Establishing trust in an attribute authentication system
Computer-implemented methods for privacy attribute based credentials include issuing a privacy-preserving attribute-based credential, which is signed with a private key and has a unique credential handle; updating an accumulator in a tamperproof log to incorporate the credential handle; and facilitating providing access to a service in response to a zero-knowledge proof that the accumulator contains the credential handle. The methods also include generating revocation conditions and initial revocation information; submitting the initial revocation information and the revocation conditions to the tamperproof log; revoking a credential by adding a credential handle of the credential to the initial revocation information; and submitting the updated revocation information to the tamperproof log. Further, the methods include writing to the tamperproof log an audit token that contains an encrypted credential handle, which is encrypted by an auditor's public key that is published on the tamperproof log.
1. A computer-implemented method comprising:
receiving a privacy-preserving attribute-based credential signed with a private key of an issuer, wherein the credential has a first credential handle as a unique attribute;
updating an accumulator in a tamperproof log to incorporate the first credential handle; comparing a size of the accumulator to a consensus ceiling value, wherein the size of the accumulator is a total number of credential handles hashed in the accumulator, corresponding respectively to attribute-based credentials issued by the issuer;
in response to the size of the accumulator exceeding the consensus ceiling value, marking the issuer as malicious and auditing identities of all of the attribute-based credentials with the corresponding credential handles hashed in the accumulator by decrypting the corresponding credential handle of each of the attribute-based credentials using a private key that is shared among a plurality of N auditors, wherein the decryption is performed only upon determining that M of the N auditors are present;
providing access to a service to a first user associated with the first credential handle, in response to a zero-knowledge proof that the accumulator contains the first credential handle and that a published revocation information does not contain the first credential handle; and
denying access to the service to a second user associated with a second credential handle in response to a second zero-knowledge proof that the accumulator does not contain the second credential handle.
2. The method of claim 1 wherein the consensus ceiling value is a per-issuer value.
3. The method of claim 1 further comprising:
changing the consensus ceiling value by agreement among all participants in the system.
4. The method of claim 1 further comprising revoking all credentials issued by the malicious issuer.
5. The method of claim 1 further comprising:
revoking all credentials issued by the malicious issuer.
6. An apparatus comprising:
a memory embodying computer executable instructions; and
at least one processor, coupled to the memory, and operative by the computer executable instructions that cause the apparatus to perform:
receiving a privacy-preserving attribute-based credential signed with a private key of an issuer, wherein the credential has a first credential handle as a unique attribute;
updating an accumulator in a tamperproof log to incorporate the first credential handle; comparing a size of the accumulator to a consensus ceiling value, wherein the size of the accumulator is a total number of credential handles hashed in the accumulator, corresponding respectively to attribute-based credentials issued by the issuer;
in response to the size of the accumulator exceeding the consensus ceiling value, marking the issuer as malicious and auditing identities of all of the attribute-based credentials with the corresponding credential handles hashed in the accumulator by decrypting the corresponding credential handle of each of the attribute-based credentials using a private key that is shared among a plurality of N auditors, wherein the decryption is performed only upon determining that M of the N auditors are present;
providing access to a service to a first user associated with the first credential handle, in response to a zero-knowledge proof that the accumulator contains the first credential handle and that a published revocation information does not contain the first credential handle; and
denying access to the service to a second user associated with a second credential handle in response to a second zero-knowledge proof that the accumulator does not contain the second credential handle.