrypted private data from the private data provider;
establish, via the network interface, a second secure channel with an experiment orchestrator;
receive, via the second secure channel, a second encryption key and a portion of an experiment description, and
apply one or more processes to the encrypted private data based in part on the first encryption key, the second encryption key and the experiment description.
13. The at least one non-transitory machine-readable storage medium of claim 12 , comprising instructions that when executed by the secure co-processor further cause the TEE to decrypt the encrypted private data based on the encryption keys.
14. The at least one non-transitory machine-readable storage medium of claim 13 , comprising instructions that when executed by the secure co-processor further cause the TEE to send an information element to the experiment orchestrator to include an indication of a root of trust of the apparatus.