Firmware validation for encrypted virtual machines
Systems and methods for firmware validation for encrypted virtual machines are disclosed. An example method may include receiving, by a processing device, a request to launch a virtual machine on a host machine; starting, on the host machine, the virtual machine comprising a first firmware and a second firmware; performing, using the first firmware, a first validation process to authenticate the virtual machine with a server of a guest owner; and performing, using the first firmware, a second validation process to validate the second firmware of the virtual machine. In some embodiments, the first firmware includes a shim firmware. In some embodiments, the second firmware includes BIOS or UEFI.
1. A method comprising:
receiving, by a processing device, a request to launch a virtual machine on a host machine;
starting, on the host machine, the virtual machine comprising a first firmware;
performing, using the first firmware, a first validation process to authenticate the virtual machine with an external server;
responsive to loading, by the first firmware, a second firmware to the virtual machine, receiving, by the processing device, secret data associated with the virtual machine, wherein the secret data is encrypted with an encryption key; and
performing, using the first firmware, a second validation process to validate the second firmware of the virtual machine.
2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the secret data comprises data to be used to boot the virtual machine on the host machine.
3. The method of claim 1 , wherein the encryption key is inaccessible to a hypervisor managing the virtual machine.
4. The method of claim 1 , wherein the second firmware comprises at least one of BIOS (Basic Input/output System) or UEFI (United Extensible Firmware Interface).
5. The method of claim 1 , wherein performing the first validation process further comprises:
obtaining a measurement representative of a state of the virtual machine; and
transmitting the measurement to a guest owner.
6. The method of claim 5 , wherein the measurement comprises a hash of contents of a memory associated with the virtual machine.
7. The method of claim 1 , wherein performing the second validation process comprises determining whether the second firmware is signed by a predetermined entity.
8. The method of claim 1 , wherein performing the second validation process comprises determining whether the second firmware is signed using a predetermined key.
9. The method of claim 8 , wherein the first firmware comprises a public key, and wherein the predetermined key comprises a private key matching the public key.
10. A system comprising:
a memory; and
a processor operatively coupled to the memory, the processor to:
receive a request to launch a virtual machine on a host machine;
start, on the host machine, the virtual machine comprising a first firmware;
perform, using the first firmware, a first validation process to authenticate the virtual machine with an external server;
responsive to loading, by the first firmware, a second firmware to the virtual machine, receive, by the processor, secret data associated with the virtual machine, wherein the secret data is encrypted with an encryption key; and
perform, using the first firmware, a second validation process to validate the second firmware of the virtual machine.
11. The system of claim 10 , wherein the secret data comprises data to be used to boot the virtual machine on the host machine.
12. The system of claim 10 , wherein the second firmware comprises at least one of BIOS (Basic Input/output System) or UEFI (United Extensible Firmware Interface).
13. The system of claim 10 , wherein, to perform the first validation process, the processor is further to:
obtain a measurement representative of a state of the virtual machine; and
transmit the measurement to a guest owner.
14. The system of claim 13 , wherein the measurement comprises a hash of contents of a portion of the memory that is associated with the virtual machine.
15. The system of claim 10 , wherein, to perform the second validation process, the processor is further to determine whether the second firmware is signed by a predetermined entity.
16. A non-transitory machine-readable storage medium including instructions that, when accessed by a processing device, cause the processing device to:
receive a request to launch a virtual machine on a host machine;
start, on the host machine, the virtual machine comprising a first firmware;
perform, using the first firmware, a first validation process to authenticate the virtual machine with an external server;
responsive to loading, by the first firmware, a second firmw are to the virtual machine, receive, by the processing device, secret data associated with the virtual machine, wherein the secret data is encrypted with an encryption key; and
perform, using the first firmware, a second validation process to validate the second firmware of the virtual machine.
17. The non-transitory machine-readable storage medium of claim 16 , wherein the secret data comprises data to be used to boot the virtual machine on the host machine.
18. The non-transitory machine-readable storage medium of claim 16 , wherein the encryption key is inaccessible to a hypervisor managing the virtual machine.
19. The non-transitory machine-readable storage medium of claim 16 , wherein the second firmware comprises at least one of BIOS (Basic Input/output System) or UEFI (United Extensible Firmware Interface).
20. The non-transitory machine-readable storage medium of claim 16 , wherein to perform the first validation process, the processing device is further to:
obtain a measurement representative of a state of the virtual machine; and
transmit the measurement to a guest owner.